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Abstract
This thesis investigates the neurocognitive systems involved in emotional 
processing, learning, and decision-making and considers the implications of dysfunction 
in these systems for psychopathy. The introductory chapter reviews the anatomy and 
function of the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala and discusses why impairment in these 
regions may contribute to psychopathy. Chapter 2 introduces an investigation of the 
impact of emotional material on operant behaviour that showed that individuals with 
psychopathy do not display appropriate emotional modulation o f attention. The 
subsequent three chapters investigate the performance of individuals with psychopathy on 
forms of instrumental learning that are dissociable at both the cognitive and neural levels. 
Chapter 3 investigates stimulus-reinforcement learning, a form o f learning thought to rely 
on intact amygdala functioning, and found impaired performance in individuals with 
psychopathy. Chapter 4 presents findings of impaired reversal learning and decision­
making, which are indicative of orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction. Chapter 5 presents an 
investigation of conditional learning, which is a form o f instrumental learning that is not 
dependent on the amygdala. As predicted by theories that emphasize amygdala and 
orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction in psychopathy, both groups performed similarly on the 
acquisition component of the conditional learning task, but individuals with psychopathy 
showed impairment on the second phase of the task when correct performance depended 
on reversing some of the acquired responses. Chapter 6 presents a case study that tests 
the analogy drawn between patients with lesions involving the orbitofrontal cortex and 
those with developmental psychopathy. The results show that the two disorders are 
characterized by sharply contrasting neurocognitive deficits. Chapter 7 reveals a 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study addressing the basic question of 
whether discrete regions within the ventrolateral and orbitofrontal cortices are involved in 
signalling the need for response change and encoding the value of a reinforcer. The 
concluding chapter summarizes the results of the thesis and outlines future avenues of 
research that may arise from the work presented.
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Chapter 1
Psychopathy: Disordered Decisions, Emotion, and Regulation 
1.1: Introduction
Psychopathy is a developmental disorder characterised by severe disruption in 
emotional responding and social functioning. Deficient decision-making, poor planning, 
and an apparent failure to be deterred by past negative consequences of their aberrant 
behaviour are key features of the disorder. Individuals with psychopathy typically 
demonstrate a range of persistently antisocial behaviours, callous affect, and manipulative 
interpersonal style (Hare, 1991). Patients with the disorder fail to appreciate the severity 
and consequences of their condition and show poor or adverse responding to traditional 
forms of treatment (Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1991; Ogloff, Wong, & Greenwood, 1990; 
Rice, Harris, & Cormier, 1992). At the cognitive level, researchers have speculated that 
psychopathy is primarily the result o f dysfunction within systems mediating fear (Gray, 
1987; Lykken, 1995), response modulation (Newman, 1998), decision-making (Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Damasio, 1994), empathy (Blair, 1995; Blair, 
Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1997), and general affective processing (Hare, 1998). However, 
on an individual basis, each explanation addresses only a limited number of clinical 
phenomena, and despite some overlap, the theories do not explain the spectrum of 
empirical findings associated with the disorder. For example, hypotheses that focus on 
empathy dysfunction explain problems identifying facial expressions in this population 
(Blair, Colledge, Murray, & Mitchell, 2001), but do not address difficulties in 
extinguishing a previously rewarded response (Newman, Patterson, & Kosson, 1987). 
Attempts to develop an overarching explanation of the seemingly disparate series of 
findings have led researchers to examine neural substrates. Two structures that have
9
received particular attention are the orbital and ventral regions of the frontal cortex 
(Blumer & Benson, 1975; Damasio, 1994; LaPierre, Braun, & Hodgins, 1995) and the 
amygdala (Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999; Patrick, 1994).
This thesis is an investigation of the potential role that neurocognitive dysfunction 
might play in the presentation of psychopathy. In this chapter, two key neural regions 
implicated in psychopathy, the ventrolateral and orbital frontal cortices and amygdala, 
will be discussed in separate sections. First, empirical and anecdotal accounts of changes 
in personality following damage to these brain regions are reviewed to place recent 
experimental investigations in context. Second, a discussion of the dominant theories of 
function and a brief review of data from animal, patient, and human neuroimaging studies 
relevant to these theories will be presented. The theories and scientific results concerning 
function are discussed with reference to findings involving psychopathic individuals. The 
chapter concludes with an overview of the key questions that instigated the experimental 
work presented in this thesis.
1.2: The Orbital, Medial, and Ventrolateral Regions of the Frontal Cortex
1.2.1: Anatomy
The primate orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is defined as the areas occupying the 
ventral surface of the frontal part of the brain, extending laterally to include Brodmann’s 
areas 10, 11, and 13.
10
Figure 1.1: Brodmann’s areas of the human brain
A) Sagittal view of lateral portions of the left hemisphere
B) Sagittal view of the medial wall of the right hemisphere
The “ventrolateral prefrontal cortex” (VLPFC) corresponds to Brodmann’s area 
47 in humans, and area 12 in macaque monkeys (Petrides & Pandya, 2002); the term 
“OFC” will be used here to refer to Brodmann’s areas 10, 11 anteriorally, 12 caudally, 13 
caudally, and 14 medially (Carmichael & Price, 1995; Petrides & Pandya, 2002; Rolls,
11
2004). Regions 11 and 13, not seen in Figure 1.1, are on the ventral surface between 
areas 47 and 14 medially. Thus, the VLPFC and OFC (VL/OFC) refer collectively to 
medial, ventral, and lateral areas of the frontal cortex to the exclusion of dorsolateral 
preffontal cortex, which includes Brodmann’s areas 8, 9,46, and portions of area 10 
(Fuster, 1997). Projections from neural regions supporting a variety of sensory modalities 
converge in the VL/OFC (Rolls & Baylis, 1994; Ongur & Price, 2000). Using 
sophisticated histochemical techniques, Carmichael and Price (1994) found the VLPFC 
(BA 47/12) could be reliably subdivided into four regions: 12r (located anteriorally 
bordering BA 10 and 46), 12m (posterior to 12r), 121 (just lateral to 12m bordering 45) 
and 12s (the most lateral part of BA 47). A secondary taste cortex was discovered in the 
caudolateral OFC that receives input from the primary taste cortex just posterior to BA47 
(Rolls, Yaxley, & Sienkiewicz, 1990; Ongur & Price, 2000). Olfactory stimulation is 
conveyed to the OFC via the olfactory bulb and olfactory cortex (Rolls & Baylis, 1994). 
Finally, tactile information is projected to the OFC via the primary somatosensory cortex 
(Carmichael & Price, 1995) and converges in 12m. The OFC also has strong connections 
with the amygdala (Amaral, Price, Pitkanen, & Carmichael, 1992; Price, 2003), which has 
rich connections with ventrolateral, ventromedial, and medial regions of PFC (Ongur & 
Price, 2000). Connections with the entorhinal and cingulate cortex (Insausti, Amaral, & 
Cowan, 1987) as well as the ventral tegmental area and caudate nucleus are also prevalent 
(Carmichael & Price, 1995).
1.2.2: Clinical correlates o f  OFC dysfunction
The suggestion that OFC dysfunction contributes to psychopathy is based on 
clinical observations and empirical reports of patients who have acquired lesions to this
12
area. One of the earliest reports o f behavioural problems following frontal lobe damage 
involved a 19th century rail worker who, following an accident, showed a dramatic 
change in personality and emotional reactivity (Harlow, 1868). Such patients often 
undergo a marked alteration in their personality that includes behavioural disinhibition, an 
inability to form realistic plans, and a failure to adjust their course in response to negative 
prospects or consequences (Blumer & Benson, 1975; Damasio, 1994; Rolls, 1996). 
Clinical accounts of patients with acquired lesions describe previously high-functioning 
individuals who sustain a head injury and subsequently suffer from a litany o f social and 
behavioural problems including difficulties maintaining employment, financial 
recklessness, inappropriate sexual behaviour, aggression, and unrealistic planning 
(Damasio, 1994; Homak et al., 2003; Homak, Rolls, & Wade, 1996; Rolls, Homak,
Wade, & McGrath, 1994). The apparent similarities between patients with acquired OFC 
damage and developmental psychopathic individuals have prompted some to refer to the 
former as “pseudo psychopaths” (Blumer & Benson, 1975) or “acquired sociopaths” 
(Damasio, 1994). The changes in personality and affect often manifest in poor decision­
making and aggression. Research involving neuroimaging and animal models 
supplement the clinical accounts and implicate the OFC in skills related to adaptive social 
and emotional functioning such as expression recognition, decision-making, response 
change or extinction, and reward processing. In the sections that follow, experiments that 
provide evidence for dysfunction in each o f these domains will be reviewed.
1.2.3: Neurocognitive investigations and theories related to OFC function
In line with suggestions of reduced empathy (Barrash, Tranel, & Anderson, 2000), 
patients with OFC lesions show multimodal emotional expression recognition deficits. 
The OFC cortex has anatomical connections with regions that are involved in
13
representing facial and vocal expressions, such as the temporal lobe (Rolls, 1999). 
Single-unit recording studies reveal neuronal activity in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex in the presence of negative, but not positive or neutral, visual stimuli (Kawasaki et 
al., 2001). Neurons also exist within the ventral prefrontal cortex that are selectively 
responsive to primate vocalizations (Romanski & Goldman-Rakic, 2002). Imaging data 
have shown greater activation of orbital regions for emotional rather than neutral vocal 
expressions (Morris, Scott, & Dolan, 1999; Phillips et al., 1998). Neuroimaging data 
suggest that depictions of emotional facial expressions activate regions of the VL/OFC 
(Blair et al., 1999; Kesler/West et al., 2001; Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel, & Przuntek,
1998). For example, the VL/OFC shows greater activation for positive versus neutral 
expressions (Dolan et al., 1996) as well as greater activation to angry than to sad facial 
expressions (Blair et al., 1999). Studies with patients provide at least partial support for 
the imaging results. Thus, individuals with lesions to the area show difficulties 
identifying vocal and facial expressions of emotion (Homak et al., 1996). However, a 
later study failed to replicate these findings in patients with bilateral OFC damage 
(Homak et al., 2003); instead, vocal affect recognition impairments were evident in 
patients with lesions outside of the OFC, such as the anterior cingulate and more dorsal 
medial regions of the prefrontal cortex (BA 9; Homak et al., 2003).
The theoretical formulation o f OFC function that best accounts for data 
concerning deficient recognition and responding to vocal and facial expressions of 
emotion is the Social Response Reversal theory (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). The Social 
Response Reversal explanation emphasizes the communicative role of facial expressions 
and suggests that the OFC responds to negative emotional expressions to monitor, assess, 
and adjust behaviour for ongoing and future interactions (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). The 
theory extends this activation to include not only negative cues, but also situations that
14
have become associated with the expression of these cues. Accordingly, significant 
lateral OFC activation is reported when participants were asked to process scenarios that 
were likely to result in anger in others (Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 2002). 
Individuals who have sustained damage to the OFC are comparably insensitive to these 
social cues, and so cannot incorporate signals from this system to adapt their interactions 
to changes in their social environment.
The VL/OFC is also involved in making decisions when the future consequences 
of responding are unknown. Two paradigms have been recently devised to investigate 
decision-making: the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Lee, 1999), and the Cambridge Gambling Task (Rogers, et al., 1999a;
1999b). Both are gambling tasks in which the reward outcomes cannot be precisely 
determined, but rather, are probabilistically estimated. The lack o f certainty regarding the 
outcome is designed to mimic real-life decision-making. In the Iowa Gambling Task, 
participants select from four decks of cards each with a different rate and value of 
reinforcement. Unknown to the participant, two o f the decks are disadvantageous; 
selecting from the decks will render high reward, but even higher punishment resulting in 
a net loss. Two of the decks are advantageous; consistently selecting from these decks 
will result in a net gain. A Positron Emission Tomography (PET) study has shown 
ventrolateral and OFC activation (BA 11 and 47) during the performance of the Iowa 
Gambling Task, but also activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate 
(Ernst et al., 2002). Patients with OFC damage persist in making risky, disadvantageous 
responses while healthy individuals learn to avoid such selections (Anderson, Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, skin conductance responses generated in anticipation o f disadvantageous 
choices were significantly lower in patients with acquired lesions.
15
In the Cambridge Gambling Task, participants make probabilistic judgements 
about whether a token is hidden under a red or blue box (Rogers, et al., 1999a). On each 
trial, the ratio of red to blue boxes varies, and can be 9:1, 8:2, 7:3, or 6:4 each time.
There are two variants of the task. In one variant, the reinforcement levels are pre­
specified (choosing the colour with the lowest probability always yields a higher reward, 
but also the potential for an equally high punishment). In a second variant, potential 
wagers are displayed on the screen serially in ascending or descending order of 
magnitude. The participant is free to select the wager when it appears on the screen. The 
task therefore synthesizes the conflict that accompanies risky decisions when dealing with 
uncertain outcomes. Selecting a high wager early for a low probability reward or a low 
wager early for a high probability reward is considered an indication of impulsivity. A 
PET study o f the Cambridge Gambling Task reports activity in the ventral regions of 
OFC including Brodmann’s areas 10, 11, and 47 (Rogers, et al., 1999b). Patients with 
lesions to the OFC show decision-making performance decrements relative to 
comparison individuals (Mavaddat, Kirkpatrick, Rogers, & Sahakian, 2000; Rogers et al., 
1999a); however, a recent study failed to replicate this result in a sample of patients with 
unilateral OFC lesions (Manes et al., 2002).
Damasio (1994) suggests that the impaired decision-making of the kind seen in 
gambling tasks results when “somatic markers” fail to provide the affective colouring that 
normally guides behaviour in healthy individuals. According to the somatic marker 
hypothesis, the OFC is involved in integrating bodily feedback to influence decision­
making (Damasio, 1994). The theory suggests that feedback from bodily states are 
conveyed to somatosensory structures which help precipitate judgements about the value 
o f a particular response option. This link is thought to be possible in two ways. When 
this occurs via actual bodily feedback (“body loop”), somatic markers are conveyed from
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the periphery to the somatosensory structures where they influence behaviour. 
Alternatively, the same information can be conveyed via virtual bodily feedback (an “as- 
if  body loop”) whereby the body is bypassed and instead representations of bodily 
responding formed on the basis o f previously conditioned associations would influence 
behaviour via the somatosensory structures. Effectively, the somatic marker labels a 
particular response option as either advantageous or disadvantageous, thereby providing 
an automated index of the incentive value o f the response. The authors suggest that the 
generation of an autonomic response (or somatic marker) when considering response 
options is crucial for adaptive decision-making and behavioural control; the failure to do 
so contributes to the pattern of maladaptive and often antisocial behaviour observed 
following OFC damage.
Perhaps related to the results concerning decision-making, it has been suggested 
that the OFC is responsible for adapting behaviour to changes in reinforcement 
contingencies (Rolls, 1996). Electrophysiological studies with non-human primates 
provide evidence for how reinforcement values may be flexibly coded in the OFC to 
facilitate relearning. For example, the involvement o f the OFC in the motivational 
control o f goal-directed behaviour is reinforced by findings that neurons within this 
region discriminate between reinforcers based on the animal’s relative preference among 
available options (Tremblay & Schultz, 1999). Neurons within the OFC have been 
identified that respond selectively to a particular food and cease responding when the 
animal is fed to satiety (Critchley & Rolls, 1996). However, the OFC is not crucial for all 
forms of motivational responding. For example, monkeys with lesions to the OFC fail to 
alter behaviour to a reversal of reinforcement valence during visual discrimination, but 
can learn to shift attention to a previously irrelevant dimension of a compound stimulus 
and respond accordingly for reward (a process called “attentional set-shifting;” Dias et al.,
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1996). Conversely, lesions to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex result in impaired 
attentional set-shifting, but intact response-reversal (Dias, et al. 1996). Imaging studies 
also implicate the OFC in response change. For example, regions of VL/OFC (BA 47) 
are activated before response change in a probabilistic response-reversal paradigm in 
which selecting the correct stimulus results in reward on most but not all trials (Cools, 
Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002; O ’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Homak, & Andrews, 
2001). In classic response-reversal paradigms involving humans, participants learn that 
responding to one of two simultaneously presented objects results in reward, and that 
responding to the other results in punishment. When the reward contingencies o f the two 
stimuli are reversed unexpectedly, patients with OFC lesions show impaired ability to 
cease making a previously rewarding response in favour of a previously punishing 
response relative to patients with lesions to other regions (Berlin, Rolls, & Kischka, 2004; 
Fellows & Farah, 2003; Homak et al., 2004; Rolls et al., 1994).
Based on findings related to response change, Rolls has suggested that the primary 
role of the OFC is to allow for the modification of behaviour in order to carry out 
effective reward and punishment-related responses, particularly when reinforcement 
contingencies change (1996; 2000). Thus, the “response-reversal” explanation suggests 
that this system is crucial in altering previously acquired stimulus-reward associations 
when they are no longer appropriate. Interestingly, Rolls’ (1996; 2000) conceptualisation 
can also explain the impaired performance of patients with OFC lesions on the Iowa 
Gambling Task. In this task, all initial responses are rewarding. Indeed, the 
disadvantageous decks initially appear to be preferable because they offer the highest 
magnitude of reward. It becomes apparent that the decks with the highest magnitude of 
reward also offer an even higher magnitude of punishment only after a participant has 
made several selections from a particular deck. By then, an initial stimulus-reward
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association had has been made, and an adjustment in responding is required to show 
adequate performance on the task. Accordingly, a response-reversal deficit may result in 
difficulties shifting responding from the ostensibly high magnitude reward decks to the 
truly advantageous decks. Rolls (1999) suggests that difficulties altering behaviour to 
non-reward can explain both the behavioural problems (tantrums and antisocial 
behaviour) and personality characteristics (emotional lability) seen in patients with OFC 
lesions.
1.2.4: Dysfunction within the VL/OFC and aggressive disorders
Taken together, the theories described provide reasonable accounts of the data 
concerning expression recognition, decision-making, and response change. However, it is 
not immediately apparent how these deficits would lead to heightened levels of 
aggression. Investigations have indeed linked metabolic and structural abnormalities in 
the prefrontal regions to aggression in general, and more specifically, to reactive 
aggression (best characterised by a frustrated temper tantrum rather than goal-directed 
instrumental aggression). Thus, Raine and his colleagues have used PET techniques to 
reveal reduced frontal glucose metabolism in violent offenders (Raine, Buchsbaum, & 
LaCasse, 1997; Raine et al., 1994; Raine et al., 1998). A volumetric analysis of the 
frontal lobes using MRI revealed an 11% reduction in grey matter volume in individuals 
with antisocial personality disorder (Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, LaCasse, & Colletti, 2000). 
Soderstrom and his colleagues (2000) report reduced regional cerebral blood flow in the 
frontal lobes in a group o f non-psychotic violent offenders in the absence of structural 
damage. More pertinently, studies that have explicitly investigated the incidence of 
reactive aggression in their sample report a particular link between reduced prefrontal 
activity and reactive aggression (Volkow & Tancredi, 1987; Volkow et al., 1995). Raine
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and his colleagues (1998) show a dissociation between reactive (referred to as 
“affective”) and instrumental (referred to as “predatory”) offenders. They found that 
while reactive offenders showed reduced left and right prefrontal functioning, 
instrumental offenders showed prefrontal functioning similar to the comparison group.
Recently, a unified model, the Integrated Emotion System (IES) was developed 
that describes how the neurocognitive deficits found in patients with OFC lesions can 
lead to reactive aggression (Blair, 2004). This conceptualisation draws on data from 
studies with non-human mammals suggesting that a neural circuit involving the OFC 
exists that plays a role in mediating reactive aggression (Panksepp, 1998). Blair (2004) 
suggests that in humans, the OFC modulates a subcortical system involved in reactive 
aggression as a function of the responding o f the response-reversal (RR; Rolls, 2000) and 
social response-reversal (SRR; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000) systems. Reactive aggression is 
thought to be regulated by neural circuitry that humans share with other mammalian 
species and that is crucial for an organism’s response to threat in the environment (Gregg 
& Siegel, 2001; Panksepp, 1971). This circuit runs from the medial amygdaloidal areas 
and through the stria terminalis to the medial hypothalamus, and down to the 
periaqueductal grey (PAG). The OFC regulates the responsiveness of this threat system 
through projections to the medial hypothalamus and medial nucleus of the amygdala 
(Gregg & Siegel, 2001; Panksepp, 1998). Effectively, function in the OFC can either 
diminish or augment subcortical “threat system” responding, thereby increasing or 
decreasing the probability of reactive aggression.
The RR system is potentially implicated in modulating the subcortical threat 
systems related to reactive aggression due to its role in providing flexible responding to 
changes in the reinforcement value of stimuli (Rolls, 2000). Frustration, thought to be 
one o f the precursors to reactive aggression (Berkowitz, 1993), results when a behaviour
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initiated to obtain reinforcement does not result in the expected reward. Consequently, 
deficits in the system involved in encoding expectations, violations of these expectations, 
or the alteration of behaviour in response to these violations may lead to increased 
frustration and subsequently, a higher risk for reactive aggression.
The SRR system is implicated in the modulation of the subcortical threat system 
because of its role in modifying behaviour as a consequence o f negative social cues in the 
environment. Blair (2004) suggests that the activation of the SRR also occurs as a 
function of the agent’s position in the social hierarchy. For example, in “sham” rage 
experiments, animals who have undergone neural stimulation will display reactive 
aggression to more submissive animals, but not to those in more dominant positions 
within the hierarchy (Alexander & Perachio, 1973). The implication is that in humans, 
displays of social disapproval or anger from super-ordinates will result in avoidance, the 
elicitation of distress cues, or other submissive displays. In contrast, the same aggressive 
cues exhibited by subordinates will result in confrontational behaviour. Individuals with 
dysfunction in the OFC affecting the SRR system will show poor modulation of 
subcortical threat system due to insensitivity to displays o f social disapproval and poor 
processing o f the status of individuals engaged in the social interaction. At present, it is 
unclear to what extent the neuroanatomical systems involved in RR and SRR overlap. 
Although probably anatomically similar, the primary difference between the RR and the 
SRR system is that the latter incorporates information with respect to status within the 
dominance hierarchy (a social construct) to modulate responding. In contrast, the RR 
system alters behaviour purely on the basis of the incentive value o f the response without 
respect to social context. Putting one’s feet up on a desk can be a rewarding experiencing 
and would therefore not activate the RR system. However, recognizing the impropriety 
of doing so on the department head’s desk would be facilitated by the SRR system.
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It has been suggested that OFC dysfunction contributes to developmental 
psychopathy (Anderson et al., 1999; LaPierre et al., 1995; Mitchell, Colledge, Leonard, & 
Blair, 2002). In addition to the clinical similarities, psychopathic individuals have shown 
difficulties in laboratory tasks that are thought to be sensitive to OFC dysfunction. For 
example, LaPierre and her colleagues (1995) report response-reversal deficits on a go/no- 
go task in which participants first acquired a prepotent response, and then were asked to 
withhold that response on a second phase of the task (LaPierre et al., 1995). Participants 
also showed difficulties on two other proposed indices of frontal functioning: olfactory 
discrimination, and qualitative errors on the Porteus Maze Task. Individuals with 
psychopathy have also shown difficulties with extinguishing a previously rewarded 
response on the One-Pack Card Playing Task (Newman et al., 1987). At odds with these 
findings, one study has shown that individuals with psychopathy did not exhibit decision­
making deficits on the Iowa Gambling Task (Schmitt, Brinkley, & Newman, 1999); 
however, as the authors note, this study contained important procedural differences to the 
ones that Bechara and his colleagues implemented (Bechara et al., 1999).
Given the apparent similarities in the presentation o f developmental psychopathy 
and acquired sociopathy, it is not surprising that that the two are surmised to have a 
common aetiology. However, a crucial difference exists in the type of aggression 
exhibited by these two patient groups. The type of aggression most often seen in 
individuals with lesions involving the OFC is reactive in nature (Anderson et al., 1999; 
Anderson, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Grafman, Schwab, Warden, Pridgen, & 
Brown, 1996). Reactive aggression is described as a non-goal-directed response to 
frustration or a perceived threat. In contrast, instrumental aggression is goal-directed and 
usually aimed at material gain (Berkowitz, 1993). Although also showing high rates of 
reactive aggression, instrumental aggression has been identified as a common, and more
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defining feature o f  psychopathy (Cornell et al., 1996; Williamson, Hare, & Wong, 1987). 
In contrast, reactive but not instrumental aggression is evident in individuals with 
acquired sociopathy (Blair, 2004). Unlike reactive aggression, instrumental aggression is 
not necessarily accompanied by high emotional intensity. It has been suggested that 
while OFC dysfunction may contribute to some o f  the features o f the disorder, a key 
contribution to psychopathy is abnormality within the amygdala (Blair, 2003a, 2003b).
1.3: T he A m ygdala
1.3.1: Anatomy
The established research suggests that the amygdala plays a pivotal role in 
emotion. Located bilaterally deep within the temporal lobes, the cluster o f  nuclei now 
referred collectively as the “amygdala” was first so-named by Burdach in 1819 
(Aggleton, 2000).
Figure 1.2: The amygdala
A) Coronal slice taken from an MRI structural scan showing the amygdala in red located 
bilaterally in the temporal lobes
B) Sagittal view showing the left amygdala.
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The amygdala has connections to subcortical and cortical structures involved in 
decision-making, reward processing, attention, memory, and sensory representation.
Some of the major subcortical connections o f the amygdala include the nucleus 
accumbens, olfactory structures, regions o f the hypothalamus, thalamus and 
periaqueductal grey as well as the ventral tegmentum (Aggleton, 2000; Amaral et al.,
1992). The cortical connections of the amygdala include regions of the frontal cortex 
(orbitoffontal, dorsolateral, medial), the insula, and anterior cingulate. The connectivity 
o f the amygdala has been described as involving three main systems (Price, 2003). First, 
a system of inputs predominantly associated with the forebrain provides sensory 
information originating in the olfactory, taste, visceral pathways, posterior thalamus, and 
sensory association cortex pathways. Second, a system characterised as a series o f 
reciprocal projections from the amygdala to the hypothalamus and brain stem, which 
modulates visceral function due to emotional stimuli. Third, a system involved in 
emotional behaviour and mood, which involves the ventromedial frontal, rostral insular, 
rostral temporal cortical areas, medial thalamus, and ventromedial basal ganglia. The rich 
connectivity o f the amygdala accounts for its functional diversity, and its ability to affect 
a range o f behaviours and cognitive processes.
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1.3.2: Clinical correlates o f  amygdala dysfunction
Despite its clear role in emotion, a link between damage to the amygdala and 
aggression has not been consistently demonstrated. This failure to establish a link may be 
indicative of the complex interaction between developmental factors and the functions of 
the amygdala. Abnormalities such as inappropriate social interactions, increased 
withdrawal, and abnormal contacts have been noted in monkeys with early lesions to the 
amygdala (Maikova, Mishkin, Suomi, & Bachelvalier, 1997). Kluver-Bucy syndrome, 
characterised by reduced affect, hyper-orality, hyper-sexuality and reduced fear of 
threatening objects, was first noted by the researchers after which it is named in monkeys 
with lesions involving the amygdala (Kluver & Bucy, 1997). However, the earlier lesion 
studies inducing Kluver-Bucy syndrome have been criticised. The lesion techniques used 
often destroy not only the amygdala, but also fibres passing through the amygdala and 
adjacent neural regions. Studies utilizing more advanced and selective lesion techniques 
using ibotenic acid, which destroys neurons of the amygdala but spares the fibres passing 
through it, have suggested a more complex role of the amygdala in social behaviour 
(Prather et al., 2001). Specifically, adult and neonatal monkeys with bilateral amygdala 
lesions show reduced fear o f threatening stimuli such as snakes. However, adult monkeys 
with amygdala lesions also show heightened affiliative social behaviour (Emery et al., 
2001). Monkeys receiving lesions at two weeks o f age can generate appropriate facial 
expressions and play behaviour, but show heightened fear behaviour during dyadic social 
situations (Prather et al., 2001). It is suggested therefore, that the amygdala plays a role 
in evaluating the “safety” o f a social situation, but is not crucial for social cognition more 
generally.
Abnormalities in social behaviour have been noted in humans following lesions to 
the amygdala, and these abnormalities tend to be more severe with earlier onset (Fine &
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Blair, 2000; Maikova et al., 1997b). Kluver-Bucy syndrome has been associated with 
amygdala lesions in humans (Hayman, Rexer, Pavol, Strite, & Meyers, 1998; Yoneoka et 
al., 2004), as has reductions in the experience of anger and fear (Sprengelmeyer et al.,
1999). The clinical presentation of patients with amygdala lesions differs from that 
produced by OFC lesions in type and consistency. For example, anomalies in amygdala 
function have been associated with depression (Drevets et al., 1992), Alzheimer’s disease 
(Chow & Cummings, 2000), schizophrenia (Fudge, Powers, Haber, & Caine, 1998), and 
autism spectrum disorders (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). Bilateral amygdalectomies have 
been reported to decrease aggressive behaviour in 70 to 76% of cases (Ramamurthi, 
1988). However, severe amygdalar atrophy has also been associated with aggression in a 
subgroup of patients with temporal lobe epilepsy (van Elst, Woermann, Lemieux, 
Thompson, & Trimble, 2000). It would therefore appear that damage to the amygdala 
might either increase or decrease the probability of aggression depending perhaps upon 
contextual or other parameters. At present, the specific parameters are unclear.
1.3.3: Neurocognitive investigations and theories related to amygdala function
Empirical data implicate the amygdala in emotional expression processing, 
aversive conditioning, instrumental learning, and the modulation of attention and 
memory. Patients with lesions to the amygdala have been shown to be impaired in the 
recognition of emotional facial expressions, particularly fear (Adolphs, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 2001; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Adolphs et al., 1999; 
Anderson & Phelps, 1998). Sophie Scott and her colleagues have reported impaired 
recognition of vocal expressions of fear and anger in a patient with bilateral amygdala 
lesions (Scott et al., 1997). However, other studies involving patients with unilateral and 
bilateral lesions have not found significant differences relative to comparison groups
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(Adolphs & Tranel, 1999; Adolphs et al., 2001; Anderson & Phelps, 1998; Anderson & 
Phelps, 1998). Although there have been suggestions that amygdala dysfunction results 
in a generalized recognition impairment (Rapcsak et al., 2000), these studies often 
involve patients with lesions extending beyond the amygdala. Imaging studies suggest a 
more specialized role for the region; modulated activity has been noted particularly with 
fearful (Breiter et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1996; Phillips et al., 1998; Phillips et al., 1997), 
sad (Blair et al., 1999) and happy (Breiter et al., 1996) facial expressions.
One of the earliest and most consistent findings in the literature regarding the 
amygdala is its involvement in aversive and appetitive conditioning. Animal studies 
show that lesions of the central nucleus of the amygdala impair processing of conditioned 
stimuli (CS), unconditioned stimuli (US), and unconditioned stimulus-response (UR) 
associations for both appetitive and aversive stimuli. For appetitive stimuli, lesions of the 
amygdala will result in impaired conditioning as indexed by several behavioural 
analogues: approach or orienting behaviours, reinforcer devaluation, pavlovian 
instrumental transfer, and impaired second order conditioning or second order 
instrumental responding (Everitt, Cardinal, Parkinson, & Robbins, 2003). Studies 
involving human participants also show that lesions o f the amygdala disrupt the 
acquisition of CS-US associations. For example, it has been shown that lesions to the 
amygdala, but not the OFC, disrupt the development o f a conditioned response to a CS 
predicting white noise (Bechara et al., 1999; Bechara et al., 1995; LaBar, LeDoux, 
Spencer, & Phelps, 1995). The results involving patients are supported by imaging 
studies implicating the amygdala in the acquisition of fear conditioning (LaBar, Gatenby, 
Gore, LeDoux, & Phelps, 1998; Veit et al., 2002).
The amygdala is necessary for some (e.g., passive avoidance learning), but not all 
(e.g., object discrimination learning and conditional learning), forms of instrumental
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learning (Baxter & Murray, 2002). In their recent review, Baxter and Murray (2002) 
distinguish instrumental learning tasks that require the amygdala from those that do not. 
They argue that some instrumental learning tasks require the formation of stimulus- 
reinforcement associations and that the amygdala is necessarily involved in the formation 
of these associations. In contrast, other instrumental learning tasks require the formation 
of sXmmhxs-response associations and that the amygdala is not crucially involved in the 
formation of these associations. For example, in passive avoidance paradigms, 
participants learn to respond to rewarding stimuli and avoid responding to stimuli that 
give rise to punishment. Consequently, passive avoidance learning is thought to rely on 
the formation of stimulus-reinforcement associations: approach (respond to) stimuli 
associated with reward and avoid (don’t respond to) stimuli associated with punishment 
(Baxter & Murray, 2002). Lesions o f the amygdala disrupt passive avoidance learning 
(Ambrogi Lorenzini, Bucherelli, Giachetti, Mugnai, & Tassoni, 1991).
In contrast, Baxter and Murray (2002) argue that object discrimination and 
conditional learning are solved through the formation o f a stimulus-response association. 
Object discrimination learning involves learning to respond to one of two objects (one 
rewarded and one not rewarded) repeatedly presented in a pair-wise fashion over a series 
o f trials. Thus, the individual can treat the presentation as if  it were a compound 
stimulus: stimulus A/B yields reward if you press B. Conditional learning involves 
learning to perform a particular motor response in the presence of a particular stimulus 
(press left button if  green light is on, but right button if red light is on). In conditional 
learning, the individual learns to make response 1 if  stimulus A is present and response 2 
if  stimulus B is present. These two forms of learning differ from stimulus-reinforcement 
learning because each stimulus is effectively associated with a positive or a negative 
result. Each stimulus is associated with reward provided that the appropriate response is
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made in its presence; thus, rather than a stimulus -reinforcement association being made to 
solve the problem, a stimulus-response association is sufficient. Lesions of the amygdala 
do not disrupt object discrimination or conditional learning paradigms (Baxter & Murray, 
2002; Bums, Everitt, & Robbins, 1999; Maikova, Gaffan, & Murray, 1997; Petrides, 
1985b; 1997).
The amygdala also plays an important role in preferentially allocating attentional 
resources to emotional stimuli in the environment. Recent formulations suggest that 
attention is a process involving the competition between multiple stimuli for neural 
representation (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 1998). Which stimuli win this 
competition and are “attended to” are a product o f both bottom-up sensory processes such 
as emotional salience and top-down influences such as directed attention (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995). Past research has implicated the amygdala in processes involving 
enhanced attention for emotional information relative to neutral information, even if  the 
emotional information is peripheral to ongoing behaviour (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; 
Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). Thus, the 
amygdala is crucially involved in increasing the perceptual saliency of emotional events, 
thereby allowing such stimuli to gain preferential access to attentional resources 
(Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003; Anderson & Phelps, 2001; 
Vuilleumier et al., 2001).
1.3.4: Dysfunction within the amygdala and psychopathy
The data implicating amygdala dysfunction in psychopathic individuals is 
considerable (Blair, 2001; Blair et al., 1999; Patrick, 1994). At the anatomical level, 
structural MRI has revealed an inverse relationship between degree of psychopathic 
affective and interpersonal traits and amygdala volume (Tiihonen et al., 2000).
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Abnormalities reported in functional imaging studies of psychopathy include reduced 
amygdala activity both during an emotional memory task (Kiehl et al., 2001), and during 
an aversive conditioning task (Veit et al., 2002). On behavioural measures, individuals 
with psychopathy show a similar performance pattern as patients with lesions involving 
the amygdala. Consistent with predictions generated from an amygdala dysfunction 
explanation of psychopathy, children and adults with the disorder show facial expression 
recognition deficits (Blair et al., 2001b; Blair et al., 2004b; Kosson, Suchy, Mayer, & 
Libby, 2002). Evidence suggests that these deficits cross sensory modalities. In a study 
using auditory emotional expression stimuli, adults with psychopathy demonstrated 
impaired recognition of fearful vocal affect (Blair et al., 2002).
The abnormalities in cognition extend to conditioning. Like individuals with 
amygdala lesions, individuals with psychopathy failed to show a conditioned response to 
stimuli that predict shock (Lykken, 1957). Similar results were obtained by Hare and 
Quinn, who found reduced skin conductance responding to a tone that had previously 
predicted shock (Hare & Quinn, 1971). Another study reported that the event related 
potentials of individuals with psychopathy did not differentiate between a CS+ and a CS- 
(Flor, Birbaumer, Hermann, Ziegler, & Patrick, 2002), and an imaging study has shown 
reduced amygdala activity in psychopathic individuals to stimuli predicting pain (Veit et 
al., 2002). Psychopathic individuals also show reduced augmentation of startle to 
aversive auditory stimuli preceded by negative images; however, they show appropriate 
attenuated startle responding when the same auditory stimuli are preceded by positive 
images (Levenston, Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 2000; Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 1993).
Early explorations of instrumental learning in individuals with psychopathy signal 
impaired performance in at least some forms. In line with suggestions of amygdala 
dysfunction, individuals with psychopathy show impairment in passive avoidance
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learning (Blair et al., 2004a; Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman & Schmitt, 1998). 
However, there is a paucity of research concerning other forms of instrumental learning in 
this patient population.
1.4: Testing the VL/OFC and Amygdala Dysfunction Hypotheses of Psychopathy
1.4.1: Aim o f  the present thesis
The present thesis was designed to assess the hypothesis that the cognitive 
impairment evident in patients with psychopathy is attributable to dysfunction within the 
VL/OFC and the amygdala.
1.4.2: Experiments associated with VL/OFC function
The VL/OFC is involved in reversal learning (Clark, Cools, & Robbins, 2004; 
Cools et al., 2002; O ’Doherty et al., 2001a; Rolls et al., 1994) and decision-making 
(Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 1999). In order to examine VL/OFC function, 
experiments involving response change and decision-making were conducted. Chapter 3 
investigates the reversals of stimulus-reinforcement associations on an instrumental 
learning task. Chapter 4 examines reversals in an object discrimination task, and presents 
an experiment investigating the performance of individuals with psychopathy on the Iowa 
Gambling Task. Chapter 5 examines reversals of conditional (stimulus-response) 
learning.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, similarities have been drawn between 
individuals with acquired sociopathy and those with developmental psychopathy 
(Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999). In Chapter 6, C.L., a case of 
acquired sociopathy is presented. Following an injury involving the frontal lobes during
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adolescence, CL underwent a dramatic change in personality accompanied by unchecked 
violence, sexual deviance, and a striking callous emotional style. CL’s performance on a 
battery of standardised and experimental tasks investigating expression recognition, 
decision-making, instrumental learning, relearning, and social cognition is compared to 
forensic and community control groups.
In the context o f examining instrumental relearning deficits in patients with 
psychopathy, a more basic question emerged concerning the processes involved in 
response-reversal. Human studies implicating the OFC in instrumental relearning 
typically involve abstract secondary reinforcement. Most studies involve situations in 
which participants must change their responding due to a reversal in reward contingencies 
associated with available response options. Patterns of OFC activation to these changing 
reinforcement contingencies are interpreted as evidence of OFC involvement in encoding 
the reward value of stimuli. However, little is known about the activation o f OFC in 
situations where abrupt changes in the value of reinforcement occur in the absence of 
demands to shift responding. Chapter 7 presents an event-related fMRI study 
investigating neural activation to changes in the value of reinforcement together with, and 
in the absence of, response change. The aim was to address the continuing question of 
whether the pattern of neural responding to changes in valence is equivalent or 
dissociable from that associated with response change.
1.4.3: Experiments associated with amygdala function
Due to increasing evidence suggesting that amygdala dysfunction may be a key 
component of psychopathy, experimental tasks thought to be sensitive to amygdala 
dysfunction were conducted. Thus, in addition to decision-making and reversal learning, 
the following chapters will examine the modulation of attention by emotion, stimulus-
32
reinforcement learning, and expression recognition. The amygdala is thought to play a 
critical role in the modulation o f attention by emotion (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Dolan 
& Vuilleumier, 2003; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). As a function of this process, the 
introduction of an emotional component not relevant to ongoing operant behaviour can 
have a detrimental impact on performance. An experimental manipulation that utilizes 
emotional material as distracters should therefore yield superior performance in patients 
with disorders of emotional processing such as psychopathy. Chapter 2 presents data 
from such a study.
Recent evidence suggests that different forms of instrumental learning may 
depend on dissociable neural substrates (Baxter & Murray, 2002). It remains unknown 
whether individuals with psychopathy show impaired performance on instrumental 
learning tasks that are not thought to rely on intact amygdala functioning, such as object 
discrimination and conditional learning. Chapter 3 extends previous suggestions that 
individuals with psychopathy show impaired stimulus-reinforcement learning in an 
instrumental learning task with multiple conditioned stimuli. Chapters 5 and 6 address 
this issue further by including behavioural tasks that contain components that assess the 
generalisability of the instrumental learning deficit in patients with psychopathy.
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Chapter 2
Emotional Responding at the Expense of Cognition
2.1: Introduction
A major focus of neurocognitive investigations involving individuals with 
psychopathy has been on the emotional basis of the disorder. It has been suggested that a 
disturbance in the affective processes involved in socialisation can lead to the 
development of psychopathy (Blair, 1995; Blair, 2003; Frick, 1995; Lykken, 1995). 
However, although playing a crucial role in many adaptive cognitive functions, emotional 
responding can also interfere with ongoing behaviour. For example, the introduction of 
threatening stimuli can result in the cessation of ongoing goal-directed activity. Early 
animal research has shown that a conditioned stimulus (CS) that predicts shock disrupts 
adaptive operant behaviour in rats (Estes & Skinner, 1941). Similar processes have been 
shown in human subjects. For example, the presentation of a CS that previously 
predicted a burst of white noise resulted in increased response latency during completion 
of the Tower of Toronto puzzle (Salgado et al., 2000). Vuilleumier and his colleagues 
demonstrated that the presentation of fearful faces in the periphery whilst participants 
made same/different judgements on houses resulted in increased response latency even 
when participants were explicitly instructed to ignore the peripheral face stimuli 
(Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). Finally, a study investigating pictorial 
stimulus processing revealed slower responding to images with negative relative to 
neutral content despite the fact that valence was incidental to performing the cognitive 
task (Simpson et al., 2000).
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These data suggest that the introduction of an emotional component not relevant 
to ongoing behaviour can have a detrimental impact on performance through at least two 
dissociable processes. One possibility is that emotional material disrupts operant 
behaviour by eliciting an incompatible response (i.e., freezing/conditioned suppression). 
Gray has proposed a two-factor learning model that provides a theoretical basis for 
conditioned freezing/suppression. It postulates that a behavioural activation system 
(BAS) exists to initiate approach behaviours to appetitive stimuli, and that a behavioural 
inhibition system (BIS) exists to inhibit behaviour when cues for punishment are in the 
environment (Gray, 1987). At the neural level, both conditioned freezing and suppression 
are disrupted following lesions of the lateral and central nuclei of the amygdala in animal 
studies (LeDoux, Cicchetti, Xagoraris, & Romanski, 1990; Killcross, Robbins, & Everitt, 
1997). This process, as conceptualised by Gray, applies to negative, but not positive 
stimuli, however.
A second possibility is that processing emotional stimuli, regardless of its valence, 
interferes with goal-relevant stimulus processing. For example, the “integrated 
competition hypothesis” (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 1998) of attention 
suggests that competition for neural representation in visually responsive brain systems 
(sensory and motor as well as cortical and subcortical) occurs when multiple stimuli are 
present. Both bottom-up sensory processes such as emotional salience and top-down 
influences such as directed attention determine which stimuli win this competition 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Past research has implicated the amygdala in processes 
involving enhanced attention for emotional information relative to neutral information 
even when the emotional information is peripheral to ongoing behaviour (Anderson & 
Phelps, 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003). Imaging studies 
have reported increased “coupling,” or correlated activity between the amygdala and
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other regions such as visual cortical areas (Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1999), middle 
occipital areas, fusiform gyri, the superior temporal sulcus, ventromedial, and OFC 
(Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002). This coupling provides support for 
the idea that a signal originating in the amygdala plays a role in allowing emotional 
stimuli preferred access to attentional resources. A likely neural mechanism explaining 
how the emotional control of attention may take place is shown in Figure 2.1, which is 
derived from the Integrated Emotion Systems model (IES; Blair, 2004).
Figure 2.1: The IES model (Blair, 2004)
This model, derived from portions of the IES model (Blair, 2004), shows a mechanism by 
which emotional stimuli can disrupt operant behaviour through either the initiation of an 
incompatible response (i.e., freezing), or the modulation of attention by emotion
Stimulus input 
(shape)
Stimulus input 
(emotional)
Motor system {Pre-motor 
cortex) Sensoiy 
representations 
{Temporal cortex)
Response
Valence representations 
{Amygdala)
Bask threat system (brainstem)
Freezing/Suppression
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Figure 2.1 depicts circuits involved in generating the “freezing,” and in 
modulating the allocation of attentional resources. In the case of freezing, the lower part 
o f the figure represents a circuit running from medial amygdaloidal areas downward 
largely via the stria terminalis to the medial hypothalamus and periaqueductal gray. This 
circuitry modulates the responding to threat as a function o f the level of stimulation. At 
low levels of stimulation, the organism will cease motor activity (Panksepp, 1971). At 
higher levels, animals will attempt to escape the environment. At higher levels still, 
where the threat is proximal and escape improbable, the organism will display reactive 
aggression (Blanchard, Blanchard, & Takahashi, 1978).
The model suggests that emotional stimuli, including conditioned stimuli, activate 
affect representations in the amygdala that are either innate (for unconditioned stimuli) or 
formed as a consequence of conditioning. As a result o f reciprocal connections between 
these affect representations and the sensory representations of the emotional stimuli, the 
sensory activity associated with these emotional representations is augmented. According 
to Duncan and Desimone’s model (1995), representation of one object in the sensory 
cortex will have an inhibitory effect on the representation of another (thereby creating 
competition for representation). The strength of a representation is a product o f its top- 
down attentional processes (such as directed attention) or bottom-up processes (such as 
emotional salience). In essence, when processing capacities are taxed, the representation 
of one stimulus will occur at the detriment of another. The presentation of multiple 
stimuli results in reduction in the amount of processing resources afforded to each. As a 
result, competing stimuli will not receive the same degree of representation, analysis, or 
control of behaviour (Desimone & Duncan, 1995).
Behavioural studies of psychopathy have focused primarily on situations in which 
emotional processing deficits result in impaired task performance; however, consistently
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impaired performance can be the result of general cognitive factors or reduced motivation 
rather than a specific neurocognitive deficit. Conditioned suppression and attentional 
interference paradigms provide an experimental setting in which healthy emotional 
responding results in slowed or impaired operant responding. This chapter presents a 
novel experiment, the Emotional Interrupt Task, for which normal emotional responding 
to positive and negative visual stimuli results in diminished performance on a primary 
motor response task. The inclusion of positive and negative stimuli enables testing of 
whether the emotional processing impairment seen in individuals with psychopathy is 
valence specific. According to the model depicted in Figure 2.1, the modulation of 
responding can occur through two routes. Projections leading from the amygdala through 
the brain stem could result in increased response latency by activating the systems 
involved in conditioned suppression or freezing. If  this were to occur, however, one 
might expect modulation in responding to the aversive stimuli rather than positive stimuli. 
A second route whereby projections from the amygdala to temporal cortex strengthens the 
representation of emotional material at the expense o f adjacent neutral material is also 
portrayed in Figure 2.1.
From the perspective of the emotional modulation o f attention, both positive and 
negative stimuli are expected to gain preferential access to attentional resources, 
particularly as the amygdala has been implicated in the processing of both positive and 
negative stimuli (Garavan, Pendergrass, Ross, Stein, & Risinger, 2001; Baxter and 
Murray, 2002; Liberzon, Phan, Decker, & Taylor, 2003; Siebert, Markowitsch, & Bartel, 
2003). Interestingly, the data concerning individuals with psychopathy is mixed. Some 
studies suggest that impairment is restricted to aversive stimuli (Fowles, 1988; Patrick, 
1994; Levenston, Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 2000; Pastor, Molto, Vila, & Lang, 2003) and
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others suggest that the impairments extend to appetitive stimuli (Williamson, Harpur, & 
Hare, 1991; Lorenz & Newman, 2002; Verona, Patrick, Curtin, Bradley, & Lang, 2004).
The objective of the current study was twofold. First, the experiment explores 
whether the affective modulation of motor responding or attention thought to depend on 
the amygdala would be reduced in individuals with psychopathy. Second, the task was 
designed to test whether this modulation would be valence specific. It was predicted that 
for the comparison group, the introduction of either positive or negative stimuli would 
result in increased response latencies relative to neutral images. In contrast, it was 
predicted that for individuals with psychopathy, no modulation of responding would be 
evident for negative images. Due to contradictory evidence in the literature, the effect 
that positive images might have on responding in psychopathic individuals was less clear.
2.2: Methods
2.2.1: Participants
Participants were 35 males (16 individuals with psychopathy and 19 comparison 
individuals) selected from three category B (high security) forensic institutions in the 
London area. Files were pre-screened to exclude individuals who were older than 55 or 
whose psychiatric reports revealed a diagnosis for psychosis, organic brain damage, or 
neurological disorder. All participants were informed that participation was voluntary, 
and would not affect individual status or record within the institution. Participants did not 
receive any financial or other gain for their participation or performance on the task. The 
ages of the participants ranged from 22 to 54 years with a mean of 32.20. The Raven’s 
advanced progressive matrix (Set I) was administered to provide an estimate of 
intelligence (Raven, 1965; 1995). Raven’s scores ranged from 5 to 12 with a mean of 
8.17 (according to UK norms, a score of 9 is equivalent to the 50th percentile for
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individuals aged 28 to 32 and between 33 and 37; Ravens, 1994). There were no 
significant group differences in either age or Raven’s score. The sample was made up of 
28 Caucasian, 1 Pacific Islander, and 6 Afro-Caribbean participants; 2 and 4 Affo- 
Caribbean participants were in the comparison and psychopathic groups respectively. 
Participant details by group are presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Emotional Interrupt Task participant characteristics
Individuals with psychopathy Comparison individuals
(n = 16) (n = 19)
M SD Range M SD Range
Participant characteristics
Ravens Score 8.00 1.55 6 to 10 8.31 2.11 5 to 12
Age 33.44 9.11 22 to 54 31.16 10.02 22 to 54
PCL-R Factor 1 Score 11.66* 1.92 7.50 to 14.90 1.97 1.52 0.00 to 5.00
PCL-R Factor 2 Score 14.90* 0.89 13.05 to 16.00 4.19 3.54 0.55 to 12.10
PCL-R Total 31.87* 1.76 30.00 to 36.80 7.43 4.65 1.65 to 17.60
M=  mean; SD = standard deviation; * p <  0.001.
2.2.2: Measures
2.2.2.1: ThePCL-R (Hare, 1991)
The PCL-R consists o f 20 behavioural items that are scored on the basis of a file 
review and semi-structured interview. High inter-rater reliability coefficients for total 
scores (not less than 0.83) and high Cronbach alpha coefficients and inter-item 
correlations provide support that the PCL-R is a reliable index of psychopathy in forensic 
settings (Hare, 1991). The PCL-R consists of two factors identified by psychometric 
analyses (e.g., Hare, 1991). Factor 1, the affective-interpersonal component, includes 
items that describe traits central to the classic clinical descriptions of the psychopath;
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these include callousness, grandiosity, and a diminished capacity for remorse. Factor 2, 
the behavioural component, is made up of items that describe traits and behaviours 
associated with an unstable and antisocial lifestyle; these include impulsivity, poor 
behavioural controls, and criminal activity. In accordance with the literature and the 
guidelines of the PCL-R, a diagnosis of psychopathy was given to individuals with a 
PCL-R score of 30 or above, whereas the comparison individuals had scores of 20 or less. 
Individuals scoring in the middle range on the PCL-R were excluded due to suggestions 
that the mixture of psychopathic and non-psychopathic traits that such individuals possess 
make them inappropriate for either classification (Hare, 1991). After consent was 
obtained, the participants were interviewed. Participants who declined an interview, but 
were willing to participate in the experiment, were scored according to file notes (n = 4 
split evenly between groups). Evidence suggests that the PCL-R can be scored reliably 
and validly if detailed file information is available (Wong, 1988; Hare, 1991). Inter-rater 
reliability was established by means of a Spearman rank correlation conducted on 33 
inmates who were scored independently by two raters. The correlation, rranks = 0.94 (p 
< .001) is comparable to that presented in the literature (Hare, 1991).
2.2.2.2: The Emotional Interrupt Task
This novel task was designed to assess the impact o f emotional processing on 
relatively habitual motor performance. Participants are engaged in a simple motor 
response task (left and right button presses to circle/square stimuli). Participants were 
seated in front of a computer screen and were instructed to respond with their left and 
right index fingers. Each trial consisted of a fixation point, a pictorial stimulus taken 
from the International Affective Picture System (LAPS, Lang & Greenwald, 1988), a 
shape (circle or square stimulus), and the same IAPs image that had preceded the shape.
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Pictorial stimuli were classified according to normative ratings provided in the IAPS 
manual (Lang & Greenwald, 1988); each picture is rated on a 9-point scale on dimensions 
of valence (higher scores corresponding to greater pleasantness) and arousal (higher 
scores corresponding to greater arousal). One third of the images were of neutral content 
(n = 16), one third o f the images were positively valenced (n = 16), and one third of the 
images were negatively valenced (n = 16). The mean valence and arousal ratings for 
neutral images were 4.76 (ranging from 4.44 to 4.96) and 2.33 (ranging from 1.55 to 2.8) 
respectively. For positive images, the mean valence and arousal ratings were 7.17 
(ranging from 6.58 to 8.14) and 5.56 (ranging from 5.04 and 6.86) respectively. The 
negative images had a mean valence and arousal rating of 2.63 (ranging from 1.88 to 
3.39) and 6.16 (ranging from 5.00 to 7.10) respectively. The negative and the positive 
stimuli both had significantly higher arousal ratings than the neutral stimuli (F(l,30) = 
310.16;/? < 0.001, and F(l,30) =412.98;p  < 0.001 respectively). Furthermore, the 
negative stimuli had significantly greater arousal ratings than the positive stimuli (F(l,30) 
= 6.31;/? <0.05).
The components of each trial were presented serially; only one component 
appeared on the screen at any time. The sequence o f each trial was: (1) fixation point 
(800 ms); (2) an IAPS image (200ms); (3) the target stimulus (a circle or square; 150ms); 
(4) the same IAPs image (400ms); and (5) the inter-trial interval (a blank screen; 1200 
ms). Each IAPS image was used once per block. Because there were four blocks, each 
image appeared twice with each target shape. The total number of trials was therefore 
192 (64 neutral, 64 negative, and 64 positive images).
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible to the circle/square 
stimuli (left button press to circle, right to square). Although participants were told not to 
respond to the IAPs images, they were asked to attend to them as they might be asked
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about them later. A sample set of instructions read verbatim to each participant is as 
follows:
In this task, you will be presented with a series o f colour pictures depicting people and 
objects and you will be presented with small black shapes (circles or squares). You will 
not have to do anything when you see a colour picture o f a person or object, but please 
pay attention to them as you may be asked about them later. When you see the shape, 
please respond as quickly as you can by pressing the “F ” key i f  you see a square, or 
press the “J ” key i f  you see a circle. For each series ofpresentations, you will always be 
presented with a colour picture, followed by either a small black circle or a small black 
square, which is followed again by the same colour picture that preceded it. Remember, 
only respond to the small black circle or square. Speed is very important, so please be 
sure to press the appropriate key as quickly as you can. You will start with a short 
practice session to make sure you get the hang o f it before the full task begins.
The shapes will only be flashed up on the screen very briefly so it is important to be ready 
for them. Before each trial a cross will appear on the screen to warn you that a trial is 
about to begin. Please keep your eyes focused on the cross each time and avoid moving 
them throughout each trial. To help you react as quickly as possible, please keep your 
index fingers resting on the “F ” and “J ” keys.
So remember, pay attention to each picture, and press the correct key in response to the 
black and white shapes as fast as you can: F for a Square and Jfor a Circle.1
The dependent measure was reaction time. Trials for which the reaction time was less 
than 150 milliseconds or greater than 1500 milliseconds were considered outliers and 
excluded from the analysis. Figure 2.2 provides a sample schematic of the components of 
a single trial.
1 The button that corresponded to the shape was counterbalanced across subjects within each group.
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Figure 2.2: Composition of a single trial in the Emotional Interrupt Task
1) Fixation 2) Image 1 3) Shape 4) Image 2
800 ms 200 ms 150 ms 400 ms
+
2.3: Results
2.3.1: Response latency data
Table 2.2 shows the mean response latency in milliseconds for each condition for 
the comparison group and for individuals with psychopathy. An initial 2 (Group: 
individuals with psychopathy and comparison individuals) X 3 (Valence: Neutral, 
negative, or positive) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the response latency 
data. There was no main effect for Group (F(l, 33) = 0.69; ns). The effect for emotion 
was also non-significant (F(2, 66) = 0.94; ns); however, a significant Group by Emotion 
interaction emerged (F(2, 66) = 3.71 ;p <  0.05). The comparison group showed a greater 
response latency when the target stimuli were temporally bracketed by emotional images 
relative to neutral images; individuals with psychopathy did not show this effect (see 
Table 2.2). Follow-up within subjects contrasts were conducted with neutral stimuli as 
the reference level to clarify the nature of the interaction. These revealed significant 
Group by Emotion interactions for negative versus neutral stimuli (F(l, 33) = 5.62; p<  
0.05) and positive versus neutral stimuli (F(l, 33) = 6.44; p  < 0.05). In order to further 
explore the nature of these interactions, separate within Groups repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted. For the comparison group, a significant main effect for
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emotion was revealed (F(2, 36) = 3.18;/? = 0.05). Follow-up contrasts revealed 
significant effects for positive versus neutral images (F (l, 18) = 5.42; p  < 0.05), and a 
trend for negative versus neutral images (F(l, 18) = 3.45; p  = 0.08). The repeated 
measures ANOVA for the individuals with psychopathy did not reveal a main effect for 
emotion (F(2, 30) = 1.41; ns). Follow-up contrasts were conducted to determine whether 
the converse effect o f reduced response latency for individuals with psychopathy was 
significant for either negative or positive stimuli. The contrasts were non-significant for 
positive versus neutral images (F(l,15) = 1.66; ns) as well as for negative versus neutral 
images (F(l,15) = 2.29; ns). This shows that although individuals with psychopathy 
respond slightly faster to negative images relative to neutral images, there are clearly no 
significant facilitatory effects of emotion for this group.
2.3.2: Error data
A second 2 (Group: individuals with psychopathy and comparison individuals) by 
3 (Valence: Negative, neutral, or positive) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on 
the error data. No main effect for Group emerged (F (l, 33) < 1; ns). However, the 
analysis revealed a main effect for emotion (F(2, 66) = 3.17; p  < 0.05); participants made 
most errors when the target stimulus was temporally bracketed by negative images. The 
Group by Emotion interaction approached significance (F(2, 66) = 2.85; p  = 0.07). 
Whereas the comparison group showed the greatest number o f errors for negative items, 
the psychopathy group showed little difference in error rates between the three 
conditions. Given the selective effects seen with the response latency data, separate 
within-subjects repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each group. For the 
comparison group, a significant main effect for emotion was revealed (F(2,36) = 6.15; p  < 
0.01). Follow-up contrasts revealed that the comparison individuals made significantly
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more errors when the target stimulus was temporally bracketed by negative images rather 
than neutral images (F (l, 18) = 8.71; p  < 0.01). However, they did not make significantly 
more errors when the target stimulus was temporally bracketed by positive in contrast to 
neutral images (F(l, 18) = 0.36; ns). In addition, significantly more errors were made 
when the target stimulus was temporally bracketed by negative images relative to positive 
images (F (l, 18) = 6.14\p <  0.05). In contrast to the comparison individuals, a within 
subjects ANOVA involving only individuals with psychopathy, showed no effect for 
emotion (F(2,30) < 1; ns). Follow-up contrasts revealed that the individuals with 
psychopathy did not make significantly more errors whether the target stimulus was 
temporally bracketed by negative rather than neutral images (F(l, 15) < 1; ns), positive 
rather than neutral images (F(l, 15) = 1.34; ns), or negative in contrast to positive images 
(F (l, 15) < 1; ns). Table 2.2 shows the reaction time and error data by group.
Table 2.2: Error and reaction time data
Individuals with psychopathy Comparison individuals
(n = 16) (n = 19)
M  SE M  SE
Reaction Time
Neutral Trials 409.35 33.00 405.04 26.69
Negative Trials 398.68 21.69 416.51 27.32
Positive Trials 408.36 20.85 423.20 29.27
Correct Responses
Neutral Trials 57.06 1.52 58.79 0.99
Negative Trials 56.69 1.74 56.84 0.88
Positive Trials 56.25 1.41 58.53 0.98
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2.4: Discussion
The purpose the present study was to examine the impact of emotional material on 
latency of responding in a simple stimulus-response task. It was predicted that to the 
extent that the current task generates competition for attentional resources, processing of 
stimuli of either valence would result in increased response latencies for emotionally 
bracketed stimuli in healthy individuals, but not in individuals with psychopathy. This 
pattern of results was observed, which supports the idea that attentional resources can be 
differentially depleted by the presentation of positive or negative visual stimuli and that 
this depletion is attenuated in individuals with psychopathy.
At least one other study has highlighted circumstances for which a deficit in 
emotional processing associated with psychopathy translates into superior performance.
In it, reduced response latency for individuals with psychopathy on approach trials 
containing a cue previously associated with punishment was reported (Newman, Wallace, 
Schmitt, & Arnett, 1997). Punishment associations were established via an initial go/no- 
go task in which participants learned to press a button to a string of symbols (letters and 
digits) only if  the string did not contain the letter “Q.” Responding while the “Q” was 
present resulted in monetary loss; responding correctly resulted in monetary gain. During 
the second phase of the task, participants were presented with a stimulus display 
containing either 3 letters and one number, or four letters in a rectangle and were 
instructed to respond only if  all the symbols were letters. Extra incentives were given for 
speed. The letter “Q,” now an innocuous stimulus like any other letter, was programmed 
to appear on 50% of the “go” trials. Latency of responding was greater for comparison 
individuals but not psychopathic individuals when the cue previously associated with 
punishment was present; however, this result was restricted to comparisons between
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psychopathic and non-psychopathic individuals who scored highly on a measure of trait 
anxiety. In fact, highly anxious individuals with psychopathy showed facilitated 
responding in the presence of punishment cues. However, this surprising result is not 
easily interpreted; no a priori theory exists to suggest that only individuals with 
psychopathy with high trait anxiety would show this pattern of responding.
In Figure 2.1, selected components of the Integrated Emotion Systems model are 
shown to provide a computational rationale for predicting the current results. In line with 
human neuro-imaging and animal work, two mutually compatible routes by which an 
emotional stimulus might interfere with on-going behaviour are suggested. First, 
negative emotional stimuli might activate the basic system mediating the 
ffeeze/flight/fight response to threat. In this instance, freezing would interfere with the 
motor response to the target stimulus (the circle or square). However, this route will not 
be activated by positive stimuli. In the present study, positive as well as negative stimuli 
resulted in increased response latencies in the comparison group. The finding that 
comparison individuals made more errors for negative, but not positively bracketed target 
stimuli relative to neutral is more likely a result o f speed-accuracy tradeoffs than it is a 
reflection of the activation of the threat circuitry. It may be that the increased errors 
associated with negative stimuli are attributable to the slightly (though non-significantly) 
reduced reaction times. This suggests that threat system activation in isolation does not 
provide a viable account o f the data. An additional or alternative system is necessarily 
involved.
Based on recent models o f attention (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 1998), 
it was suggested that any representation of peripheral emotional stimuli would, to a 
greater extent than neutral stimuli, interfere with the representation of a more 
behaviourally relevant target stimulus. Current views on attention characterise this
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process as the competition for representation which occurs when multiple stimuli are 
present (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 1998). The “integrated competition 
hypothesis” states that given the brain’s finite processing capacity for visual stimuli, not 
all stimuli in the visual field will be processed to the same degree (Duncan, 1998). The 
degree to which a stimulus is processed is determined by bottom-up sensory processes 
such as stimulus salience and top-down influences such as directed attention (Desimone 
& Duncan, 1995). Within this framework, emotional salience is considered to have a 
bottom-up influence on attention.
At the anatomical level, the amygdala is necessary for the display of conditioned 
freezing/conditioned suppression (LeDoux et al., 1990; Killcross, Robbins, & Everitt, 
1997). It is also involved in the enhanced perceptual saliency of emotional events, which 
allows such events to gain preferential access to attentional resources (Anderson & 
Phelps, 2001; Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, Gabrieli, 2003). The suggestion is 
that emotional material (i.e., conditioned stimuli) activate valence units in the amygdala 
(due to prior learning) which, because of their reciprocal connections with the 
representations of the emotional stimuli, further augment the activity of the 
representations of the emotional stimuli in temporal cortex. Because sensory 
representations are mutually inhibitory, suppression of the task relevant information 
results (i.e., the representation of the square/ circle), which leads to increased response 
latencies.
On the basis of existing evidence for amygdala dysfunction in psychopathy 
(Patrick, 1994; Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999; Blair, 2001; Blair, 2003), it is 
suggested that the connections between the sensory representations and the valence 
representations generated by the amygdala are weaker in individuals with psychopathy 
relative to the comparison group. Based on current work regarding computational
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modelling (Blair et al., 2004a; Budhani, 2004), this may caused by reduced activation of 
the valence units by basic unconditioned stimuli. Reduced activation of the valence units 
by a stimulus would mean slower Hebbian learning of the connections between these 
units and the sensory information. Weaker connections between the sensory 
representations and the valence representations would mean both reduced activation of 
the basic system mediating the ffeeze/flight/fight response to threat as well as reduced 
reciprocal activation of the emotional stimulus competing for representation with the 
target stimulus. Consequently, there should be less interference by an emotional stimulus 
on behaviour. This was, o f course, seen in the individuals with psychopathy.
The current study examined the detrimental impact of both positive and negative 
emotional material on task performance. Individuals with psychopathy did not show an 
effect for emotion whether the visual image was positive or negative. This suggests that 
individuals with psychopathy present with equivalent processing difficulties for both 
positive and negative emotional material. In some respects, this is surprising given 
suggestions that psychopathy might be associated with reward-dominant responding 
(Fowles, 1988).
The empirical picture, however, is complicated. Individuals with psychopathy 
show appropriate suppression o f the startle reflex following the presentation o f positive 
visual primes, but show reduced augmentation of the startle reflex following the 
presentation of negative visual primes (Patrick, 1994; Levenston et al., 2000). These 
results have since been replicated in a Spanish prison population (Pastor, Molto, Vila, & 
Lang, 2003). This suggests that individuals with psychopathy are unimpaired in 
processing positive material. Recent affective priming (Peschardt et al., submitted-b) and 
decision-making studies (Peschardt et al., submitted-a) have suggested that individuals 
with psychopathy show impaired processing of both positive and negative material, but
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that this impairment is particularly severe for negative material. Other studies utilizing 
emotional material have observed that individuals with psychopathy show the same 
deficits for processing positive and negative emotional material. For example, Verona 
and her colleagues report reduced skin conductance responding in individuals with 
psychopathy to both positive and negative auditory stimuli (Verona et al., 2004). In a 
lexical decision-making task, comparison individuals were faster to identify positive and 
negative emotional words than neutral ones, but individuals with psychopathy did not 
show this emotional advantage (Williamson, Harpur, & Hare, 1991; Lorenz & Newman, 
2002). It has been noted that across these studies, individuals with psychopathy identify 
positive words more quickly than negative words (an advantage ranging from 21ms to 
99ms) on average (Peschardt et al., submitted-b).
In short, it is currently unclear which parameters determine the degree to which 
positive emotional processing is impaired in individuals with psychopathy. One 
possibility is that the results are influenced by task sensitivity. Tasks such as the 
Emotional Interrupt or Lexical Decision Tasks may be more sensitive indices o f the 
impairment in processing positive material in individuals with psychopathy. O f course, 
such a position currently provides no a priori reason for why the case would be, nor does 
it explain why the impairment for negative material is revealed so consistently across 
studies. A second more interesting possibility is that a modularity in processing exists 
between tasks. With reference to the model presented in Figure 2.1, tasks showing 
greater impairment for processing positive material in individuals with psychopathy (the 
current task, emotional lexical decision-making and affective priming) involve the 
reciprocal feedback of information from the valence representations to the sensory 
representations (which, at the anatomical level, involves amygdala-cortical interactions). 
Tasks showing minimal impairment for processing positive material in individuals with
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psychopathy (suppression o f the startle reflex by positive visual primes) involve 
activation of the basic threat system by the valence representations (at the anatomical 
level, amygdala-brainstem interactions). The pathology associated with psychopathy 
might particularly affect the reciprocal feedback of information from positive valence 
representations to the sensory representations. Of course, this explanation is highly 
speculative. Further investigations into the parameters determining the degree to which 
the processing of positive emotional material is impaired in individuals with psychopathy, 
however, may prove to be useful in understanding this disorder.
2.5: Conclusion
In this study, the impact o f emotional stimuli on motor responding in individuals 
with psychopathy and comparison individuals was tested. The comparison group showed 
increased response latencies to a target stimulus when this stimulus was temporally 
bracketed by an emotional rather than a neutral visual image; however, individuals with 
psychopathy did not show a modulation of responding by emotion. This study thus 
provides further evidence of emotional dysfunction in individuals with psychopathy but 
does so by demonstrating superior rather than inferior task performance relative to 
comparison individuals.
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Chapter 3
Instrumental Learning and Relearning in Individuals with Psychopathy 
3.1: Introduction
In Chapter 1 reviewed evidence suggesting that “instrumental learning” is not a 
unitary construct, but rather, a term devoted to several neurally dissociable forms 
learning. In brief, evidence suggests that instrumental learning tasks that are completed 
through the acquisition of stimulus-reinforcement associations necessarily involve the 
amygdala (Baxter & Murray, 2002). In contrast, the amygdala is not crucial for 
instrumental learning tasks that require the formation of stimulus-response associations. 
To date, evidence does not suggest that an analogous distinction exists between reversing 
acquired stimulus-reinforcement associations and reversing stimulus-response 
associations. This chapter presents an experimental investigation of the acquisition and 
reversal of stimulus-reinforcement associations acquired during an instrumental learning 
task in individuals with psychopathy.
A classic example of stimulus-reinforcement learning is demonstrated by the 
passive avoidance paradigm. In passive avoidance paradigms, participants learn to 
respond to rewarding stimuli (such as approaching a particular visual stimulus for food) 
and avoid responding to stimuli that give rise to punishment (do not approach an object 
associated with electric shock). Consequently, passive avoidance learning is thought to 
rely on the formation o f stimulus-reinforcement associations (Baxter & Murray, 2002); 
each stimulus presented is associated with either a positive or a negative outcome. 
Lesions of the amygdala disrupt passive avoidance learning (Ambrogi et al., 1991). In 
line with suggestions of amygdala dysfunction, individuals with psychopathy show
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impaired passive avoidance learning (Blair et al., 2004a; Newman & Kosson, 1986; 
Newman & Schmitt, 1998).
Passive avoidance learning stands in contrast with the form of instrumental 
learning demonstrated in object discrimination tasks. During object discriminations, 
participants select between two objects presented simultaneously; the same two objects 
are always presented together. One object is associated with reward and the other with 
non-reward. Thus, participants can solve the problem on each trial with a series of “if- 
then” statements: if  given the choice between object A versus object B, then choose A. 
The problem can be solved with reference to both stimuli; consequently, stimulus- 
reinforcement associations need not be formed. The amygdala is not crucial for 
performing object discriminations (Baxter & Murray, 2002). For example, rhesus 
monkeys with selective excitotoxic lesions of the amygdala were not impaired selecting 
between a series of fixed pairs of visual objects for secondary auditory reinforcement 
(Maikova et al., 1997a).
Although data concerning individuals with psychopathy has consistently indicated 
the existence of passive avoidance deficits (Blair, et al., 2004; Newman & Kosson, 1986; 
Newman & Schmitt, 1998), it has yet to be determined whether this deficit extends to 
include other forms of instrumental learning. Currently, evidence suggests that children 
with psychopathic tendencies show no difficulties with object discrimination learning 
(Blair, Colledge, & Mitchell, 2001). In this chapter, an instrumental learning task 
involving the formation o f stimulus-reinforcement associations is presented. Unlike 
conditional learning tasks which require making a response in the presence of a reference 
stimulus (all stimuli yield reward provided the appropriate response is made in its 
presence), the task presented here depends on stimulus-reward associations (each 
stimulus itself is associated with a positive or negative outcome). In the Tokens Task, the
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participant is presented with four stimuli. Each of the four stimuli can be paired with any 
of the other stimuli, including itself (i.e., there may be two blue tokens on the screen and 
the participant has to choose one of these two). This is unlike an object discrimination 
task where the identical pair is presented serially. Two of the stimuli yield reward when 
selected, and two stimuli yield punishment when selected. This task presumably could be 
solved through the formation of stimulus-response associations through a complicated 
series of “if-then” statements. However, given that there are 10 different stimulus 
combinations, this is not a very efficient solution. A more efficient solution is to 
associate reward with two stimuli and punishment with the other two stimuli (i.e., to solve 
the task by the formation of stimulus-reinforcement associations).
In Chapter 1, evidence was reviewed that suggested that the VL/OFC is crucial for 
adjusting responding to stimuli when reward contingencies change (Rolls, 2000; Rolls, 
Homak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994). Specifically, lesions of the OFC disrupt reversing a 
response that was previously rewarding in favour of a response that was previously 
punishing (Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 1996; Swainson et al., 2000). The Tokens Task 
also contains a component designed to assess instrumental relearning. Following an 
initial acquisition phase, two reversal phases take place. Data suggests that response 
suppression or reversal deficits exist in individuals with psychopathy (Blair, Colledge, & 
Mitchell, 2001; LaPierre, Braun, & Hodgins, 1995). In these studies, however, reversal 
learning and response suppression were measured using tasks that may require the 
formation of instrumental associations that differ from those of the Tokens Task. In the 
LaPierre et al. study (1995), a go/no-go task was used in which participants acquire a 
prepotent motor response to visual stimuli and are later asked to withhold responding to 
these previous “go” stimuli. In Blair et al.’s study (2001), reversals occurred after 
participants had correctly selected one of two fractal images in a series of same-object
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discriminations. In each case, the RR being investigated is characterised by a change in 
sXimuhxs-response association, rather than a change in stimulus-reinforcement association 
such as the one that takes place in the Tokens Task.
One other investigation has been conducted investing the performance of 
individuals with psychopathy on a variant of the Tokens Task (Fine, 2000). In it, Fine 
(2000) reports severely impaired performance in individuals with psychopathy. As 
predicted by studies suggesting a role for the amygdala in stimulus-reinforcement 
acquisitions (Ambrogi et al., 1991), the same study also showed that a patient with a 
congenital amygdala lesion was severely impaired in learning the reinforcement value of 
the stimuli. In contrast, two patients with acquired lesions involving the OFC showed 
intact acquisition during the instrumental learning phase, but were severely impaired on 
the reversal phase of the task. This provides additional evidence that, although a 
fractionation of instrumental learning is evident at the neural level, reversal learning 
appears to rely on the integrity of the OFC whether the association with the stimulus is 
one involving reinforcement values or a specific response. The objective of the study 
presented in this chapter was to examine stimulus-reinforcement learning and relearning 
in an expanded sample of individuals with psychopathy. Furthermore, specific 
predictions related to the amygdala and OFC explanations of psychopathy were tested. 
Amygdala dysfunction explanations of psychopathy must predict that stimulus- 
reinforcement learning as presented in the first phase of the task should be disrupted. In 
contrast, if only OFC dysfunction is characteristic o f the disorder, intact stimulus- 
reinforcement but disrupted reversal learning should result. The present study tests these 
predictions in a sample of psychopathic and non-psychopathic inmates, as well as a group 
of individuals with intermediate levels of psychopathic characteristics to examine whether
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their instrumental learning performance shows a categorical or continuous relationship 
with psychopathy.
3.2: Methods
3.2.1: Participants
The sample was drawn from 7 forensic institutions for men in England. All 
participants (n = 88) were assessed using the PCL-R. Written consent was obtained from 
each inmate who agreed to take part, and all were informed that they were free to 
withdraw from the study at any time. Participants were assigned to high, medium, and 
low levels of psychopathic characteristics based on their PCL-R scores. The ages of the 
participants ranged from 21 to 53 years with a mean o f 30.77. The National Adult 
Reading Test (NART; Nelson & Willison, 1991) and Raven’s Advanced Matrix (Raven, 
1965) were administered to provide indices of general cognitive functioning. Estimated 
Full-scale IQ scores generated from the NART ranged from 86.50 to 117.21 with a mean 
of 102.22 (the 50th percentile is 100 for general population; Nelson & Willison, 1991). 
Raven’s scores ranged from 4 to 12 (maximum score is 12) with a mean of 7.76 
(according to UK norms, a score of 9 is equivalent to the 50th percentile for individuals 
aged 28 to 32 and between 33 and 37; Ravens, 1994). There were no significant group 
differences for age (F(2,85) = 1.43, ns), NART (F(2,85) = 2.10, ns), or Raven’s score 
(F(2,85) = 0.70, ns). Participant details by group are presented in Table 3.1.
3.2.2: Measures
3.2.2.1: The PCL-R (Hare, 1991).
The PCL-R was used to assign participants to high, medium, and low psychopathy 
groups. Additional details concerning the psychometric properties and administration of
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the PCL-R are presented in section 2.2.2.1 of Chapter 2. After consent was obtained, 
participants were interviewed. Participants who declined an interview, but were willing 
to participate in the experiment (n = 8), were scored according to file notes. Inter-rater 
reliability was established by means of a Spearman rank correlation conducted on 46 
inmates who were scored independently by two raters. The correlation, rranks = 0.90 (p 
< 0.001), is comparable to that presented in the literature (Hare, 1991). The PCL-R 
scores of the participants ranged from 1 to 37, with a mean of 20.20 (SD = 9.52). 
Participants were divided into 3 groups based on their PCL-R score: less than 21 (a non- 
psychopathic group, n = 40), 21-29 (a sub-threshold psychopathy group, n = 30), and 30 
or above (a psychopathic group, n = 18). The mean PCL-R scores by group are given in 
Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Tokens Task participant characteristics
Individuals with psychopathy 
(n = 18)
Sub-threshhold 
psychopathy (« = 30)
Comparison individuals 
(n = 40)
M  SD Range M  SD Range M  SD Range
Participant characteristics
Ravens Advanced Score 7.59 1.85 5 to 11 8.13 2.11 4 to 12 7.55 2.31 4 to 12
NART Estimated IQ 99.83 9.63 87 to 116 101.08 8.86 87 to 117 104.14 6.83 91 to 117
Age 33.24 7.95 22 to 53 30.77 7.04 21 to 45 29.73 6.91 21 to 48
PCL-R Factor 1 Score 11.89 2.03 9 to 15 9.08 2.43 3 to 13 3.78 2.64 0 t o 9
PCL-R Factor 2 Score 15.10 1.43 12 to 17 12.32 2.90 6 to 16 5.86 3.53 Oto 12
PCL-R Total 31.96 2.14 30 to 37 25.04 2.84 21 to 29 11.27 5.52 1 to 20
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3.2.2.2: The Tokens Task
This task consists of three key phases and is designed to assess both the ability to 
form complex stimulus-reinforcement associations and to provide an index of RR 
difficulties. In this task, participants were told that they can win points by selecting the 
(coloured) tokens that appear in pairs on the computer screen. Following token selection, 
a message appeared on the screen informing the participant of the number of points won 
or lost. The task included four different token colours (red, yellow, green, blue). Two 
tokens were associated with winning 300 points, and two tokens with losing 300 points. 
On each trial, two tokens (approximately 2.5 x 2.5cm square) appeared on the screen 
simultaneously. The participant selected the token o f choice using the computer mouse. 
Following token selection, a message appeared on the screen to inform the participant of 
the points that had been lost or gained. A total score message at the bottom of the screen 
was updated before the next trial began. The task consists of nine blocks of ten trials with 
each block comprising the ten possible token combinations (four same-colour token 
combinations and six different-colour token combinations). Following an initial 
familiarization block in which each token combination was presented (10 trials), three 
main phases of the task took place: (1) an expectation acquisition phase (EA; trials 11 to 
40) in which participants learned the reward value of each stimulus; (2) an initial reversal 
phase (Rl; trials 41 to 70) in which one of the previously rewarded tokens became 
punishing and one of the previously punished tokens became rewarding; and (3) a second 
reversal phase (R2; trials 71 to 90) in which the remaining two tokens reversed (one 
became rewarding and the other punishing). Token choices were scored as follows. The 
trial was scored as “correct” if  the subject chose the positive (300 points) over the 
negative (-300 points) token. The trial was scored as “incorrect” if  the subject chose the 
negative token. If the tokens were of equal value, the trial was not scored. Furthermore,
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in Phases 2 and 3, trials were not scored if the subject had not yet had the opportunity to 
learn the new value of the tokens that had reversed in value. As in the acquisition phase, 
if a positive (300 points) token was selected over a negative (-300 points) token, the trial 
was scored as “correct.” The trial was scored as “incorrect” if  the subject chose the 
negative token. If the tokens were of equal value, the trial was not scored. Participants 
were not informed that the task consisted of different phases and were instructed to gain 
as many points as possible. The instructions for the Tokens Task were as follows:
Tokens will appear on the screen in pairs. Pressing on some o f the tokens will win you 
points. However, pressing on others will lose you points. When you click on a token you 
will be told how many points you have won or lost. A total will appear at the bottom o f 
the screen telling you how many points you have won or lost so far. Try to win as many 
points as possible.
3.3: Results
Neither age nor estimates of cognitive functioning were correlated with the 
dependent variables. An initial mixed-model 3(Phase) by 3(Group) Repeated Measures 
ANOVA was conducted. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant; consequently, the 
more conservative Greenhouse-Geisser value was used. This revealed a main effect for 
Phase (F( 1.87,159) = 5.95\p <  0.005), with participants as a whole showing the highest 
proportion correct at the initial acquisition phase, and the lowest proportion correct at the 
second RR phase. There was also a significant main effect for group (F(2, 85) = 5.46; p  < 
0.01), with individuals with psychopathy making the lowest proportion of correct 
selections (0.49), the comparison group showing the most (0.62), and the sub-threshold 
psychopathy group showing an intermediate proportion (0.57). Finally, a Phase by Group 
interaction was also significant (F(3.74,159) = 2.87; p  < 0.05). While the comparison and 
sub-threshold psychopathy groups performed best on the initial acquisition phase, the
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individuals with psychopathy did not. Furthermore, although the comparison group 
showed improved performance on the second reversal phase relative to the first, the 
performance o f both the psychopathic and sub-threshold groups declined following the 
first reversal phase. Figure 3.1 shows mean proportion correct by phase for each group.
Figure 3.1: Proportion correct on the Tokens Task
The bars represent the proportion of correct selections; the vertical lines indicate the 
standard error of the mean
■  High Psychopathy 
□  Intermediate Group
■  Non-psychopathic
Learning First Reversal Second Reversal
Follow-up post-hoc tests were conducted to further explore group differences. 
These tests revealed that individuals with psychopathy performed significantly worse than 
comparison individuals on the acquisition (p < 0.05; Bonferroni adjusted) and second 
reversal (p < 0.01) phases. The sub-threshold psychopathy group also made significantly 
greater errors than the comparison individuals on the second reversal phase (p = 0.05).
Correlational analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between 
psychopathy and performance on the components o f the Tokens Task. The results are 
presented in Table 3.2. As seen in the table, significant negative correlations exist 
between psychopathy and the proportion correct on the acquisition and second reversal
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phase. In contrast, no significant correlations exist for the first reversal phase and either 
total or factor scores.
Table 3.2: Correlations between PCL-R and number correct
Factor 1 Factor 2 Total Score
Acquisition r  = -0.30** r  = -0.28** r= -0.31**
First Reversal r = 0.02 r = -0.05 r = 0.00
Second Reversal r = -0.26* r = -0.22* r = -  0.28**
* p <0.05 
* * / > < 0.01
3.4: Discussion
This study examined the performance of adult psychopathic and non-psychopathic 
individuals on a task assessing the formation of stimulus-reinforcement associations and 
the reversal of those associations. The results replicate a previous finding involving a 
smaller sample showing impaired acquisition and reversal of stimulus-reinforcement 
associations in psychopathic individuals (Fine, 2000). These findings are extended, 
however, by examining the same processes in a group with intermediate levels of 
psychopathic characteristics. Like psychopathic individuals, this sub-threshold 
psychopathy group showed significantly greater difficulties relative to the comparison 
group in reversing their respond when previously rewarding stimuli became punishing 
and previously punishing stimuli yielded reward. Furthermore, the primary and 
correlational analyses suggest a continuous rather than discrete relationship between 
difficulties with both stimulus-reward learning and relearning, and levels of psychopathy. 
That is, individuals with sub-threshold levels of psychopathy also showed intermediate 
levels of dysfunction on this form of instrumental learning and relearning.
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It is noteworthy that individuals with psychopathy did not show significant 
reversal deficits in phase 2 (the first reversal phase), but did show significant deficits in 
the second reversal phase. This finding may be attributable to the failure to learn initial 
reinforcement associations in the first phase (individuals with psychopathy are 
performing at chance). The failure to have formed significant reinforcement associations 
would mean that the first reversal component was no longer an index of response 
reversal, but instead, effectively an extension of the acquisition phase for the 
psychopathic individuals. By the third phase, however, individuals with psychopathy had 
leamt the association to some degree, and consequently, they show profound deficits 
when required to adjust their responding.
These results complement a growing body of work investigating separable forms 
of instrumental learning and relearning in individuals with psychopathy. For example, 
inmates with this disorder show impaired performance in passive avoidance learning 
(Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman & Schmitt, 1998), and in extinguishing a once 
rewarded, but now punished response, (Newman, Patterson, & Kosson, 1987). In the 
current study, additional evidence is provided that the reversal impairment in 
psychopathic individuals extends to affect the alteration of stimulus-reinforcement 
acquisitions.
3.5: Conclusion
As predicted by conceptualizations of psychopathy that implicate an impaired 
circuit involving the amygdala and OFC, this study showed impaired acquisition of 
stimulus-reinforcement associations and impaired reversal o f these associations, once 
formed, relative to comparison individuals. In addition, previous findings were extended 
by the inclusion of a medium scoring group enabling correlational analyses to be
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conducted. The significant negative correlations suggest a continuous rather than discrete 
relationship between psychopathy and both stimulus-reinforcement association 
acquisition and the reversal of these acquisitions once contingencies change.
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Chapter 4
Risky Decisions and Response Reversal:
Is There Evidence of OFC Dysfunction in Psychopathic Individuals?2
4.1: Introduction
The experiments described in this chapter are aimed at exploring decision-making 
and a form of object discrimination learning and relearning described in Chapter 1. 
Theories of VL/OFC dysfunction in patients with developmental psychopathy were 
originally inspired by accounts of profound social disturbance shown by some patients 
with acquired lesions in this area (Anderson, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Blumer 
& Benson, 1975; Damasio, 1994; LaPierre et al., 1995). Empirical indications of 
VL/OFC pathology exist in psychopathic individuals. As previously noted, Lapierre and 
her colleagues (1995) found that psychopathic individuals made more commissive errors 
than comparison individuals on a go/no-go task. Furthermore, psychopathic individuals 
show difficulties extinguishing a previously rewarding response (Newman, Patterson, & 
Kosson, 1987).
The Iowa Gambling Task is considered a sensitive test of VL/OFC dysfunction 
(Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 1999). In this task, participants select cards from 
four decks each with different rates of monetary reinforcement. Two of the decks contain 
high rewards, but even higher punishment, making them disadvantageous. The other two 
decks have low reward, but even lower punishment values. Over the course of the task, 
healthy participants show a preference for the low-risk decks, whereas patients with
2 The experiments discussed in this chapter have been published in the article:
Mitchell, D.G.V., Colledge, E., Leonard, A., & Blair R.J.R. (2002). "Risky decisions and response 
reversal: Is there evidence of orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction in psychopathic individuals?" 
Neuropsychologia, 40: 2013-2022.
66
lesions to the VL/OFC continue to choose disadvantageous^ (Bechara et al., 1994; 
Bechara et al., 1999). A previous study found that psychopathic individuals perform 
similarly to a comparison group on the gambling task (Schmitt, Brinkley, & Newman, 
1999). However, the null result occurred not because the psychopathic group was risk 
averse, but because the comparison group also failed to show a preference for the low- 
risk decks. Furthermore, as the authors contend, the studies contained significant 
procedural differences from the original studies presented by Bechara and his colleagues 
(1999). Indeed, a recent study that used the recommended procedure showed impaired 
performance in boys with psychopathic tendencies relative to comparison children (Blair, 
Colledge, & Mitchell, 2001).
Considerable human and animal data suggest that the VL/OFC is involved in 
altering behaviour to acquired instrumental associations when they become inappropriate 
(Dias et al., 1996; Rolls, 2000). Thus, patients with VL/OFC lesions, like psychopathic 
individuals, have difficulty adjusting their responding when reward contingencies are 
unexpectedly reversed (Homak et al., 2004; Rolls et al., 1994). A pure form of reversal 
learning error is indexed by object reversals. In object reversals, participants choose 
between two shapes presented to them on a computer screen. Choosing one shape results 
in reward, whereas choosing the other will result in punishment. Participants, including 
those with lesions to the VL/OFC, easily learn to choose the correct stimulus. Once the 
discrimination is learnt, the contingencies reverse so that the previously punished 
stimulus is rewarded and vice versa. Despite the simplicity of the task, object reversals of 
this nature have distinguished between patients with lesions to the VL/OFC and those 
with lesions located in more posterior or dorsal regions of the frontal cortex (Rolls, et al., 
1994).
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The current study investigates the performance of psychopathic individuals on two 
tasks thought to be sensitive to VL/OFC dysfunction: the Intradimensional- 
Extradimensional shift (ID/ED) task and the Iowa Gambling Task. A previous study has 
suggested that both patients with amygdala lesions and those with damage to the VL/OFC 
show impaired performance on the gambling task (Bechara et al., 1999). In contrast, the 
ID/ED task is thought to index two dissociable functions of the frontal cortex. In addition 
to indexing RR performance, the task also includes a separate extradimensional set (ED) 
shift component, which requires the participant to attend to a specific aspect of a 
compound stimulus that had not previously predicted reward or punishment. Whereas 
impaired RR performance is associated with lesions of the VL/OFC (Dias et al., 1996; 
Fellows & Farah, 2003; Homak et al., 2004; Rolls et al., 1994), ED shift dysfunction is 
associated with damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Dias et al., 1996; Owen, 
Roberts, Polkey, Sahakian, & Robbins, 1991). Moreover, these abilities to perform RRs 
and ED shifts are doubly dissociable in both animal lesion studies as well as human 
neuropsychological work (Dias et al., 1996; Fellows & Farah, 2003; Rolls, 2000).
If psychopathy is associated with VL/OFC dysfunction, patients with the disorder 
should present with impaired performance on both the gambling task and RR components 
of the ID/ED, but intact performance on the ED shift component. The current study tests 
these predictions.
68
4.2: Methods
4.2.1: Participants
Participants were 51 men selected from three Category B (high security) forensic 
institutions in the London area according to screening and selection criteria described 
more fully in Chapter 2. Although 51 inmates participated in the study, not all 
individuals were available for two testing sessions due to inmate transfers. Consequently, 
31 adults took part in both tasks, 9 completed only the gambling task and 11 completed 
only the ID/ED task. The ages of the participants ranged from 21 to 50 with a mean of 
33.06 years (SD = 8.03). The mean age for the psychopathic and non-psychopathic 
groups was 34.42 (SD = 8.07) and 31.64 (SD = 7.91) respectively. The Raven’s 
Advanced Progressive Matrices (Set I) was administered to provide an estimate of 
intelligence (Raven, 1965; 1995). Raven’s scores ranged from 4 to 12 with a mean of 
8.12 (SD = 2.47). The mean Raven’s Advanced Matrix group scores for psychopathic 
and control groups was 7.65 (SD = 2.40) and 8.60 (SD = 2.50) respectively. There were 
no significant group differences in either age (F(l,49) = 1.55, ns), or Ravens score 
(F(l,49) = 1.90, ns). The sample was made up of 49 Caucasian and 2 Afro-Caribbean 
participants (1 Afro-Caribbean participant in each group). In order to confirm that the 
groups were age and cognitively matched for the reduced number of participants involved 
in the ID/ED and Gambling Task primary analyses, additional one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted on age and Raven’s score. These revealed that the mean age and Raven’s 
score did not differ significantly between groups for either task. Table 4.1 lists 
participant means, standard deviations, and ranges divided by task.
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Table 4.1: ID/ED and Gambling Task participant characteristics
Group PCL-R Age Ravens
The Gambling Task
Psychopathic Inmates 
(n = 20)
33.10 
(2.22; 30 to 37.5)
34.90 
(7.06; 22 to 47)
7.65 
(2.48; 4 to 12)
Controls (n = 20) 9.83 
(2.88; 4.5 to 14)
30.35 
(7.41; 21 to 44)
8.65 
(2.72; 4 to 12)
The ID/ED Task (Primary Analysis)
Psychopathic Inmates 33.07 
(n = 15) (2.29; 30 to 37)
32.67 
(7.69; 22 to 50)
7.73 
(2.22; 4 to 12)
Controls (n = 17) 9.16 
(3.50; 4.5 to 14)
32.65 
(7.83; 23 to 45)
8.65 
(2.67; 4 to 12)
ID/ED Task (All Participants)
Psychopathic Inmates 32.98 
(n = 21) (2.16; 30 to 37.00) 
Controls (« = 21) 9.08
(3.24; 4.5 to 14)
33.62 
(8.01; 22 to 50) 
32.86 
(7.93; 22 to 45)
7.52 
(2.40; 4 to 12)
8.52 
(2.44; 4 to 12)
4.2.2: Measures
4.2.2.1: The PCL-R (Hare, 1991)
The PCL-R consists of 20 behavioural items that are scored on the basis of a file 
review and semi-structured interview as described more fully in section 2.2.2.1. In 
accordance with the literature and the guidelines o f the PCL-R, the psychopathic group 
for the current study was composed o f individuals with a PCL-R score of 30 or above, 
while the non-psychopathic group was made up of individuals scoring 20 or less.
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Participants who declined an interview, but were willing to participate in the experiment 
(n = 6), were scored according to file notes. Inter-rater reliability was established by 
means of a Spearman rank correlation conducted on 41 inmates who were scored 
independently by two raters. The correlation, rranks = 0.89 (p < 0.01), is comparable to 
that presented in the literature (Hare, 1991).
4.2.2.2: The Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et a l, 1999)
The Iowa Gambling Task was administered in computerised format. The task is a 
card game in which participants make selections from four decks (labelled A, B, C, and 
D). Each deck contained different rates and values of monetary reinforcement (play 
money). Following each selection, the computer emitted a distinct sound (similar to a 
casino slot machine). Subsequently, a message was displayed on the screen indicating the 
amount of money the participant had won or lost, and a green bar located above the decks 
changed proportionately according to the result. The minimum interval between 
selections was set at 1 second. The computer program terminated automatically after 100 
trials (card selections). The participant was not informed in advance about the total 
number of trials. On the screen, the backs of the cards appeared identical, like real decks 
of cards. Decks A and C had a higher frequency of punishment, but these punishments 
were of a lower magnitude. Decks B and D had a lower frequency of punishment, but the 
punishments were of a higher magnitude. Overall, decks A and B were disadvantageous, 
and selecting from them would result in a sizable net loss. Ten selections from deck A 
would yield $1,000, but also five unpredictable losses ranging from $150 to $350 thereby 
bringing the net loss to $1250. Ten selections from deck B would yield $1000, but also a 
single loss of $1250. In contrast, ten selections from decks C and D would yield $500, 
but even smaller losses (ranging from $25 to $75 in deck C and one $250 loss in deck D).
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Thus, selecting from decks C and D would result in a net gain of $250. The instructions 
of the task were read verbatim to each participant as follows:
1-In front o f you on the screen, there are 4 decks o f cards A, B, C, and D.
2-1 want you to select one card at a time, by clicking on the card, from any deck you 
choose.
3-Each time you select a card, the computer will tell you that you won some money. I  
don't know how much money you will win. You will find out as we go along. Every time 
you win, the green bar gets bigger.
4-Every so often, however, when you click on a card, the computer tells you that you won 
some money, but then it says that you lost some money too. I  don't know when you will 
lose, or how much you will lose. You will find out as we go along. Every time you lose, 
the green bar gets smaller.
5-You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to the other at any time, and as often as 
you wish.
6-Thegoal o f the game is to win as much money as possible, and if  you can't win, avoid 
losing money as much as possible.
7-You won't know when the game will end. You must keep on playing until the computer 
stops.
8-1 am going to give you this $2000 credit, the green bar, to start the game. The red bar 
here is a reminder o f how much money you borrowed to play the game, and how much 
money you have to pay back before we see how much you won or lost.
9- It is important to know that the colour o f the cards are irrelevant in this game, and 
there is no way for you to figure out when you lose money. So you must not try to figure 
out what the computer is doing—you can't!! All lean say is that some decks are worse 
than the others. You may find all o f them bad, but some are worse than the others. No 
matter how much you find yourself losing, you can still win if  you stay away from the 
worst decks.
Participants are told that they are free to choose from any of the decks that they 
wish and that the objective is to win as much money as possible or to avoid losing money 
as much as possible. In this version of the instructions, it is made clear to the participant 
that some decks are worse than others and that it is possible to achieve the game 
objectives if these poor decks are avoided. As with previous studies incorporating the
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gambling task, the task was split up into 5 blocks of 20 trials, and the dependent variable 
was the number of disadvantageous selections made in each block.
4.2.2.3: The ID/ED Task (Dias et al., 1996)
The ID/ED is a multi-component instrumental learning task. Participants learn to 
select between two stimuli presented to them on a computer screen based on feedback 
provided on the display (the words “correct” or “incorrect”). The stimuli presented are 
novel, and involve up to two dimensions (object shape and line contour). The correct 
stimulus for discrimination is always specified by one dimension or the other (i.e., shape 
A whether it is paired with line 1 or line 2; or line B regardless of the shape that it is 
paired with).
On each trial, the two test stimuli appeared randomly in two of four rectangles 
positioned towards the perimeter of the screen. In order to make a selection, participants 
used a mouse to position the cursor over the box containing the relevant stimulus. The 
task consists of nine stages presented in fixed order, and participants were required to 
learn each discrimination before proceeding past a given stage. In order to meet the 
learning criterion, participants were required to make eight consecutive correct selections. 
Participants did not receive any notification when a stage ended and a new rule was 
presented, nor were they told how many trials or phases made up the experiment. The 
nine stages and their descriptions were as follows:
(1) Simple discrimination: between two (pink) shapes (Shape 1 and Shape 2). The 
participant must learn to respond to Shape 1.
(2) Simple reversal: contains the same two stimuli, but the reward contingencies are 
reversed. Thus, the participant must inhibit responding to Shape 1 and instead respond to 
Shape 2.
(3) Compound discrimination (separate): a pair of white line patterns adjacent to 
each shape is introduced (Line 1 and Line 2). However, the contingencies remain 
unchanged. The participant should maintain responding to Shape 2 whether Shape 2 is
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paired with Line 1 or Line 2. The pink shapes and white line are spatially separated to 
encourage the subject to perceive them as distinct. Pairing is pseudo-random: the same 
pairings (e.g., Shapel-Linel and Shape2-Line2) appear in runs of no more than three 
trials.
(4) Compound discrimination (superimposed): the white lines are superimposed on 
the pink shapes for this and all subsequent stages so that transfer learning could not be 
attributed to spatial learning. The contingencies remain the same. The participant should 
maintain responding to Shape 2.
(5) Compound Reversal: the same stimuli are used but the contingencies are 
reversed. The participant must reverse their selection of Shape 2 and respond to Shape 1. 
As before, participants respond to Shape 1 regardless of whether it is paired with Line 1 
or Line 2.
(6) Intradimensional shift: new shapes and lines are introduced (Shape 3 and Shape 
4 and Line 3 and Line 4). The participant must learn to select Shape 3 whether it is paired 
with Line 3 or Line 4.
(7) Intradimensional reversal: the contingencies are reversed. The participant must
inhibit the selection of Shape 3 and respond to Shape 4.
(8) Extradimensional shift: new shapes and lines are again introduced (Shapes 5 and
6; Lines 5 and 6). However, in this phase of the task the participant must learn that the 
stimulus feature that predicts reward is the superimposed line rather than the shape. For 
example, the participant must learn to select Line 5 whether it is paired with Shape 5 or 
Shape 6.
(9) ED reversal: the contingencies are reversed. The participant must inhibit 
selecting Line 5 in favour of responding to Line 6.
The dependent variable was the number of errors made before successfully advancing to 
the next stage (calculated by the computer). In the event that an individual was unable to 
pass a given stage before making 16 errors on any given stage, the task was terminated.
Each participant was tested individually in a quiet interview room. Both the 
gambling and ID/ED tasks were presented as part of a larger neuropsychological test 
battery delivered in random order. The tasks were described without informing the 
participant o f the investigation’s specific objectives and expectations. The instructions 
were read verbatim to each participant as follows:
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Can you see the two patterns? One o f these patterns is correct, and one o f the patterns is 
wrong. Have a guess at which pattern is correct. I f  you have made the right choice the 
computer will show the word “Correct" in green. I f  you get it wrong the computer will 
show the word “Wrong” in red. Keep choosing the pattern you think is correct. There is 
a rule you can follow to make the correct choice each time, but occasionally that rule will 
change and you have to be prepared for this, but the change will not happen very often.
4.3: Results
4.3.1: The Iowa Gambling Task
Based on previous reports in the literature (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 
1999), it was predicted that the comparison group, but not individuals with psychopathy, 
would sample randomly at first, but then develop a preference for the advantageous 
decks. For the analysis, the 100 trials were divided into 5 blocks of 20 trials each. For 
each block the number of disadvantageous selections (decks A and B) were calculated, as 
well as the number of advantageous selections (decks C and D). The performance of the 
two groups is presented in Figure 4.1. The analysis was conducted by way of a mixed 
model ANOVA. Because Mauchly’s Test o f Sphericity showed a heterogeneity of 
covariance, the more conservative Greenhouse-Geisser test was performed. The resulting 
2 (control vs. psychopathic) X 5 (blocks of 20 trials) ANOVA yielded main effects for 
block, (F  (2.82, 107.03) = 4.40; p  < 0.01), with participants becoming increasingly risk- 
averse over time. There was also an effect for Group, with non-psychopathic individuals 
making fewer selections from the disadvantageous decks than psychopathic participants 
(F (l, 38) = 6.14; p  < 0.05). The Block by Group interaction was also significant (F(2.82, 
107.03) = 2.56;p  < 0.05; 1-tailed); non-psychopathic individuals became more risk- 
averse over time compared with psychopathic participants. An examination of block 
performance by group in light o f the interaction suggests that the main effect for block 
may best be accounted for by the performance of the control group.
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Figure 4.1: Mean number of risky selections on the Iowa Gambling Task 
The figure displays the mean number of high risk selections for psychopathic and non- 
psychopathic individuals by block of 20 trials. Although non-psychopathic individuals learned to 
avoid the high-risk decks over time, individuals with psychopathy did not show this effect. 
Vertical lines depict standard errors of the mean.
Gambling Task Results
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Blocks
4.3.2: ID/ED
The mean number o f errors for each of the three core stage types was calculated 
for psychopathic and non-psychopathic inmates. The three core stage types were: (1) 
learning (phases 1 & 6); (2) reversal learning (phases 2, 5, 7, 9); and (3) ED shifting 
(phase 8). Because obtaining a reliable mean was contingent upon passing all stages, 
only those participants who had successfully completed each stage were included in the 
primary analysis. A failure was defined as the commission o f 16 errors without achieving 
the criterion for passing (8 consecutive correct choices). The exception was one 
individual with psychopathy, who elected to terminate the experiment after making 12
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errors on the ED portion o f the task. Six psychopathic and four control individuals failed 
to complete the ED-shift component of the study, which reduced the number of 
participants included in the primary analysis to 32 (15 psychopathic and 17 non- 
psychopathic individuals). Based on previous studies investigating RR and extinction 
(LaPierre et al., 1995; Newman et al., 1987), it was predicted that individuals with 
psychopathy would show impaired performance on the RR component of the task. In 
contrast, based on evidence in the literature suggesting that psychopathic individuals do 
not show impairments on attentional set-shifting as indexed by measures such as the 
Wisconsin Card-sorting Task (Hare, 1984; LaPierre et al., 1995), it was predicted that 
psychopathic individuals would not show impairments on the ED component of the task.
The two groups were initially compared using a 2 (group: psychopathic vs. non- 
psychopathic) by 3 (component: learning, reversal learning, and ED shift) mixed-model 
ANOVA. Mauchly’s Test o f Sphericity was significant (Mauchly’s W=  0.760; df=  2; p
< 0.05); consequently, the more conservative Greenhouse-Geisser test was used for the 
analysis. This revealed a significant main effect for component (F(l .61,48.37) = 7.75; p
< .01) with participants making fewest errors on the learning component of the task (see 
Figure 4.2). A significant main effect for group (F(l,30) = 7.86;p  < 0.01) revealed that 
psychopathic individuals made more errors on the task than the comparison group. A 
significant group by component interaction also emerged (F (l.61,48.37) = 3.63;p  < .05); 
psychopathic individuals made greater errors on the reversal component than they did on 
any other component whereas non-psychopathic individuals made more errors on the ED 
component than they did on any other component.
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Figure 4.2: Mean number of errors on the ID/ED Task
The mean number of errors made by psychopathic and non-psychopathic individuals across key 
components of the ED/ED Task is presented. Psychopathic individuals made significantly more 
errors than the comparison group only on the RR component. The bars represent the mean 
number of errors; the vertical lines indicate the standard error of the mean.
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To determine how selective the effect for group was on the components of 
interest, three one-way ANOVAs were conducted comparing the performance of 
psychopathic individuals and controls on learning, RRs, and ED shifts. The results 
showed that psychopathic inmates made significantly more errors on the RR components 
(F(l,30) = 7.1 \ \ p  < 0.05). In contrast, no significant differences were found for the 
learning (F(l,30) = 0.218; ns) or ED components (F(l,30) = 2.02; ns).
Although no significant difference existed between the two groups with respect to 
the ED component, ten participants failed to complete this phase and as a consequence, 
were omitted from the primary analysis. The ED shift performance data was 
subsequently analyzed in two ways. First, a one-way ANOVA was conducted, which
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included participants who had failed the ED component o f the task (made 16 errors at 
which point the task was terminated). This revealed no significant group differences for 
the number o f ED errors (F (l, 40) = 1.84; non-significant). Second, in order to assess 
whether psychopathic individuals were disproportionately represented in this subset of 
individuals failing the ED component, a chi-square test was conducted. This test revealed 
that the percentage of psychopathic versus non-psychopathic participants failing the ED 
component of the task was not significantly different (X  (1) = .525; ns).
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Table 4.2: Errors on ID/ED by phase
Table 4.2 shows the mean number of errors and standard deviation (in brackets) for psychopathic 
and non-psychopathic participants for each phase of the ID/ED Task. Significant differences 
were found only for the first and last reversal phase of the task.
Phase Psychopathic
(n = 21)
Mean Errors Number of 
(SD) Failures
Non-Psychopathic 
(n = 21)
Mean Errors Number of 
(SD) Failures
1) Simple 1.00 0 0.57 0
Discrimination (3.26) (1.36)
2) Simple Reversal 3.10* 0 0.86 0
(3.81) (1.24)
3) Compound 0.62 0 0.86 0
Discrimination (0.86) (1.59)
4) Compound 0.29 0 0.14 0
Discrimination (0.72) (0.48)
Superimposed
5) Compound 0.29 0 0.29 0
Reversal (0.56) (0.78)
6) ID Shift 0.14 0 0.19 0
(0.36) (0.51)
7) ID Shift Reversal 0.24 0 0.24 0
(0.54) (0.70)
8) ED Shift 8.00 6 5.33 4
(6.66) (6.07)
9) ED Shift Reversal 3.94* 0 0.29 0
(5.96) (0.47)
*p < 0.05
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4.4: Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine the performance of adult psychopathic 
individuals on the gambling and ID/ED Tasks. In line with predictions, individuals with 
psychopathy were less likely to avoid making risky selections over the course of the 
gambling task relative to comparison individuals. On the ID/ED Task, psychopathic 
individuals showed a selective RR deficit while performing similarly to control 
participants on the attentional set-shifting and object discrimination components of the 
task. This selective result cannot be attributed to a task difficulty effect: a significant 
interaction revealed that while the psychopathic individuals made more errors on the RR 
component than the attentional set-shifting component o f the task, the opposite was true 
for the comparison group. Furthermore, both groups performed close to ceiling on the 
object discrimination (general learning) components o f the task. Chapter 3 reviewed 
evidence that suggests that object discrimination learning does not rely on intact 
amygdala functioning. Although the simplicity o f the object discriminations performed in 
the ID/ED task limits conclusions that can be drawn about the absence of deficits, the 
finding provides some additional support for the idea that the instrumental learning deficit 
evident in individuals with psychopathy is selective.
A previous study has suggested impaired RR performance in psychopathic adults 
(LaPierre et al., 1995). The present study provides additional evidence for this 
impairment. To date, one other study has reported intact performance in individuals with 
psychopathy on the Iowa Gambling Task (Schmitt et al., 1999). However, the procedure 
o f this latter study differed significantly from that used by Bechara and his colleagues 
(Bechara et al., 1999). In particular, the instructions used by Schmitt and his colleagues 
did not explicitly state that some decks involved more loss than others and that
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participants could win more money overall if  they avoided those decks. This may have 
created a tendency for the comparison group to approach the task as a game o f chance, 
thereby reducing the influence o f signals involved in encoding reinforcement 
contingencies. The only two studies that used the same procedure as Bechara and his 
colleagues (1999) yielded significant findings. Thus, both boys with psychopathic 
tendencies in a previous study (Blair et al., 2001a) and adults with psychopathy in the 
current study show reduced ability to avoid disadvantageous responding.
One way o f conceptualising deficits associated with VL/OFC dysfunction is in 
light of the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1998; Damasio, 1994). This hypothesis 
suggests that during decisions o f emotional significance, bio-regulatory states provide 
affective colouring to available response options either through bodily feedback (“body 
loop”) or by representations o f bodily feedback formed from previous associations (“as-if 
body loop”). Effectively, the somatic marker labels an option as either good or bad, 
thereby rapidly constraining the incentive value of that particular choice. Damasio and 
his colleagues (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1991) suggest that 
dysfunction in the somatic marker system may give rise to psychopathic characteristics. 
Although the behavioural data in the current study is consistent with the somatic marker 
hypothesis, the explanation does not predict important findings associated with 
developmental psychopathy. For example, one of the key findings with respect to the 
somatic marker hypothesis is that individuals with VL/OFC lesions show reduced 
autonomic responding to emotionally arousing stimuli (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1990). In contrast, psychopathic adults and boys with psychopathic tendencies show a 
selective impairment to stimuli depicting distress, but intact responding to other 
emotional stimuli such as some threat cues and (sometimes) appetitive stimuli (Blair, 
1997; Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1997; Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 1993). In light o f
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these contradictions, it seems unlikely that developmental psychopathy can be explained 
strictly in terms of somatic marker dysfunction.
It should be noted that the present study has clear significance for another 
important model of psychopathy—the response modulation hypothesis. Response 
modulation is defined as a “rapid and relatively automatic (i.e., non-effortful or 
involuntary) shift of attention from the effortful organisation and implementation of goal- 
directed behaviour to its evaluation” (Newman, 1998; Newman, Schmitt, & Voss, 1997). 
Newman (1998) suggests that dysfunction in this system results in a failure to give 
sufficient consideration to potentially relevant peripheral information when engaging in 
goal-directed behaviour. Data from the One-Pack Card Playing Task supports the 
prediction that psychopathic individuals should persist in responding to a previously 
rewarded response, even if  the rate of punishment increases (Fisher & Blair, 1998; 
Newman et al., 1987; O'Brien & Frick, 1996). However, evidence from lesion studies 
does not support the idea o f a unitary system for response modulation (Dias et al., 1996; 
Homak et al., 2004; Rahman, Sahakian, Hodges, Rogers, & Robbins, 1999; Rolls et al., 
1994). Collectively, these studies show evidence for a double dissociation between the 
system crucial for RR and the system crucial for attentional set-shifting. Both RR and 
attentional set-shifting are clear examples of a modulation in responding. RR requires 
participants to integrate changes in reinforcement value to redirect their responding from 
one stimulus to another. The ED shift component o f the ID/ED requires individuals to 
redirect their attention from one stimulus dimension (shape) to consider the relevance of 
another, previously irrelevant stimulus dimension (superimposed design). Thus, the 
neuropsychological data clearly demonstrate that there is no single system for response 
set modulation. This conclusion is supported by the current study. The psychopathic 
individuals in the present study presented with poor RR performance; however, they did
83
not show deficits in performing ED shifts in the ID/ED, nor is there evidence of 
attentional set-shifting deficits as indexed by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Hare, 
1984; LaPierre et al., 1995). This suggests that the response modulation hypothesis is in 
need of modification to clarify the parameters under which the system is thought to 
operate.
An alternative way o f conceptualising the current results is in light o f the 
Integrated Emotional Systems (IES) model (Blair, 2004). This model, described in more 
detail in Chapters 1 and 7, suggests that regions of VLPFC (BA 47) play a crucial role in 
RR. Functionally, units within BA 47 are thought to detect mismatches between 
expectations o f valence reinforcement (represented by the insula and relayed to medial 
regions o f frontal cortex where they are able to influence behaviour) and actual received 
reinforcement. Thus, damage to VLPFC, insula, or medial regions of prefrontal cortex 
will all result in impaired RR. Blair (2004) suggests that the degree of dysfunction in this 
circuit determines the extent of the RR performance decrement on such measures as the 
Iowa Gambling and ID/ED Tasks.
It is worth noting that a recent study reports intact RR performance on the ID/ED 
in boys with psychopathic tendencies (Blair et al., 2001a). Thus, boys with psychopathic 
tendencies may have less dysfunction than the adults as indicated by their delayed risk 
avoidance learning but intact performance on the ID/ED. In contrast, the greater 
dysfunction in psychopathic adults is shown by the lack o f risk avoidance learning on the 
Iowa Gambling Task and the pronounced RR impairment on the ID/ED Task. The 
differences in the degree o f VL/OFC impairment between adults and boys with 
psychopathic tendencies may be a developmental consequence of the disorder. Given the 
evidence for interdependence and functional connectivity of the VL/OFC and amygdala, 
it is possible that a primary deficit within the amygdala could give rise to deficits
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associated with VL/OFC impairment. Indeed, a recent imaging study shows reduced 
amygdalar volume in psychopathic individuals relative to a comparison group (Tiihonen 
et al., 2000). Although highly speculative, a reduction in afferent input from the 
amygdala may, over time, have a negative impact on the responsiveness of the VL/OFC. 
Accordingly, the long-term effects of this dysfunction may not be evident until later in the 
life-span. This would account for the apparent absence of RR deficits in boys with 
psychopathic tendencies.
Alternatively, the greater impairment seen in adult psychopathic individuals may 
arise as a secondary consequence o f the behavioural characteristics of the disorder. For 
example, one o f the criteria o f psychopathy, stimulation seeking, is often associated with 
drug use (Hare, 1991). Studies suggest that psychopathy is associated with higher rates of 
drug abuse, dependence, and poly-drug use (Hemphill, Hart, & Hare, 1994; Smith & 
Newman, 1990). Furthermore, studies also show impaired performance on the gambling 
task in alcohol and drug-dependent patients (Bechara et al., 2001; Grant, Contoreggi, & 
London, 2000). Using a novel decision-making task, Rogers and his colleagues (1999a) 
assessed the quality o f decision-making and deliberation time of individuals with focal 
VL/OFC damage and individuals who abused amphetamine or opiates. All three groups 
showed impaired performance on the task relative to comparison groups. Given the 
neurocognitive impairments associated with chronic drug abuse and the data suggesting 
that higher rates of abuse and dependence among psychopathic individuals, it cannot be 
discounted that some o f the decision-making impairments seen in psychopathic 
individuals is acquired as a secondary consequence o f their stimulus-seeking behaviour.
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4.5: Conclusion
This study provides evidence for impaired performance of psychopathic 
individuals on the gambling task and the RR component o f the ID/ED Task. This 
impairment may be representative of dysfunction within a neural circuit involving the 
VL/OFC that is crucial for detecting discrepancies between actual and expected levels of 
reinforcement. This finding is consistent with other studies that assess psychopathic 
individuals on tasks with RR or response modulation components (LaPierre et al., 1995; 
Newman et al., 1987). Interestingly, this dysfunction may be greater in adults with 
psychopathy than in boys with psychopathic tendencies (Blair et al., 2001a). This 
disparity raises the possibility that the VL/OFC deficits observed in adult psychopathic 
individuals may develop as a secondary consequence o f early amygdala dysfunction or 
substance abuse. Further research that controls for substance abuse history and includes 
decision-making tasks with graded levels of difficulty may establish which o f these two 
possibilities are relevant.
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Chapter 5
Psychopathy and Conditional Learning:
Setting the Conditions for the Instrumental Learning Impairment
S.l: Introduction
Chapter 3 described an instrumental learning task believed to rely on stimulus- 
reinforcement associations. Chapter 4 presented an experiment involving a task that 
requires participants to demonstrate object discrimination learning. Object 
discriminations are thought to be a product o f stimulus-response association formation. 
The present chapter explores the performance of individuals with psychopathy on an 
instrumental learning and relearning task—the Ask for Money Task. This paradigm 
features a third form of instrumental learning referred to as “conditional learning.”
Conditional learning is distinct from other forms of learning at the cognitive and 
neural levels. At the cognitive level, conditional learning involves selecting from 
available responses in the context o f a reference stimulus. In making conditional 
discriminations, individuals determine their response based on which stimulus is present 
(i.e., press the left button for stimulus 1, but the right button for stimulus 2). Thus, all 
stimuli and all responses are associated with reward provided that the appropriate 
response is performed in the appropriate stimulus’ presence. As in object discrimination 
tasks, conditional learning tasks are not solved through the formation of stimulus- 
reinforcement associations, but rather, through stimulus-response associations (Baxter & 
Murray, 2002). Indeed, conditional discrimination tasks cannot be solved through 
stimulus-reinforcement learning because each of the stimuli yield reward. Because each
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stimulus can yield reward or punishment, a specific affective value or “emotional tone” 
(i.e., reinforcement value) cannot be associated with the stimulus to facilitate learning.
At the neural level, human and non-human lesion studies support the idea that 
conditional discriminations represent a dissociable form of instrumental learning. 
Laboratory rats with basolateral amygdala lesions perform similarly to rats with sham 
lesions in a conditional learning task; however, the lesioned rats do show impaired 
second-order conditioning and extinction (Bums, Everitt, & Robbins, 1999). The 
amygdala is thought to be crucial for representing stimulus value (Everitt, Cardinal, 
Parkinson, & Robbins, 2003). It is this role in value representation that explains why the 
amygdala is involved in stimulus-reinforcement, but not stimulus-response learning. 
Based on these findings, it can be proposed that the amygdala allows affective values to 
be “tagged” to stimuli to facilitate responding. Affective values are not associated with 
stimuli in stimulus-response learning; consequently, amygdala function does not facilitate 
this form of instrumental responding.
Rather than amygdala involvement, the data implicate regions of dorsolateral PFC 
(Petredes, 1982; 1985a), or inferotemporal cortex together with orbital and ventrolateral 
structures (Bussey, Wise, & Murray; 2001; 2002) in conditional learning. Macaques with 
bilateral (but not unilateral) removal of ventral and orbital PFC show conditional learning 
deficits (Bussey et al., 2001; 2002). Monkeys with crossed disconnection o f ventral and 
OFC with the inferotemporal cortex were also impaired, suggesting that communication 
between these structures mediates conditional learning (Bussey et al., 2002). It should be 
noted that the lesions involved in the latter two studies were extensive, including not only 
ventrolateral regions (Walker’s 12), but also regions anterior (Walker’s 11), medial 
(Walker’s 11 and 13), and dorsolateral (Walker’s 45) to ventrolateral PFC. Monkeys 
with lesions restricted to the dorsolateral or periarcuate cortex show conditional learning
decrements (Petrides, 1982; Petrides, 1985a). Finally, deficient conditional 
discrimination performance was observed in humans with lesions involving the frontal 
cortex (particularly posterior dorsolateral preffontal cortex), but not in patients with 
temporal lobectomies (Petrides, 1985b; 1997).
The task described in this chapter consists of two phases. In the first phase, 
participants encounter one of four stimuli on each trial and leam to choose between two 
responses for each stimulus. In this initial conditional learning phase, participants leam 
which response maps on to each of the stimuli. The dorsolateral preffontal cortex is not 
thought to be impaired in individuals with psychopathy (Hare, 1984; LaPierre et al., 1995; 
Blair et al., 2001a; Mitchell et al., 2002); therefore, any focal amygdala or VL/OFC 
dysfunction analysis o f psychopathy must predict intact performance for individuals with 
psychopathy on the initial phase of this task. In the second phase, response contingencies 
change for half o f the stimuli; participants must alter their responses to these stimuli in 
order to achieve maximal performance. Regardless o f the neural substrate involved in the 
acquisition of the instrumental association (e.g., the amygdala in the case o f stimulus- 
reinforcement learning and the dorsolateral preffontal cortex in the case of conditional 
learning), the VL/OFC is thought to be involved in reversing the acquisition. For 
example, making object discriminations does not rely on the amygdala, but the VL/OFC 
is nevertheless crucial for the reversal of object discriminations (Rolls et al., 1994; 
Fellows & Farah, 2003; Homak et al., 2004). Thus, the VL/OFC is considered to be 
involved in the second phase of the Ask for Money Task. Consequently, any analysis of 
psychopathy that emphasizes VL/OFC dysfunction must predict impaired performance 
for the conditional relearning phase o f this task.
In the present study, individuals with psychopathy and a control group are 
compared on a conditional learning task. Given the lack of evidence for dorsolateral
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preffontal cortex dysfunction in this patient group, it was predicted that individuals with 
psychopathy would not be impaired in acquiring stimulus-response associations in Phase
1 of the Ask for Money Task. Given the association between VL/OFC dysfunction and 
psychopathy, however, it was predicted that patients with the disorder would show a 
selective impairment for conditional relearning.
5.2: Methods
5.2.1: Participants
Participants were 39 individuals selected from three category B (high security) forensic 
institutions in the London area (19 psychopathic and 20 non-psychopathic offenders). 
Files were screened to exclude individuals who were older than 55 or whose psychiatric 
reports revealed a diagnosis for psychosis, organic brain damage or neurological disorder. 
All participants were informed that participation was voluntary and would not affect 
individual status or record within the institution. Participants did not receive any 
financial or other gain for their participation or performance on the task. The ages of the 
participants ranged from 22 to 54 years old with a mean of 35.54. The Raven’s advanced 
progressive matrix (Set I; Raven, 1965) was administered to provide an estimate of 
intelligence. Raven’s scores ranged from 5 to 12 with a mean of 8.21. There were no 
significant group differences in either age (F(l,37) = 0.32, ns) or Raven’s score (F(l,37)
= 1.85, ns). The sample was made up of 32 Caucasian and 7 Affo-Caribbean participants;
2 and 5 Affo-Caribbean participants were in the comparison and psychopathic groups 
respectively. Participant details by group are presented in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Ask for Money Task participant characteristics
Psychopathic Individuals 
(n = 19)
Comparison Group 
(n = 20)
M SD Range M SD Range
Participant characteristics
Ravens Advanced Score 7.79 1.60 5 to 11 8.60 2.09 5 to 12
Age 34.63 9.04 22 to 53 36.40 10.40 23 to 54
PCL-R Factor 1 Score 12.76* 1.86 9 to 16 4.10 3.36 0.50 to 12.50
PCL-R Factor 2 Score 14.69* 1.92 7.70 to 16 4.18 2.53 1.10to9
PCL-R Total 32.32* 2.23 29.75 to 37.5 9.96 4.51 2.50 to 18.95
*p<0.01.
5.2.2: Measures
5.2.2.1: ThePCL-R (Hare, 1991).
The PCL-R was administered as an index of psychopathy. Additional details 
concerning the psychometric properties and administration of the PCL-R are presented in 
section 2.2.2.1 of Chapter 2. Inter-rater reliability was established by means of a 
Spearman rank correlation conducted on 36 inmates who were scored independently by 
two experienced raters. The correlation, rranks = 0.90 (p < .001), is comparable to that 
presented in the literature (Hare, 1991). Individuals with psychopathy were significantly 
higher on factor 1, 2, and total PCL-R scores than non-psychopathic individuals (p < 
0 .01).
5.2.2.2: The Ask fo r  Money Task (Fine, 2000)
The Ask for Money Task is an instrumental learning task that assesses the ability 
of participants to adjust responding to changes in reinforcement contingency. In the task, 
participants were presented with a scenario in which they imagine that they are
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attempting to borrow additional money from their relatives. The instructions given to the 
participants were as follows:
You are penniless and desperately need some money. You are going to have to try to 
persuade your relatives to give you some money. When you see a relative, you can either 
hint that you would like some money, or beg them to give you some money.
Unfortunately, you already owe all o f your relatives a lot o f money, so sometimes a 
relative will demand that you repay them some o f the money that you owe them.
Some relatives may respond better to hinting, and some relatives may respond better to 
begging. This means that you can maximize the amount o f money that your relatives give 
you, and minimize the amount o f money that you pay them back, by learning which is the 
best way to ask your different relatives for money.
In the game, relatives will appear one at a time. You must decide whether to hint for  
money, or beg. Once you have chosen, a message will appear on the screen. I f  your 
relative has given you money, the message will say “You have won x  pounds**. I f  your 
relative has demanded money from you, the message will say, “You have lost x  pounds**. 
A message will also appear on the screen, telling you how many pounds you would have 
won or lost if  you had chosen the opposite way to ask for money (i.e., hinting instead o f 
begging, or begging instead o f hinting).
Remember, you need all the money you can get! Good luck.
The task was presented to the participant via a computer screen. On each trial, a 
bitmap cartoon representation of a relative appeared in the centre of the screen (see Figure 
5.1). Participants could select either the “Hint” or the “Beg” button on each trial by using 
a mouse. A message would then appear over the button selected indicating how much 
money the participant had received from their relative, or how much money was 
reclaimed from them. Additionally, a message would appear on the screen indicating 
how much money the participant would have gained or lost had they asked for money in 
the opposite way. Following delivery o f reinforcement, there was a four second pause
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before the next trial commenced. The total score message was updated on each trial.
Four different relatives depicted by distinctive bitmap pictures were in the game. In 
Phase 1 of the task, two of the relatives were associated with acquiring money and two of 
the relatives were associated with losing money when the “Beg” or “Hint” buttons were 
selected.3 The reward associations are shown in Table 5.2. It can be seen that for two of 
the relatives, hinting was more advantageous than begging; for the remaining two 
relatives, the opposite was true. In both phases of the experiment, there were two positive 
stimuli (relatives who gave money) and two negative stimuli (relatives who demanded an 
instalment). Each of the phases consisted of blocks consisting o f four trials with each 
relative being presented once in every block in a random order. There were eight blocks 
(32 trials) in phase 1 (expectation acquisition) and six blocks (24 trials) in phase 2 
(reversal). As can be seen in Table 5.2, in the second phase of the task, the optimal 
strategy for requesting money changed for two of the relatives from begging to hinting for 
one, and from hinting to begging for the other. The first block o f both phase 1 and 2 were 
not scored and were excluded from the analysis to ensure exposure to the reinforcement 
contingencies for each stimulus. As a result, phase 1 consisted o f 28 scored trials; phase 
2 consisted of twenty trials.
3
There are differences between the current conditional learning task and tasks used previously in humans 
by Petrides (1985; 1997). First, in previous conditional learning tasks, stimuli and responses have been 
paired in a 1:1 matching such that each response is correct for one and only one stimulus. The Ask for 
Money Task, in contrast, has a 4:2 mapping. Secondly, response choice in this design leads to greater or 
lesser amounts of reward/punishment for each relative, rather than one response being rewarded and the 
other punished.
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Table 5.2: Response contingencies in each phase of the task
Phase I Phase II
Hint Beg Hint Beg
A £5 £10 - £5 -£10
B - £5 -£10 £5 £10
C £10 £5 £10 £5
D -£10 - £5 -£10 - £5
The valence of the response outcomes are reversed between phase one and two for 
two of the stimuli (positive to negative for relative A and vice versa for relative B). For 
relative C and D, the valence and values of the response outcomes remain the same. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the feedback screen o f the user interface of the task displayed 
following a selection that was made.
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Figure 5.1: The user interface for the Ask for Money Task (Fine, 2000)
The central figure is the bitmap cartoon depicting one of the conditional stimuli. The response 
buttons appear on either side of the bitmap image on the lower half of the screen. In this 
particular example, the participant has erroneously selected the “beg for money” option as 
depicted by the bolded frame surrounding the “BEG” button.
Y O U  H A V E  £ 5
YOU WOULD 
HAVE WON £10
IIIN I
YOU WIN
BEG
In the current task, three variables were of particular interest: (1) initial stimulus- 
response associations as measured by correct selections in phase 1 (conditional learning); 
(2) behavioural adjustment to changes in reward contingencies as measured by correct 
selections in phase 2 (for the two stimuli that alter reinforcement values; conditional 
relearning); and (3) maintenance of old but appropriate stimulus-response associations as 
measured by correct selections for the two stimuli that retain their original reinforcement 
contingencies in the second phase.
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Figure 5.2: The remaining three conditional stimuli in the Ask for Money Task
•f.
5.3: Results
An initial MANOVA was conducted comparing psychopathic and non- 
psychopathic participants on three components: (1) the number of correct selections on 
phase 1; (2) the number of correct selections for the stimuli that reverse reinforcement 
contingencies in phase 2; (3) the number of correct selections for the stimuli that maintain 
the same reinforcement contingencies in phase 2. A trial was scored as correct if the 
participant selected the strategy (hinting or begging) that resulted in the highest level of 
reinforcement. Table 5.3 presents the number correct for each condition for each group.
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Table 5.3: Mean number correct by trial type
Individuals with psychopathy 
(n = 19)
Comparison individuals 
(n = 20)
M  SD  Range M  SD  Range
Correct Selections
Acquisition 
(Phase; max = 28)
16.00 4.42 10 to 25 16.90 3.93 8 to 24
Reversed Stimuli 
(Phase 2; max = 10)
4.95* 1.68 2 to 7 6.15 2.25 OtolO
Non-reversed Stimuli 
(Phase 2; max = 10)
5.84 2.06 3 to 10 6.05 2.50 OtolO
*p < 0.05; one-tailed.
The Wilkes Lambda multivariate statistic did not reveal a significant effect for 
group (F(3, 35) = 1.20; ns)', individuals with psychopathy did not make significantly less 
correct selections overall. In addition, the individuals with psychopathy and the 
comparison individuals did not perform significantly different on the conditional learning 
phase of the task (F(l,37) < 1; ns). Moreover, one-sample t-tests demonstrated that the 
performance o f both groups was significantly above chance during the conditional 
learning phase (individuals with psychopathy: (t(18) = 1.84; p  < 0.05, one-tailed); 
comparison individuals: (/(l 9) = 2.96; p  < .01); both groups displayed conditional 
learning.
In phase 2, the individuals with psychopathy made significantly fewer correct 
selections relative to the comparison individuals for the stimuli that changed 
reinforcement contingencies (F(l,37) = 3.54;p  < 0.05, i f  = 0.6; d  = 0.42; one-tailed).
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However, there was no significant group difference for the stimuli that retained the same 
reinforcement contingencies in phase 2 as they had held in Phase 1 (F(l,37) < 1; ns).
Thus, individuals with psychopathy performed significantly worse than the comparison 
group at the reversal phase, and did not perform significantly above chance in responding 
to stimuli for which the response contingency was reversed.
5.4: Discussion
This study examined the performance of adult psychopathic and non-psychopathic 
individuals on a task assessing conditional learning and relearning. Psychopathic 
individuals did not show significant impairment relative to a comparison group in 
conditional learning. However, in line with predictions, the psychopathic group made 
significantly more errors than comparison individuals on the second phase of the task for 
the stimuli that reversed their response contingencies. They did not, however, differ from 
the comparison groups in their responding to stimuli that did not reverse response 
contingencies.
This experiment joins a body of work investigating different forms o f instrumental 
learning and relearning in individuals with psychopathy. Individuals with psychopathy 
show difficulty with passive avoidance learning (Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman & 
Schmitt, 1998; Blair et al., 2004a), extinction (Newman et al., 1987) and object reversals 
(Mitchell et al., 2002). Individuals with psychopathy show little difficulty on the current 
conditional learning task, however, or on reward-only or punishment-only versions of 
passive avoidance learning (Newman & Kosson, 1986).
Individuals with psychopathy present with impairment in specific aspects of 
amygdala functioning. Consequently, they should, and do, present with impairment on 
tasks such as passive avoidance learning, which are reliant on the formation of stimulus-
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punishment and stimulus-reward associations. In contrast, individuals with psychopathy 
do not present with impairment on measures involving stimulus-response associations, 
such as object discrimination (Mitchell et al., 2002), and the Ask for Money Task.
In light of the present findings, a novel explanation for the dissociation between 
classic passive avoidance learning and reward or punishment-only variants of passive 
avoidance learning emerges. Despite consistently showing deficits on traditional forms of 
passive avoidance learning in which responding to half o f the stimuli results in reward 
and responding to others results in punishment, individuals with psychopathy show intact 
performance on reward-only and punishment-only versions of the task (Newman, Widom, 
& Nathan, 1985; Newman & Kosson, 1986). In such versions of the task, participants are 
rewarded both for responding to the appropriate stimuli and for withholding a response to 
inappropriate stimuli. When participants respond (or withhold responding) incorrectly, 
they are not rewarded. As in the conditional learning task described in this chapter, all 
stimuli can yield reward provided that the appropriate response is made in its presence. 
Thus, an affective value cannot be tagged to stimuli; the reward-only or punishment-only 
versions of the passive avoidance are essentially conditional learning tasks and so 
performance is not facilitated by amygdala responding.
This formulation has already produced testable hypotheses. A recent study 
involving fMRI found that, in line with predictions, successful passive avoidance learning 
performance relies on an integrated neural response including the amygdala, 
hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex (Budhani, 2004). According to the theory, one 
must predict that the performance o f reward-only/punishment-only versions of the task 
would activate regions of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, but not the amygdala. 
Preliminary data suggest that this is indeed the case (Budhani, 2004).
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Although individuals with psychopathy did not present with significant 
impairment relative to a comparison group in conditional learning, they did present with 
difficulties reversing their responding following a contingency change. This was in line 
with predictions. It is suggested here that VL/OFC is involved in altering both stimulus- 
reinforcement and stimulus-response associations. The role of the VL/OFC in altering 
behaviour based on stimulus-reinforcement associations can be seen in extinction 
paradigms; lesions of OFC in humans and other primates disrupt extinction (Butter, 1969; 
Rolls et al., 1994). The role of VL/OFC in altering behaviour based on stimulus-response 
associations can be seen in simple object discrimination RR paradigms; VL/OFC lesions 
in humans and other primates disrupt performance on such tasks (Rolls et al., 1994; 
Fellows & Farah, 2003; Berlin, Rolls, & Kischka, 2004; Clark, Cools, & Robbins, 2004). 
Furthermore, imaging studies investigating reversals o f probabilistic object reversals also 
implicate the VLPFC (Cools et al., 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2003).
5.5: Conclusion
This chapter argued that conditional learning paradigms are reliant on the 
formation o f stimulus-response associations. As predicted by recent conceptualizations 
o f psychopathy that implicate an impaired circuit involving the amygdala and OFC, 
psychopathy was associated with intact acquisition of conditional discriminations but 
impaired conditional RRs relative to a comparison group. These results are in line with 
suggestions that individuals with psychopathy show difficulties with the formation of 
stimulus-reinforcement but not stimulus-response associations, and in making changes to 
acquired associations, whether they are between a stimulus and reinforcement or a 
stimulus and a response.
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Chapter 6
Acquired Sociopathy Following an Automobile Accident 
6.1: Introduction
This chapter reports on a patient (C.L.), who following trauma to the right frontal 
region including the OFC at age 14, showed evidence o f a personality change consistent 
with “acquired sociopathy.” His behaviour is characterised by impulsivity, promiscuity, 
pathological lying, temper tantrums, and a callous disregard for the seriousness o f his 
interpersonal behaviour. A series o f experimental investigations were conducted to 
investigate the underlying cognitive dysfunction that may contribute to his aberrant social 
behaviour. His performance was compared with that of forensic samples of psychopathic 
and non-psychopathic individuals, and healthy volunteers of comparable age and IQ.
Frontal lobe damage has been associated with profound changes in personality 
and emotional responding including increased irresponsibility, promiscuity, impulsivity 
and poor planning (Damasio, 1994). Previously high functioning individuals who incur 
damage to the OFC are often unable to sustain the same level of occupational or social 
functioning and often engage in previously uncharacteristic aggression. Chapter 1 of this 
thesis reviewed evidence suggesting that patients with lesions involving the VL/OFC 
show deficits on tasks involving: emotional expression recognition (Homak et al., 1996; 
Blair & Cipolotti, 2000), empathic responding (Grattan et al., 1994; Eslinger, 1998), and 
judgements of social convention (Damasio, 1994; Anderson et al., 1999). These 
laboratory findings are often accompanied by clinical observations of increased emotional 
volatility, a diminished regard for the welfare of others, and aggression (Burgess &
Wood, 1990; Stuss et al., 1992; Damasio, 1994; Anderson et al., 2000).
Patients with OFC damage also show deficient decision-making (Bechara et al., 
1994; Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al. 1999) and poor behavioural change following
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changes in reinforcement contingencies (Rolls et al., 1994; Rolls, 1997; Rolls, 2004). 
Currently, three dominant theoretical frameworks exist to characterise key (partially 
dissociable) functions of VL/OFC. These theories make reference to the VL/OFC as a 
somatic marker system (Damasio, 1994), a response reversal (RR) system (Rolls et al., 
1994; Rolls, 2004), and as a social response reversal (SRR) system (Blair & Cipolotti, 
2000). Each of these conceptualisations is reviewed in Chapter 1. In brief, the somatic 
marker hypothesis suggests that the VL/OFC is involved in integrating feedback from 
bodily states or representations of bodily states (formed by previous associations) to help 
precipitate judgements about the value of a particular response option. Rolls (1996) has 
suggested that the OFC plays a crucial role in modifying behaviour to produce effective 
reward and punishment-related responding, particularly when reinforcement 
contingencies change. Thus, the RR explanation suggests that this system is crucial in 
altering previously acquired stimulus-reward associations when they are no longer 
appropriate. The SRR explanation suggests that expressions convey important social 
information used to monitor, assess, and adjust behaviour for ongoing and future 
interactions (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). Essentially, this explanation is a social equivalent 
to the RR position, but with negative social feedback such as angry expressions initiating 
the cessation of ongoing social behaviour. Individuals who have sustained damage to the 
OFC are comparably insensitive to these social cues, and so cannot incorporate signals 
from this system to alter ongoing behaviour.
Recently, a unified model has been proposed that describes how the 
neurocognitive deficits shown in patients with OFC lesions can lead to reactive 
aggression (Blair, 2004). In this model, two of the systems described above, the RR and 
SRR systems, while functionally dissociable, are thought to exist within regions of 
VLPFC. The RR system is implicated in reactive aggression in its role in detecting
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mismatches between the expected and actual value of reinforcement. Frustration, thought 
to be one of the precursors of reactive aggression (Berkowitz, 1993), results when a 
behaviour initiated to obtain reinforcement does not result in the expected reward. As a 
consequence, deficits in the system involved in encoding expectations and violations of 
these expectations may lead to increased frustration and subsequently, a higher risk for 
reactive aggression. The SRR is implicated in reactive aggression because of its role in 
modifying behaviour as a consequence of negative social cues in the environment. This 
responding is believed to occur as a function o f social dominance. The OFC will either 
mediate or moderate subcortical threat system responding (thereby increasing or 
decreasing the probability of reactive aggression) depending on how the individuals 
involved in the interaction are positioned within the dominance hierarchy.
It has been suggested that individuals with early-onset OFC damage present with a 
syndrome analogous to developmental psychopathy (Anderson et al., 1999). The 
apparent similarities between the two disorders have prompted individuals to describe 
patients with lesions to this region as “acquired sociopaths” (Damasio, 1994) or “pseudo­
psychopaths” (Blumer & Benson, 1975). In line with this hypothesis, adult psychopathic 
individuals show deficits on tasks thought to be sensitive to OFC dysfunction. For 
example, psychopathic individuals showed significantly impaired performance relative to 
incarcerated controls on a go/no-go task (LaPierre et al., 1995), made significantly more 
RR errors on the ID/ED Task (Mitchell et al., 2002), and significantly more 
disadvantageous selections on the Iowa Gambling Task (Blair et al., 2001a; Mitchell et 
al., 2002). RR deficits in children with psychopathic tendencies appear to be less 
pronounced, being detected only in tasks with more subtle changes in reward 
contingencies (Blair et al., 2001a; Budhani, 2004). This finding has prompted speculation
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that the RR deficits observed in developmental psychopaths may be a secondary 
consequence of their disorder (Blair, 2001).
Key differences between developmental psychopathic individuals and acquired 
sociopaths have been noted. Developmental psychopathy is particularly associated with 
instrumental and reactive aggression (Cornell et al., 1996); however, acquired sociopathy 
is almost exclusively associated with reactive aggression (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Blair, 
2004). Evidence suggests that instrumental and reactive aggression are mediated by 
distinct neurocognitive systems. Reactive aggression, in particular, has been linked to 
abnormalities within the frontal lobes. Thus, imaging studies have shown reduced 
prefrontal activity in reactive offenders (Volkow & Tancredi, 1987; Volkow et al., 1995). 
Raine and his colleagues have shown reduced prefrontal activity in reactive, but not 
instrumentally violent offenders (Raine et al., 1998).
Recent formulations suggest that early disruption in the socialisation process can 
be a particular risk factor for instrumental, rather than reactive aggression (Blair, 1995; 
Blair & Morton, 1995; Blair et al., 1997). Although aversive conditioning does facilitate 
socialization, it is the distress cues of the victim rather than the threat o f punishment that 
acts as effective aversive stimuli. These aversive stimuli become associated with the 
aggressive acts that elicit the cues, and through a process of conditioning, the acts 
themselves become punishing. Given the amygdala’s importance in aversive 
conditioning and instrumental learning (Killcross et al., 1997; LeDoux, 1998; Davis, 
2000), dysfunction in this region is suggested to be a specific risk factor for instrumental 
aggression (Blair, 2001). The link between instrumental aggression and instrumental 
learning enables the generation o f specific predictions with regard to learning deficits in 
patients with developmental versus acquired psychopathy. Chapters 3 ,4 , and 5 review 
evidence suggesting that the amygdala is crucial for some (stimulus-reinforcement), but
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not all (stimulus-response) forms o f instrumental learning. Consequently, one would 
predict that the learning impairments demonstrated by individuals with psychopathy 
would be distinct from those expected in individuals with acquired sociopathy.
A second crucial difference between developmental and acquired psychopathy is 
that evidence exists for SRR dysfunction in the latter, but not the former patient group 
(Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). Thus, subjects with developmental psychopathy show intact 
recognition of some expressions, such as anger (Blair et al., 2001b; 2004b), and 
appropriate identification o f situations likely to induce social disapproval in others (Blair 
& Cipolotti, 2000). The finding that individuals with psychopathy show intact SRR 
(Blair & Cipolotti, 2000), but impaired RR (LaPierre et al., 1995; Mitchell et al., 2002) 
supports suggestions that these systems are dissociable. In fact, a double dissociation has 
been observed in psychopharmacological research. For example, alcohol and diazepam 
disrupt SRR (Borrill, Rosen, & Summerfield, 1987; Blair & Curran, 1999), but not RR 
(Coull et al., 1995). Conversely, serotonergic manipulations modulate RR (Clarke, 
Dailey, Crofts, Robbins, & Roberts, 2004), but not SRR (Harmer, Bhagwagar, Cowen, & 
Goodwin, 2001). Despite the presence of RR deficits in developmental psychopathic 
individuals, the contribution that this dysfunction makes to their instrumental aggression 
has been questioned (Blair, 2004).
In this chapter, a case study o f patient C.L. is presented. Following a severe head 
injury, C.L. displayed a pattern o f behaviour characterised by “acquired sociopathy.” The 
objective o f the experiments described in this chapter was to investigate the cognitive 
impairments that were associated with his injury and help define how these deficits might 
relate to his profound social and emotional impairment. In light o f the debate concerning 
the neurocognitive impairments associated with developmental psychopathy, the 
performance o f C.L. was compared with that of a small group of individuals with
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developmental psychopathy, a comparison group consisting o f incarcerated adults, and 
healthy adults from the community. This enabled comparisons to be drawn between 
neurocognitive deficits associated with acquired sociopathy and developmental 
psychopathy. The tasks employed were associated with decision-making, instrumental 
learning and relearning, emotional expression recognition, and social cognition.
6.2: Case Report
C.L. is a 51 year-old, right-handed male, who was injured at the age of 14 in a 
traffic accident whilst cycling. He was admitted to hospital suffering severe head trauma 
in a confused and excited state. Surgeons removed necrotic brain tissue from the right 
orbital region. A series of operations were undertaken to repair the affected region.
Prior to the accident, C.L. lead a relatively unremarkable childhood. Although 
engaging in occasional truancy, his records contain no reports of behavioural problems. 
After his injury, however, he is reported to have lost his friends and to have become 
socially isolated. He left school without obtaining any qualifications and began to work. 
His work history thereafter was sporadic, and in his first job he was dismissed in weeks. 
Subsequently, he obtained roughly a dozen different jobs ranging from one day to six 
months in duration. His first contact with the law occurred at age 18 when he murdered 
and sexually assaulted a middle-aged woman. Upon remand, psychiatric evaluations 
found no evidence of mental illness, but did report the patient’s striking failure to 
appreciate the gravity o f his offence. After a few months of observation, the diagnosis 
“post-traumatic psychopathic disorder” was issued by a psychiatrist, and the patient was 
described as being a danger both to himself and to others. His recollection of the event 
was allegedly poor, and he offered several conflicting versions of the offence in an 
apparent attempt to exculpate himself. His characterisation of the offence ranged from a
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full admission to a denial that a murder even took place. During periods in custody, 
reports indicate that C.L. continued to lack insight into his offence, had an unrealistically 
high opinion of himself, and that his social interactions were conducted in an abrasive, 
domineering, and confrontational manner.
C.L. was discharged as an outpatient after being detained for approximately 15 
years. In the years that followed, he was in recurrent conflict with the law. He was 
reported making sexual advances to a minor and, on another occasion, was arrested on 
suspicion of indecent assault. However, during this period his only conviction was of 
impaired driving; victims were allegedly reluctant to press charges, and insufficient 
evidence existed for a conviction. His spouse reported that he abused her both physically 
and sexually. He was prone to tantrums in which he would throw objects and furniture 
around the room, particularly after drinking. Individuals responsible for his care felt that 
their safety was being threatened. Eventually, after several years as an outpatient, C.L. 
was convicted of a sex-related offence and incarcerated. Specialists reported that his 
intake period was characterised by persistent lying. Mental health specialists commented 
on C.L.’s impoverished sense of remorse despite an intact ability to report it verbally. 
Again, it was suggested that C.L. suffered from psychopathy; however, details about the 
criteria used to reach this diagnosis were not available.
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Figure 6.1: Computerized Axial Tomography (CAT) scan of patient C.L.
The scan shows signs of severe necrosis in the frontal cortex. A radiology report 
concerning a CAT scan of the head reveals wedge-shaped low density lesions involving 
the frontal lobes bilaterally suggestive of frontal infarcts.
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6.3: Behavioural Assessment
In the years following his injury, C.L. qualified for the diagnosis of Antisocial 
Personality Disorder (ASPD). Reports from the community and within the institution 
indicate that he “failed to conform to social norms,” was “irritable and aggressive,” and 
was “reckless regarding others’ personal safety.” He was impulsive and sexually 
inappropriate. Reports indicate that he failed to display any regret or remorse about his 
prior acts. C.L. also failed to accept responsibility for his actions, often suggesting that 
he was being victimized by the process. In line with this, C.L. displayed a striking 
tendency to lie even when his story could easily be checked. These stories usually 
involved placing himself in an impressive light. For example, he suggested that he had 
been involved in several professions ranging from complex computer programming to 
lion-taming and military operations, and while never attaining any formal qualifications, 
he excelled in each. He seemed to be unaware or unconcerned about the fact that his 
accounts on one session contradicted accounts he gave earlier.
In addition to fulfilling the criteria for ASPD, C.L. displays striking similarity to 
the construct o f psychopathy as defined by the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; 
Hare, 1991). The PCL-R is described in more detail in Chapter 2. It has been reported to 
be a highly reliable and valid instrument for assessing psychopathy in a prison population 
(Hare, 1991; Hare, 1996). Although not displaying enough of the symptoms to reach 
diagnostic criteria according to the recommended cut-off (Hare, 1991), C.L.’s score on 
the PCL-R reflects that he shows a high degree of psychopathic traits. He attained a score 
of 13 for Factor 1 (90th percentile for male forensic patients), and 10.1 for Factor 2 (41st 
percentile for male forensic patients), and a total score of 26.3 (77th percentile). The
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score of 26 falls short of a traditional diagnostic cut-off for psychopathy; however, the 
score suggests significant psychopathic characteristics and places C.L. in the middle- 
range or “mixed” psychopathy group (Hare, 1991). C.L.’s interpersonal relations are 
characterised by high rates o f poor behavioural controls, sexual promiscuity, grandiosity, 
superficial relations, and a lack of emotional depth.
6.4: Neuropsychological Assessment
C.L. was assessed using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) 
and obtained a verbal and performance IQ in the high average range (see Table 6.1). He 
also obtained a high-average score (9/12) on the Raven Advanced Matrices (Set I; Raven, 
1965). C.L.’s performance on the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson & 
Willison, 1991) was 45/50 signifying an estimated verbal IQ o f 124, a performance IQ of 
121, and a full-scale IQ of 123.8. On the Recognition Memory Task for words and for 
faces (Warrington, 1984), C.L. showed intact performance with a score o f 46/50 and 
33/50 respectively. Performance was near ceiling on the Graded Naming Test (McKenna 
& Warrington, 1980) and the concrete and abstract word synonym lists with a score of 
26/30 in each case (Warrington, McKenna, & Orpwood, 1998). C.L. scored on the 60th 
percentile on the Rey-Osterriech Complex Figure Test (CFT; Rey & Osterriech, 1993), 
showing well organised and successful initial drawing order and 70% recall after 40 
minutes.
6.4.1: Frontal executive functions
C.L. was assessed on measures of impulse control, planning, and detection o f rule 
change. C.L. made only one error on the Cognitive Estimates Task (Shallice & Evans, 
1978), in which participants are asked to give an approximate answer to a general
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knowledge question (e.g., “how high is the post office tower?”). He made two minor 
association errors on the Hayling Task (Burgess & Shallice, 1994) where participants 
must complete fifteen sentences with an appropriate word, and then complete fifteen 
sentences with a word that is inappropriate in that context (e.g., “The captain stayed with 
the sinking” [banana rather than ship]). Five out of the six tasks were attempted on The 
Six Element Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1993). There were no rule violations, and C.L. 
performed in the low average range. On the Brixton Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1994), 
participants learn rules to predict the appearance of a circle in one o f 10 locations and also 
detect rule changes. C.L. made only eight errors, indicating unimpaired performance. On 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task performance all four categories were successfully 
completed with no more than two errors for each category change showing unimpaired 
performance. C.L.’s performance on the Proverbs and Classical Weigl Colour Form Task 
was also unimpaired. Performance on the Stroop and Trail Making Task was at the 17th 
and 25th percentile respectively, which is indicative o f impaired performance given his 
IQ.
C.L. presented with acquired sociopathy and in the absence of marked frontal 
executive impairments. In the experiments that follow, the potential neurocognitive basis 
of C.L.’s acquired sociopathy was explored, and compared with that o f developmental 
psychopathic individuals, forensic controls, and community volunteers. Table 4.1 shows 
C.L.’s results for the general cognitive and frontal functioning test scores.
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Table 6.1: General cognitive and executive function test scores
C.L. Result
Verbal IQ 115
Performance IQ 113
Full Scale IQ 114
Raven’s Advanced Matrix 9/12
Nart 45/50
RM Words 46/50
RM Faces 33/50
GNT 26/30
Concrete Word Synonyms 23/25
Abstract Word Synonyms 23/25
Object Decision 20/20
Cube Analysis 11/11
Cognitive Estimates Faultless
Wisconsin Card Sorting Unimpaired
Proverbs 6/8 Pass
Verbal Fluency 60 Pass
Unrestricted nouns 36(28)
Words beginning “S” 23(18)
Animals 18(18)
Weigl Colour Form Sort Pass
AMIPB, Form I*
Motor Speed (40) 25th
Cognitive Speed A (60) 25th to 50th
Cognitive Speed B (58) 25th to 50th
Accuracy A (97%) 50th to 75th
Accuracy B (100%) > 50th
*AMIPB Information Processing, Form I 
Adult average score in brackets
6.5: Experimental Investigation
The following experiments were conducted over a period of 1 year. The tasks 
were introduced to C.L. as way of understanding his behaviour and determining how 
brain function is correlated with decision-making and emotional processing skills. He 
found the task to be a stimulating diversion from normal ward activities. In order to 
investigate C.L.’s acquired sociopathy, instrumental learning and relearning, emotional 
expression recognition, and social cognition tasks were carried out.
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6.5.1: Comparison groups
C.L.’s performance on social cognition, reversal learning, and emotional 
expression processing was compared with that of five male prison inmates with 
developmental psychopathy and five non-psychopathic control inmates held in equivalent 
forensic institutions. In addition, five healthy males from the community also 
participated in the study. Psychopathy was assessed in the forensic samples using the 
PCL-R (Hare, 1991). Files were pre-screened to exclude individuals who were older than 
60 or whose psychiatric reports revealed a diagnosis for psychosis, organic brain damage, 
or neurological disorder. All participants were informed that participation was voluntary 
and would not affect individual status or record within the institution. Participants did not 
receive any financial or other gain for their participation. The ages of the forensic 
participants ranged from 37 to 53 years with a mean o f 42.5. The Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrix (Set I) was administered to provide an estimate of intelligence. 
Raven’s scores ranged from 5 to 11 with a mean of 7.70. There were no significant group 
differences in either age (F(l,8) = 1.11, ns) or Raven’s score (F(l,8) = 0.68). Because of 
the unique demographic profile of the forensic institutions from which the sample was 
drawn, it was not possible to select a forensic comparison group of C.L.’s age and IQ. 
Consequently, a second comparison group from the community was gathered. For the 
healthy community-based volunteers, the age range was 44 to 59 (mean = 50.4). The 
range of scores on the Raven’s advanced matrix was 7 to 12 (mean = 9.60). Participant 
details are shown in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2: Characteristics of the comparison groups
Individuals with psychopathy 
(n = 5)
Comparison individuals 
(n = 5)
Community Controls 
(n = 5)
M  SD  Range M  SD  Range M  SD  Range
Participant characteristics
Ravens Score 7.80 1.92 5 to 10 7.60 2.70 5 to 11 9.60 2.07 7 to 12
Age 41.40 6.66 37 to 53 43.60 3.36 39 to 48 50.40 6.88 44 to 59
PCL-R Factor 1 Score 11.07 2.17 9.00 to 14.00 4.40 3.90 1.50 to 10.00 - - -
PCL-R Factor 2 Score 15.00 1.87 12.00 to 17.00 5.59 3.59 1.30 to 10.15 - - -
PCL-R Total 31.07 1.37 30.00 to 33.35 11.92 7.28 3.30 to 20.00 - - -
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6.5.2: Decision-making, instrumental learning, and relearning
The tasks in this section are designed to assess behavioural adjustment based on 
differences or changes in reinforcement. Two tasks investigated separable forms of 
instrumental learning: the Passive Avoidance Task (Blair, et al., 2004) and the Ask for 
Money Task (Fine, 2000). Three tasks were administered in order to investigate 
sensitivity to rates or changes in reinforcement value: the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara 
et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 1999) the ID/ED Task (Dias et al., 1996), and the One-Pack 
Card-Playing Task (Newman et al., 1987).
Task 6.1: The Passive Avoidance Task (Blair et al., 2004a). A classic measure of 
the ability to leam from aversive experiences is passive avoidance. In this paradigm, 
individuals leam to respond to stimuli that yield reward and to avoid responding to 
stimuli that yield punishment. Success on the task is measured by the rates of passive 
avoidance errors (responses to punishing stimuli) and errors of omission (failing to 
respond to rewarded stimuli).
In order to perform the task, participants associate a specific stimulus to a specific 
level of reinforcement; that is, some stimuli are associated with a positive outcome and 
initiate approach behaviours, and others are associated with a negative outcome and are 
avoided. Stimulus-reinforcement associations represent a form of instrumental learning 
for which the amygdala is considered crucial (Baxter & Murray, 2002). Individuals with 
psychopathy consistently show deficits on classic measures of instrumental learning such 
as passive avoidance (Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman & Schmitt, 1998; Blair et al., 
2004a). Instrumental learning deficits have not, however, been associated with reactive 
aggression or OFC pathology (Blair, 2004).
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Procedure: The Graded Passive Avoidance Task (Blair et al., 2004a) is a 
modified version of the Newman and Kosson (1986) task in which individual stimuli (in 
this case numbers) are associated with specific levels of point reward/punishment. In the 
task, 8 different numbers were presented to the participant once per block, for 10 blocks. 
Four of the stimuli yielded reward when selected, and four yielded punishment. The 
independent variable was the number of passive avoidance errors.
Results: C.L.’s made significantly less passive avoidance errors than the 
psychopathic individuals (number of errors is less than the 95% confidence interval), and 
performed within the range of both comparison groups. He also made a similar amount 
o f omission errors as any group, suggesting that his reduced passive avoidance errors was 
not due to a bias towards non-responding. In line with predictions, no evidence for 
stimulus-reinforcement learning deficits was present.
Table 6.3: Passive Avoidance Task results
Passive 
Avoidance errors
Omission
errors
CL 8 7
Psychopathic
M 24.40 11.00
SD 9.45 5.24
Range 10 to 36 5 to 19
C t 12.7 to 36.1 4.5 to 17.5
Forensic controls
M 18.00 13.00
SD 8.09 7.45
Range 7 to 28 4 to 24
Cl 8.0 to 28.0 3.7 to 22.3
Controls
M 9.40 10.80
SD 4.28 7.82
Range 5 to 16 0 to 20
Cl 4.1 to 14.7 1.1 to 20.5
4 Cl = confidence interval. All confidence intervals are calculated at 0.95 level.
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Task 6.2: The Ask fo r  Money Task (Fine, 2000). In conditional learning, 
participants leam to make one of two responses when they encounter each stimulus. This 
form o f instrumental learning is said to show stimulus-response learning rather than 
stimulus reinforcement learning (Baxter & Murray, 2002). Unlike in stimulus- 
reinforcement association formation, the reinforcement value of the stimulus for stimulus- 
response association formation is contingent upon the response. Because stimuli are not 
intrinsically rewarding or punishing, there is no reinforcement contingency to be leamt. 
Lesion studies suggest that the amygdala is not crucial for the formation of stimulus- 
response associations, which are instead dismpted by lesions to dorsolateral areas of 
prefrontal cortex (Petrides, 1982; 1985a; 1990).
Procedure: The Ask for Money Task is described more fully in Chapter 5. In 
brief, participants are presented with a scenario in which they imagine that they are 
attempting to borrow additional money from various relatives. There were four relatives 
(conditional stimuli represented by unique bitmap images and presented on a computer 
screen), and two response options (buttons) for each stimulus (hint or beg). Two of the 
stimuli yielded a favourable response to hinting, and two of the stimuli yielded a more 
favourable response to begging. After each selection, the computer displayed the amount 
o f money won or lost, but also the amount that would have been gained or lost had the 
opposite response been selected. The task consists of two phases. In the first phase, 
participants leam the stimulus-response associations. The second phase measures 
conditional reversals; half o f the stimuli reverse so that the previously disadvantageous 
response is now advantageous. There were eight blocks (32 trials) in phase 1 
(expectation acquisition) and six blocks (24 trials) in phase 2 (reversal). Participants were 
asked to acquire as much money as possible.
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Results: C.L. showed impaired conditional learning. His performance, although 
within the range and confidence intervals of die forensic samples, falls outside of the 
range and Cl o f the age and IQ-matched comparison group. His impoverished 
performance is not unexpected given the extent of his frontal lesion. The results provide 
further support for the notion that dissociable forms of instrumental learning exist.
Table 6.4: Ask for Money Task results
Conditional 
Acquisition Correct
Phase 2 
Reversed Stimuli
Phase 2 
Non-reversed Stimuli
CL 13 4 3
Psychopathic
M 18.20 4.60 6.00
SD 4.32 1.14 1.87
Range 13 to 24 3 to 6 4 to 9
Cl 12.8 to 23.6 3.2 to 6.0 3.7 to 8.3
Forensic controls
M 15.80 5.80 4.40
SD 4.44 0.84 2.51
Range 8 to 19 5 to 7 0 to 6
Cl 10.3 to 21.3 4.8 to 6.8 1.3 to 7.5
Controls
M 23.00 5.80 9.60
SD 5.61 2.86 1.67
Range 15 to 30 1 to 8 7 to 11
Cl 16.0 to 30.0 2.2 to 9.4 7.5 to 11.7
Task 6.3: The Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 1999). 
The task is described in detail in Chapter 5. Bechara and his colleagues have reported 
that both patients with acquired sociopathy and individuals with amygdala lesions show 
impaired performance on the gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, recent investigations have suggested deficits in incarcerated psychopaths 
(Mitchell et al., 2002), and in a sample of sub-clinical psychopaths (Van Honk, Hermans, 
Putman, Montagne, & Schutter, 2002). Given the tasks sensitivity to both amygdala and
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OFC dysfunction, it was predicted that both individuals with psychopathy and C.L. would 
show impaired performance relative to the comparison groups.
Procedure: The gambling task was administered in computerised format with a 
schedule o f reinforcement described by Bechara and his colleagues (1999). The task 
parameters and procedure is described in detail in Chapter 5. In brief, participants make 
selections from four decks of cards containing different rates of monetary reinforcement. 
Two of the decks (high-risk decks) involve a high magnitude of reward, but even higher 
magnitude of punishment resulting in a net loss. The remaining two decks involve a 
lower magnitude of reward but punishments are of a lower magnitude. Participants must 
leam to avoid the high-risk decks in order to achieve the game objectives. In this version 
of the instructions, it is explicit that some decks are worse than others and that it is 
possible to achieve the game objectives if these poor decks are avoided.
Results: Over the course o f the task, CL failed to show avoidance of risky 
selections. His performance is similar to individuals with psychopathy (mean risky 
selections 54 versus 52 for the psychopathic group). In total, CL selects more cards from 
the disadvantageous decks than the advantageous decks. His total number of risky 
selections is outside the range and Cl of the forensic and community control groups. 
Table 6.5 shows the mean number o f risky selections by block for CL, psychopathic 
individuals and the comparison groups.
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Table 6.5: Iowa Gambling Task results
CL Individuals with psychopathy Forensic Controls Community Controls
M SD Range Cl M SD Range Cl M SD Range Cl
Total Disadvantageous Selections
Block 1 15 10.60 1.34 9 to 12 8.9 to 12.3 13.60 4.45 8 to 19 8.1 to 19.1 9.00 8.31 Oto 16 Oto 19.3
Block 2 8 8.80 2.17 6 to 11 6.1 to 11.5 7.60 4.39 2 to 13 2.1 to 13.1 5.40 3.65 Oto 10 0.9 to 9.9
Block 3 7 10.40 3.71 5 to 13 5.8 to 15.0 6.00 4.53 Oto 11 0.4 to 11.6 6.20 3.42 1 to 10 2.0 to 10.4
Block 4 15 12.40 4.83 8 to 18 6.4 to 18.4 2.00 3.94 0 to 9 0 to 6.9 8.00 6.63 2 to 18 Oto 16.2
Block 5 9 9.80 5.93 6 to 20 2.4 to 17.2 3.00 4.24 0 to 9 0 to 8.3 4.80 3.03 3 to 10 1.0 to 8.6
Totals by Decks
Decks A/B 54 52.00 12.49 39 to 67 36.5 to 67.5 32.20 11.58 20 to 50 17.8 to 46.6 33.40 10.48 22 to 46 20.4 to 46.4
Decks C/D 46 48.00 12.49 33 to 61 32.5 to 63.5 67.80 11.58 50 to 80 53.4 to 82.2 66.60 10.48 54 to 78 53.6 to 79.6
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Task 6.4: The Intradimensional-Extradimensional Shift (ID/ED) Task (Dias et al.,
1996). The ID/ED Task measures four separable cognitive skills: (1) the ability to 
perform simple and compound discrimination learning; (2) the ability to transfer this 
learning to a new exemplar o f the same dimension (Intradimensional shift); (3) the ability 
to change response set criteria from one dimensional to a second previously irrelevant 
dimension (Extradimensional shift); and (4) the ability to alter responding when the 
reinforcement contingencies reverse (RR).
Studies have shown that patients with OFC lesions exhibit impaired performance 
on the RR component while dorsolateral lesions are associated with ED shift impairments 
(Dias, et al., 1996; Rahman et al., 1997). A study involving adults with psychopathy and 
the ID/ED Task reports a selective RR impairment (Mitchell et al., 2002). However, a 
study involving children with psychopathic tendencies found normal RR performance 
(Blair et al., 2001a).
Procedure: The task is described more fully in Chapter 4. In brief, participants 
must leam to select between two stimuli presented to them on a computer screen based on 
feedback provided on the display (the words “correct” or “incorrect”). The stimuli 
involve up to two dimensions (object shape and line shape). With the exception of the 
ED shift component, the correct stimulus for each pair is always specified by the shape 
dimension regardless of the line over which it is superimposed. On each trial, the two test 
stimuli appear randomly in two of four rectangles positioned towards the perimeter o f the 
screen. Participants used a mouse to make selections. The task consists of nine stages 
presented in fixed order (to assess the four capacities described above), and participants 
were required to demonstrate having leamt the given discrimination before proceeding 
past a given stage. In order to meet the discrimination learning criterion, participants
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needed to choose the correct stimulus on eight consecutive trials. The dependent variable 
was the number of errors made before successfully advancing to the next stage 
(calculated by the computer). The task was terminated in the event that a subject made 
greater than 15 errors on a single stage.
Results: Table 6.6 shows the performance of each group on the ID/ED Task. 
C.L.’s performance on this task was well within or better than the range and Cl for the 
psychopathic, forensic, and community comparison groups. Indeed, he performs at 
ceiling; all RR components were conducted without error and his performance on the ED 
component of the task was clearly unimpaired.
Table 6.6: ID/ED Task results
Object
Discrimination
ED 
Set Shifting
Object
Reversal
CL 0 1 0
Psychopathic
M 1.40 9.40 7.60
SD 0.89 6.80 8.14
Range 0 to 2 2 to 15 1 to 17
Cl 0.29 to 2.5 0.95 to 17.8 Oto 17.7
Forensic controls
M 1.20 5.00 1.40
SD 0.84 5.67 1.34
Range 0 to 2 1 to 15 0 to 3
Cl 0.16 to 2.2 Oto 12.0 Oto 3.1
Controls
M 0.00 7.00 0.53
SD 0.00 7.45 0.51
Range - Oto 15 Oto 1
Cl “ Oto 16.3 Oto 1.2
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Task 6.5: The One-Pack Card Playing Task (Newman et al., 1987). A second 
reversal learning/extinction task was used. Reports in the literature suggest that 
individuals with developmental psychopathy are impaired on the One-Pack Card Playing 
Task (Newman et al., 1987).
Procedure: The task procedure is described more fully by Newman and his 
colleagues (1987). In brief, participants make selections from a single deck of cards. 
Initially, all selections from the deck are positively reinforced (participants receive ten 
points). As the task progresses, however, the number o f punishments steadily increases 
by 10% for every 10 cards played. The task continues until the participant elects to stop. 
Ideally, participants should terminate responding before the probability of punishment 
exceeds the probability of reward.
Results: In Table 6.7, the performances of C.L. and comparison groups are 
shown. C.L. terminated the experiment after thirty-eight selections, which is within the 
range and Cl of forensic and community comparison groups, but the number of cards 
played (indexing sensitivity to changes in reinforcement contingency) was less than the 
range and Cl of psychopathic inmates. Consequently, no evidence for impairment on 
this task exists.
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Table 6.7: One-pack Card Playing Task results
Cards Selected Points
CL 38 260
Psychopathic
M 78.40 232.00
SD 18.53 85.53
Range 58 to 98 120 to 320
Cl 55.4 to 101.4 126.1 to 337.9
Forensic controls
M 56.80 260.00
SD 21.42 43.01
Range 26 to 85 200 to 300
Cl 30.2 to 83.4 206.6 to 313.4
Controls
M 53.40 262.00
SD 19.46 55.86
Range 23 to 73 170 to 310
Cl 29.2 to 77.6 192.6 to 331.4
6.5.3: Emotional expression processing
Task 6.6: The Emotional Expression Multimorph Task. Neuroimaging and lesion 
studies indicate that dissociable neural substrates are crucial for the processing of distinct 
emotional expressions. Accordingly, the most common expression recognition deficit 
found in patients with amygdala lesions is for fearful stimuli (Fine & Blair, 2000). 
Similarly, damage to the VL/OFC regions also results in impoverished emotional 
expression recognition (Homak et al., 1996; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000) and imaging work 
has implicated VLPFC activation to angry facial expressions (Blair et al., 1999).
Previous studies utilising the Emotional Expression Multimorph Task report impaired 
expression recognition in children with psychopathic tendencies (Blair et al., 2001a) and 
adults with psychopathy (Blair et al., 2004b).
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Procedure: This task is a variation of the task designed by Murray and her 
colleagues (unpublished manuscript) and is used to assess the level of expression intensity 
required before successful expression recognition is obtained. The stimuli used are taken 
from the empirically validated Pictures of Facial Affect Series (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). 
The series consists of stimuli depicting six basic emotional facial expressions (happiness, 
surprise, fear, sadness, disgust, and anger) that are consistently recognized across a range 
of different cultures. The individual stimuli were prepared by blending a photographic 
quality picture of a prototypical expression (i.e., 100% expressed) in varying proportions 
with the corresponding neutral affect (i.e., 0% expressed). For each continuum, the 
participant viewed each face as it gradually changed through twenty morphed sequences 
in 5% increments into one of six prototypical expressions. In brief, participants were 
instructed to watch as the expression changed, and to report verbally what emotion was 
being indicated as soon as possible without merely guessing. Participants did not receive 
any feedback and were free to change their response up until the end of the presentation. 
After a practice block consisting of one example from each of the six expressions, the 
participants were presented with 18 test stimuli in random order. Each stage in the 
morphed sequence was presented for 3 seconds. Participants were scored according to 
the number of stages (expression intensity) necessary before successful expression 
recognition occurred (maximum 21). The final answer was scored as the valid response, 
and in the event of an error, the stage was coded as one point greater than the highest 
possible score (21 + 1) as a conservative estimate of impairment.
Results: As predicted, C.L. showed a prominent impairment in the recognition of 
facial expressions of emotion. As reflected by his mean score being outside the range and 
Cl of both forensic and community controls, he suffers from a general facial expression 
recognition impairment. Inspection of means for individual emotions reveals that he is
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outside of the range and Cl of forensic controls for fearful, happy and angry facial 
expressions and beyond the Cl for disgusted facial expressions. Furthermore, C.L. scored 
outside the range and Cl of the psychopathic individuals in sensitivity to anger, and 
beyond the Cl for the recognition of happy facial expressions. C.L.’s performance on 
each of the emotions is beyond the range and Cl of that of the community comparison 
group for every category with the exception of sad and surprised expressions. In short, 
C.L. shows profound deficits in the recognition of emotional facial expressions.
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Table 6.8: Multimorph Expression Recognition Task Number of Stages Required for Recognition
Fearful Sad Happy Surprised Disgusted Angry Total
CL 17.33 15.00 14.33 15.00 21.33 21.00 17.32
Psychopathic
M
SD
Range
Cl
17.80 
3.02 
13.33 to 21.67 
14.0 to 21.6
15.27 
1.94 
12.67 to 17.33 
12.9 to 17.7
9.40 
3.42 
5.33 to 14.33 
5.2 to 13.6
14.67 
4.28 
9.00 to 19.67 
9.4 to 20.0
16.80 
4.69 
10.00 to 22.00 
11.0 to 22.0
14.27 
4.11 
7.33 to 17.67 
9.2 to 19.4
14.70 
2.44 
11.39 to 17.00 
11.7 to 17.7
Forensic controls
M  12.93 
SD 1.79 
Range 10.67 to 15.67 
Cl 10.7 to 15.2
15.27 
1.94 
12.67 to 17.33 
8.5 to 19.0
8.73 
3.01 
5.00 to 13.33 
5.0 to 12.5
12.07 
3.59 
9.00 to 19.67 
7.6 to 16.5
15.73 
4.46 
10.00 to 22.00 
10.2 to 21.3
11.93 
4.21 
7.33 to 17.33 
6.7 to 17.2
12.52 
2.39 
9.28 to 15.72 
9.6 to 15.5
Controls
M
SD
Range
Cl
13.80 
2.30 
11.33 to 16.67 
10.9 to 16.7
13.93 
2.92 
9.33 to 17.33 
10.3 to 17.6
6.73 
2.42 
4.33 to 10.33 
3.7 to 9.7
16.07 
4.59 
12.00 to 22.00 
10.37 to 21.76
14.20 
4.68 
8.67 to 21.67 
8.39 to 20.0
13.93 
4.02 
8.67 to 17.33 
9.0 to 16.4
13.11 
2.62 
9.17 to 16.28 
9.9 to 16.4
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Task 6.7: Audio Emotion Recognition (Scott et a l, 1997). The Vocal Affect 
Recognition Test assesses recognition of emotion conveyed through prosody. On each of 
the 65 test trials, one of six bi-syllabic concrete nouns (digitalized at 22kH z) of neutral 
denotation (carpet, finger, hammock, motor, sailor, daughter) are presented in random 
order from a Macintosh G3 laptop computer.
The test consists of 65 neutral words (e.g., carpet) spoken by native English 
speakers (3 male and 3 female) that convey emotions of happiness, disgust, anger, 
sadness and fear (13 examples of each emotion). Participants were asked to listen to each 
stimulus and to identify the emotion that the speaker was most likely to have been feeling 
based on how the word was spoken. The result is a score out o f 12 for each basic vocal 
emotion providing an index o f sensitivity to emotion presented in the auditory modality.
Results: In striking contrast to C.L.’s recognition of facial expressions of 
emotion, he performed within the range and Cl of both the forensic and community 
comparison groups for the recognition of auditory emotional expressions. Furthermore, 
he showed superior performance to individuals with developmental psychopathy for the 
identification of distress cues (fearful and sad vocal affect).
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Table 6.9: Auditory Emotional Expression Recognition Task results (Errors)
Fearful Sad Happy Disgusted Angry Total
CL 0 1 7 2 3 2.60
Psychopathic
M
SD
Range
Cl
5.00
2.00 
3.00 to 8.00
2.5 to 7.5
4.20 
1.48 
2.00 to 6.00 
2.4 to 6.0
4.20 
2.58 
1.00 to 8.00 
1.0 to 7.4
2.80 
2.95 
0.00 to 7.00 
0.0 to 6.5
3.80 
2.17 
2.00 to 7.00 
1.1 to 6.5
4.00 
1.57 
2.20 to 5.40 
2.1 to 5.9
Forensic controls
M  1.80 
SD 1.10 
Range 0.00 to 3.00 
Cl 0.44 to 3.2
2.60 
1.15 
1.00 to 4.00 
1.2 to 4.0
4.60 
3.36 
1.00 to 10.00 
0.4 to 8.8
2.00
0.71
1.00 to 3.00
1.1 to 2.9
2.60 
1.52 
1.00 to 4.00 
0.7 to 4.5
2.72 
0.30 
2.40 to 3.20 
2.3 to 3.1
Controls
M
SD
Range
Cl
1.60 
1.67 
0.00 to 4.00 
0 to 3.7
1.20 
0.84 
0.00 to 2.00 
0.2 to 2.2
5.00 
2.55 
3.00 to 9.00 
1.8 to 8.2
3.60 
2.19 
1.00 to 7.00 
0.9 to 6.3
2.20 
1.79 
0.00 to 4.00 
0.0 to 4.4
2.72 
1.24 
1.40 to 4.40 
1.2 to 4.3
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6.5.4: Social cognition
The following tasks were aimed at assessing two main aspects of social cognition. 
First, C.L.’s ability to infer internal mental states in others (tasks 6.8 and 6.9) was 
examined. Second, the ability to assess the appropriateness of a set of behaviours 
presented in a variety of social contexts was investigated (task 6.10). The ability to infer 
mental states such as thoughts, feelings, or intentions in others and to predict and 
understand behaviour on the basis these mental states has been referred to as “theory of 
mind” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Impairments of theory of mind have been 
implicated in autism spectrum disorders (Happe, 1994; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000) and 
schizophrenia (Corcoran, Mercer, & Frith, 1995; Frith & Corcoran, 1996). The neural 
structures implicated in theory of mind are the amygdala, superior temporal sulcus, 
anterior paracingulate, and the OFC (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; 
Gallagher et al., 2000; Fine, Lumsden, & Blair, 2001; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, 
& Cohen, 2004). Studies investigating theory of mind in individuals with psychopathy 
find no evidence of impairment (Blair et al., 1996; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Richell et al., 
2003).
Task 6.8: The Joke Comprehension Test (Corcoran et al., 1997). C.L. completed 
the Joke Comprehension Test (Corcoran et al., 1997), which contains 10 jokes that are 
understood only with reference to mental states of the characters and 10 jokes that can be 
understood through physical and semantic analysis. C.L. and healthy age and IQ matched 
controls from the community were asked to explain each cartoon and to rate how 
humorous they found them on an ascending scale of 1 to 10. Their explanations were 
recorded verbatim and scored following the testing session. A score of 1 was given for
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each mental state cartoon that was appropriately explained with reference to mental 
states. Similarly, each response that made reference to the physical situation was given a 
score of 1. Individuals with deficient theory of mind show poor comprehension of the 
mental state cartoons, but normal comprehension and humour to the physical cartoons 
(Corcoran et al., 1997).
Figure 6.2: Cartoons from the Joke Comprehension Test (Corcoran et al., 1997)
A) Theory of mind cartoon. Theory of mind facilitates the comprehension of this cartoon: to 
understand the joke, participant must realize the dog-owner’s erroneous assumption about the size 
of the rabbit.
B) Physical state cartoon. This cartoon can be understood without reference to mental states.
“Go on boy, rabbits, get ‘em!”
“It’s really no wonder that we’re endangered”
131
Results: C.L., in making only one error, was able to explain the nature of each 
cartoon with reference to both physical and mental states for each sample. His humour 
rating for each cartoon is equivalent for both physical and theory of mind samples 
signifying a comparable degree of comprehension and appreciation. His scores are well 
within the range of the comparison group; C.L. shows no evidence of theory of mind 
impairments on the task.
Table 6.10: Performance on the Joke Comprehension Test
Theory of mind 
comprehension 
(max = 10)
Theory of mind 
comic rating 
(max = 10)
Physical 
comprehension 
(max = 10)
Physical 
comic rating 
(max = 10)
CL 9.00 4.50 10.00 5.60
Controls
M 9.00 4.76 9.20 4.58
SD 1.00 1.86 1.79 1.93
Range 8 to 10 2.30 to 6.70 6.00 to 10.00 1.90 to 6.40
Cl 7.8 to 10.2 2.4 to 7.1 7.0 to 11.4 2.2 to 7.0
Task 6.9: The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (Advanced Theory o f  Mind; 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Rate, & Plumb, 2001). The Eyes Task investigates an 
individual’s ability to infer mental states of others based on visual information from 
photographs depicting a person’s eyes. Previous reports have indicated that high- 
functioning individuals with autism-spectrum disorder and above average IQ show 
impaired performance relative to matched control participants (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). 
An imaging study has implicated the amygdala in processing the images.
Procedure: Details about the development of this task are presented in a previous 
study (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). In brief, participants are presented with 36 photographs 
depicting a small portion of an actor’s face including the eyes, eyebrows and the eyes of
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actors and the region of the face around the eyes. Four complex mental state descriptors 
(e.g. dispirited, bored) were printed around the photo, one at each comer. One of these 
words (the target) correctly identified the mental state of the person in the photo, whilst 
the others were included as foils (e.g., annoyed, hostile, horrified, or preoccupied). 
Participants are asked to choose the word that best describes what the person in the 
picture is thinking or feeling. Definitions for each of the words were made available to 
each participant.
Results: In contrast to C.L.’s performance on basic emotional expression 
recognition, his performance on the task is within the upper range of normal. Therefore, 
the data do not support suggestions of an association between acquired sociopathy and 
theory of mind deficits.
Table 6.11: Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task results
Correct Responses 
(max = 36)
CL 30
Psychopathic
M 25.20
SD 4.71
Range 19.00 to 31.00
Cl 19.3 to 31.1
Forensic controls
M 25.00
SD 4.30
Range 20.00 to 31.00
Cl 19.7 to 30.3
Controls
M 29.40
SD 4.16
Range 23.00 to 33.00
Cl 24.2 to 34.6
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Task 6.10: The Social Situations Task (Dewey, 1991). The Social Situations Task 
indexes an individual’s ability to detect situations that are likely to provoke disapproval in 
others. These include acts for which no formal societal prohibitions exist, but which may 
provoke anger or aggression in observers. The study includes nine short stories depicting 
behaviours that are either normative (in line with social norms) or violations (violating 
social norms). At various points in the story, participants rate the appropriateness of the 
behaviours described by giving a score from 0 to 3 expressing the severity of the violation 
(a score of “0” denotes normal behaviour and 3 indicates shocking behaviour). By 
examining the frequency with which social norms and their violations are identified, the 
task provides an estimate o f an individual’s ability to detect socially inappropriate 
behaviour. Previous research suggests that the task distinguishes between two types of 
pathologies. Although this task is sensitive to cognitive deficits associated with acquired 
sociopathy, individuals with developmental psychopathy do not show impaired 
performance (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). Individuals with autism also exhibit difficulties 
with this task; however, they respond abnormally to both normal and inappropriate 
behaviours (Dewey, 1991). In contrast, the SRR conceptualisation of acquired sociopathy 
predicts that patients with OFC lesions will rate inappropriate behaviours as appropriate.
A previously documented case of acquired sociopathy, patient J.S., showed precisely this 
pattern of impairment (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000).
Procedure: Scenes describing social situations were presented to the participants 
on a computer screen and read aloud. At specified points in the stories, participants were 
asked to verbally rate the behaviour just described to them in the story according to how 
they thought most people would judge that behaviour had they witnessed it. The 
following scale was used: 0 = Fairly normal behaviour in that situation; 1 = Rather
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strange behaviour in that situation; 2 = Very eccentric behaviour in that situation; 3 = 
Shocking behaviour in that situation.
Eight social scenes were described to the participant in total. Between 2 and 4 
behaviours were rated in each scene. These behaviours were divided into normative 
scenes (e.g., “when she woke up there was just enough time to dress and get to the 
airport, so she skipped her breakfast”) and violations (e.g., “without wasting any time, 
even before the introductions, he asked the hostess when dinner would be served”). Mean 
ratings for these two types of behaviour were calculated. A sample story is presented 
below:
Keith, age twenty-five, was a file clerk who worked in an office in the city. At noon, he 
took his lunch to a small park and sat on a sunny bench to eat. Often he tore part o f a 
sandwich into bits, scattering it on the ground for pigeons ( ). One day when he came to 
his favourite bench a baby carriage was parked beside it. Keith noticed that a young 
woman was swinging an older child nearby. The baby in the carriage began to cry but 
the mother did not hear this because the swing was squeaking. Now, Keith had learnt 
that when his baby nephew screamed, sometimes this meant that a pin in his diaper had 
opened. Rather than bother the mother in the vark. Keith quickly checked the baby’s 
clothinz to see whether he could feel an oven pin ( ).
Results'. C.L. shows significant performance decrements on this task relative to 
forensic, psychopathic and community groups scoring less than the range and Cl o f each 
group. He correctly identified only 5 of 11 social norm violations. This contrasts with 
his above-average performance on the theory of mind tasks. The results lend support to 
the idea that although the identification of socially inappropriate behaviours is impaired in 
individuals with autism (Dewey, 1991; Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, &
Plaisted, 1999), it can also be impaired in an individual who exhibits no theory of mind 
deficits. Therefore, although theory of mind deficits may be sufficient for producing 
deficits in the recognition of socially inappropriate behaviour, it is not the only factor.
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Table 6.12: Social Situations Task results
Social violations 
Correctly identified 
(Oto 11)
Normal behaviours 
labelled violations 
(Oto 11)
Inappropriateness rating 
for violations 
(0 to 33)
CL 5 1 8
Psychopathic
M 8.40 2.00 13.20
SD 1.14 1.87 3.70
Range 7 to 10 Oto 5 10 to 19
Cl 7.0 to 9.8 0 to 4.3 8.6 to 17.8
Forensic controls
M 8.40 2.20 14.80
SD 0.55 1.64 0.84
Range 8 to 9 0 to 4 14 to 16
Cl 7.7 to 9.1 0.2 to 4.2 13.8 to 15.8
Controls
M 9.80 2.40 18.80
SD 1.30 2.30 5.45
Range 8 to 11 Oto 6 12 to 27
Cl 8.2 to 11.4 Oto 5.3 12.0 to 25.6
6.6: Discussion
Following bilateral trauma to the frontal region involving OFC, C.L. presented 
with a severe disturbance in affective, behavioural, and interpersonal functioning. His 
aberrant behaviour and interpersonal style bore a strong resemblance to the construct of 
psychopathy (Hare, 2003); based on numerous detailed clinical accounts, C.L. can be 
described as a case of “acquired sociopathy” (Damasio, 1994). This chapter presents 
measures of decision- making, instrumental learning and relearning, emotional expression 
recognition, and social cognition. C.L.’s performance was compared with a forensic 
sample of psychopathic and non-psychopathic adults and with a sample of healthy 
community controls of comparable age and IQ. C.L. showed clear deficits in decision­
making, conditional learning, emotional expression recognition, and in the identification
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of inappropriate social behaviours. Contrary to expectations, C.L. did not show 
pronounced reversal learning deficits. Despite showing normal ability to form stimulus- 
reinforcement associations, C.L. demonstrated clear conditional learning impairment. 
Finally, no evidence of difficulties with theory of mind was indicated in C.L. or the 
forensic samples.
6.6.1: Decision-making performance
The data implicating orbital regions of the frontal cortex in decision-making is 
considerable (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 2000). In line with predictions, C.L., 
along with a group with developmental psychopathy, showed impaired performance on 
the Iowa Gambling Task relative to both the forensic and community controls. It is 
important to note that individuals with amygdala dysfunction also show deficits on this 
task (Bechara et al., 1999). The source of their impairment, however, may differ. Using 
psychophysiological measures, Bechara and his colleagues (1999) draw a distinction 
between the impairment shown by patients with amygdala dysfunction from that of 
patients with frontal lesions. They suggest that patients with lesions o f the amygdala fail 
to avoid disadvantageous selections because of a general insensitivity to reinforcement 
(they fail to generate skin conductance responses following reward or punishment). In 
contrast, patients with lesions to the OFC were able to generate skin conductance to 
reward and punishment, but were unable to generate anticipatory responses when making 
high-risk deliberations. Although the current chapter shows that both C.L. and 
individuals with developmental psychopathy were impaired on the Iowa Gambling Task, 
the underlying neurocognitive deficit contributing to their respective performances may 
be different.
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Regions o f the frontal cortex, particularly ventrolateral regions have been 
implicated in RR (Cools et al., 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2003). One of the dominant 
theoretical frameworks o f VL/OFC function posits that the system is crucial for the 
representation of, and detection o f changes in, the reinforcement value o f stimuli (Rolls, 
1996; Rolls, 2004). In the current set of experiments, the performance of C.L. and a 
forensic sample was investigated on two tasks thought to be sensitive to reversal learning 
and extinction: the ID/ED Task and the One-Pack Card Playing Task. Contrary to 
expectations, C.L. showed no evidence of reversal learning or extinction impairment. 
Individuals with psychopathy show deficits on both tasks (Newman et al., 1987; Mitchell 
et al., 2002). The ID/ED Task features an abrupt change in reinforcement contingency 
that may be less sensitive to more subtle reversal learning impairments. The One-Pack 
Card Playing Task, however, contains a subtle shift in reward contingency, and C.L.’s 
performance was within the range and Cl for the comparison groups and was better than 
that of individuals with psychopathy. This might suggest that despite the extent of the 
lesion, other more general factors, such as IQ, may act as compensatory mechanisms to 
facilitate performance on this task. Taken together, the data presented in this chapter do 
not provide any evidence of a reversal learning impairment for C.L.
6.6.2: Dissociable forms o f  instrumental learning
This study examined two forms of instrumental learning. The Passive Avoidance 
Task provides a measure o f stimulus-reinforcement learning and the Ask for Money Task 
features conditional learning. Crucially, the two forms of learning are dissociable at the 
neural level. The amygdala is necessary for stimulus-reinforcement but not conditional 
learning (Baxter & Murray, 2002). In contrast, dorsolateral regions play a crucial role in 
conditional, but not stimulus reinforcement learning (Petrides, 1985a; 1985b; 1990;
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1997). For example, monkeys with lesions to the periarcuate region of dorsolateral 
preffontal cortex are unable to complete a conditional discrimination; they are unable to 
produce one response when stimulus A is present and a second response when stimulus B 
is present for reward (Petrides, 1985a). The same monkeys, however, were able to 
respond to one stimulus for reward and to withhold responding to another stimulus that 
was associated with non-reward. Given the extent of C.L.’s frontal lesions, and intact 
temporal lobes, it was predicted that he would show deficient conditional learning, but 
intact passive avoidance learning. The results supported this prediction. The experiments 
show a double dissociation between acquired and developmental psychopathy. Although 
C.L. showed intact passive avoidance learning and diminished conditional learning, the 
opposite pattern of impairment was found in the group with developmental psychopathy. 
The result provides additional support for the notion that dissociable forms of 
instrumental learning exist.
6.6.3: Emotional expression recognition
Emotional expression processing has been linked to the OFC (Homak et al., 1996; 
Blair & Cipolotti, 2000) and a more specialized role for the amygdala particularly with 
fearful (Breiter et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1996; Phillips et al. 1997; Phillips et al., 1998), 
sad (Blair et al., 1999), and happy (Breiter et al., 1996) facial expressions. In addition to 
being impaired relative to the healthy community sample, C.L. performs outside the range 
of forensic controls and even psychopathic individuals. C.L. shows evidence of a general 
facial expression recognition impairment, which was perhaps most pronounced for angry 
and disgusted facial expressions. This result replicates a previous finding (Homak et al.,
1996), and based on the severity o f the angry expression recognition deficit, provides a 
partial replication of Blair and Cipolotti’s (2000) study involving J.S., a similar case of
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acquired sociopathy. Relative to a forensic comparison group, J.S. showed deficient 
recognition of happiness, anger, disgust, and sadness.
Interestingly, C.L.’s performance did not cross modalities; he performed close to 
ceiling on the auditory emotional expression identification task. It should be noted that at 
least two studies have found vocal expression recognition deficits in patients with 
bilateral OFC damage (Homak et al., 1996; Homak et al., 2003). However, C.L. may not 
be unusual in this regard. It has been noted that emotional expression recognition deficits 
do not necessarily cross modalities even among frontal patients (Homak et al., 2004;
Rolls, 2004).
6.6.4: Theory o f  mind
It has been suggested that a circuit involving the OFC and amygdala is involved in 
making inferences about intentions, thoughts, and feelings of others— a process 
collectively referred to as “theory of mind” (Brothers & Ring, 1992; Stone et al., 1998; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Sabbagh, 2004). At least three studies have investigated theory 
of mind performance in psychopathic individuals diagnosed by the PCL-R; however, 
none have found evidence of impairment (Blair et al., 1996; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; 
Richell et al., 2003). Despite the sensitivity o f the tests used, the present investigation did 
not indicate theory o f mind dysfunction in the forensic samples or in C.L. The study 
involving J.S. also failed to find evidence for difficulties representing mental states in 
others (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). Furthermore, suggestions of links between theory of 
mind deficits and aggression have been sharply criticized (Blair, 2003).
Despite these findings, at least one study has reported theory of mind deficits in 
patients with lesions to the OFC. Stone and her colleagues (1998) report that patients 
with lesions involving the orbital, but not dorsolateral regions of the frontal cortex are
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impaired on the Social Faux Pas Test. This task consists o f a series of stories depicting 
social exchanges in which the speaker makes an inappropriate remark. The authors 
interpret a failure to identify the social faux pas as evidence of theory of mind 
dysfunction. However, the task is arguably less a measure of theory of mind than it is a 
measure of the identification of inappropriate social behaviour. Indeed, in the same 
study, the patients with lesions to OFC did not differ from comparison individuals in their 
judgement of first and second order theory o f mind problems. Furthermore, patients with 
OFC lesions were able to identify how the victims of the social faux pas would have felt 
and why the speaker said what they said. Responding correctly to these questions is 
arguably a more sensitive index of mental state representation than the identification of 
inappropriate social behaviour.
6.6.5: Identification o f  social violations
The present investigation used Dewey’s Social Situations Task (1991) to explore 
C.L.’s ability to detect inappropriate social behaviour. Neuroimaging and patient studies 
suggest that the OFC plays a role in monitoring and adjusting social behaviours (Blair & 
Cipolotti, 2000; Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 2002). The ability to make such 
judgements is thought to be an index of the SRR system (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Blair, 
2004). The SRR system is activated by negative valenced expressions (particularly anger 
and disgust) and situations associated with social disapproval. The SRR system is 
thought to be functionally dissociable from the system that computes or codes changes in 
reinforcement (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Blair, 2004). The results of the present 
investigation provide support for this conceptualisation: C.L. showed a profound 
impairment in the recognition of socially inappropriate behaviour. In addition, he showed 
a striking deficit for identifying emotional facial expressions, particularly anger and
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disgust. In contrast, C.L. did not exhibit an equivalent level of impairment on the reversal 
component of the ID/ED Task, or the more subtle shift in reinforcement value on the 
One-Pack Card Playing Task. Both of these tasks are sensitive measures of reversal 
learning deficits in adults with developmental psychopathy (Mitchell et al., 2002).
6.7: Conclusion
The current investigation compared the performance of a patient with acquired 
sociopathy to individuals with developmental psychopathy as well as to forensic and 
community controls. In line with predictions, C.L. showed a strikingly different pattern 
of impairment than developmental psychopaths. Specifically, he showed a collection of 
deficits that are associated with an impaired SRR system, only subtle, if  any, impairment 
o f the RR system, and a decision-making impairment. Conversely, individuals with 
developmental psychopathy showed no evidence of SRR dysfunction, but did exhibit 
impaired RR and decision-making. Contrary to OFC accounts of theory of mind, C.L. 
showed no evidence of impairment on two tasks that are considered to be highly sensitive 
to making inferences about mental states. With respect to instrumental learning, a double 
dissociation was found. C.L. showed pervasive conditional learning deficits in the 
absence of passive avoidance learning deficits. Conversely, developmental psychopaths 
showed intact conditional learning and pronounced passive avoidance deficits. Together, 
the results provide additional support for the notion that SRR deficits can be associated 
with reactive aggression in the absence of evidence for theory of mind or pronounced RR 
dysfunction. It also provides further evidence that acquired sociopathy and 
developmental psychopathy are dissociable at a neurocognitive level. The different forms 
of impairment may underlie the two different forms of aggression, reactive versus
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instrumental, that characterise each acquired sociopathy and developmental psychopathy 
respectively.
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Chapter 7
fMRI Investigation of Response Reversal Versus Value Change 
7.1: Introduction
The neural basis of instrumental relearning and stimulus devaluation has been the 
focus of a considerable body of research. Regions of the VL/OFC cortex are implicated 
in altering responding to changes in reinforcement (Rolls, 1999). Theories emphasize the 
role of the OFC in response change and in flexibly encoding the value of stimuli (Rolls, 
1999; Rolls, 2004). These theories often implicitly subsume the process of stimulus value 
encoding, inhibition of a prepotent response, and response change within the VL/OFC. 
However, the precise neural loci of these potentially dissociable functions remains 
unclear. This chapter presents an event-related fMRI study investigating neural activation 
to changes in the value o f reinforcement together with, and in the absence of, demands for 
response change. The experiment was designed to enable contrasts that would distinguish 
between processes involved in detecting changes in the value of reinforcement from 
processes involved specifically with response change. The aim was to address the 
continuing question of whether the neural response to changes in valence or magnitude of 
reinforcement is dissociable from activation associated with response change.
Studies emphasizing flexible encoding of reward value began with experiments 
involving the response of non-human subjects to primary reinforcement. These 
investigations suggest that the OFC is involved in encoding the reinforcement value of 
both pleasant and aversive stimuli. For example, single unit recording of neurons in the 
caudolateral region of the macaque OFC identified neurons that respond to the taste of a 
stimulus with nutritive value, such as fruit juice, but not to non-nutritive tastes such as
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quinine (Rolls et al., 1990). Neurons in the OFC selectively fire to an olfactory stimulus 
associated with food, and decrease firing when that food is devalued (Critchley & Rolls, 
1996). Single unit recordings o f neurons within the OFC of behaving rhesus monkeys 
reveal associative stimulus-specific activity (Thorpe, Rolls, & Maddison, 1983). Thus, in 
a visual discrimination task, a percentage of neurons responded selectively to a stimulus 
associated with reward, and other neurons to the stimulus associated with punishment. 
Interestingly, when the reinforcement associations were reversed, the pattern of neuronal 
firing reversed accordingly.
Later studies used imaging techniques to investigate neural responding to 
reinforcement in human subjects. These studies provide further support for the role of the 
OFC in encoding the value o f primary reinforcement. For example, activation has been 
reported in adjacent regions of VLPFC to sucrose and salt (O’Doherty et al., 2001b). A 
second study reported activation of the ventral striatum and OFC to the expectation of 
receiving sucrose (O’Doherty, Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002). Furthermore, in a 
human analogue to the study involving macaque monkeys, a recent investigation showed 
that OFC responding to a food odour decreased when the food associated with the odour 
was eaten to satiety (O’Doherty et al., 2000).
The OFC is also involved in encoding abstract forms of reinforcement. For 
example, participants engaging in a simple motor response task showed activity in the 
inferior frontal left amygdala, inferior frontal gyrus, left hippocampus, and right VLPFC 
to positive versus negative verbal feedback (Zalla et al., 2000). Thut and his colleagues 
(1997) report greater activation for monetary versus verbal reinforcement in dorsolateral 
(BA 10 and 44) and VLPFC (BA 47) in addition to thalamic and midbrain activity. In a 
probabilistic object discrimination and reversal task involving monetary reward, 
O’Doherty and his colleagues report medial frontal activity to reward and lateral activity
145
to punishment (O’Doherty et al., 2001a). The activity in the medial and lateral prefrontal 
cortex correlated with the magnitude of reward and punishment respectively.
The evidence implicating VL/OFC regions of the frontal cortex in processing both 
primary and abstract reinforcement is compelling. Data also exist suggesting a special 
role for at least some regions of the prefrontal cortex with respect to response suppression 
and reversing a previously rewarded response. For example, patients with lesions to the 
OFC show difficulties reversing a previously rewarding response (Rolls et al., 1994; 
Fellows & Farah, 2003; Homak et al., 2003; Berlin et al., 2004; Homak et al., 2004). 
Bechara and his colleagues (2000) have shown that individuals with damage to 
ventromedial regions of frontal cortex are unable to adjust their immediate behaviour for 
future reward. In a study conducted by Cools and her colleagues (2002), VLPFC was 
activated specifically by probabilistic errors that preceded response alteration. Imaging 
studies consistently implicate this region in RR (Rogers et al., 2000; Clark et al., 2004; 
Cools et al., 2004). The data therefore suggest a specific role for the region in response 
change. Evidence, however, also suggests that VL/OFC is involved in the inhibition of a 
prepotent response. For example, using a detour reaching task, Wallis and his colleagues 
showed that monkeys with lesions involving the OFC encountered difficulties inhibiting 
the dominant, but unsuccessful, direct reach response (Wallis, Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 
2001). In humans, VLPFC activation has been reported for no-go trials of a go/no-go 
task (Liddle, 2001).
Based on these findings involving response change and response inhibition, 
researchers have speculated that discrete regions within the VL/OFC may be performing 
separate functions during response change. For example, O’Doherty and his colleagues 
(2001a) have suggested that a valence-dependent functional dissociation exists between 
the orbital and ventral regions of the prefrontal cortex. Based on their fMRI data, they
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propose that medial regions are specifically involved in processing reward and lateral 
regions in processing punishment. Similarly, it has been suggested that medial regions of 
OFC have also been implicated in processing the reward value of response options when 
correct choice is unclear and requires the integration of information over several trials to 
determine (Elliott, Rees, & Dolan, 1999; Elliott, Dolan, & Frith, 2000). In contrast, the 
lateral regions of the frontal cortex are thought to be recruited in circumstances for which 
the inhibition of a previously rewarded (or otherwise prepotent) response is necessary 
(Elliott et al., 2000). Indeed, an fMRI investigation o f a delayed matching and non­
matching to sample task showing medial activation to matching and lateral activation to 
non-matching provides support for this position (Elliott & Dolan, 1999). Thus, the 
medial regions (BA 24 and 25) were involved when participants were instructed to select 
the familiar pattern in a pair. In contrast, ventrolateral regions (BA 11) of frontal cortex 
were involved when participants had to inhibit selecting the familiar stimulus in favour of 
the unfamiliar one. This formulation offers a reasonable account o f why lesions to either 
medial (inconsistent selection of rewarding stimuli) or lateral (perseverating on 
unrewarded stimuli) regions of the prefrontal cortex can lead to impaired decision­
making. Interestingly, in a study involving patients with OFC lesions, Berlin and 
colleagues report both a reduced tendency to shift responding following a large 
punishment and a failure to maintain responding following a large reward in patients with 
lesions involving the OFC (Berlin et al., 2004). Crucially, eight o f the ten patients in the 
study had lesions involving both medial and lateral prefrontal regions.
These studies suggest a potential dissociation of function within the frontal lobes 
based on valence of reinforcement or demands for response change. However, the studies 
designed to investigate response change and changes in reinforcement value are often 
confounded; the tasks that are commonly used may not adequately distinguish modulated
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neural activity to changes in reinforcement value from neural responding due to increased 
demands for response change. For example, decision-making tasks typically involve 
reversing a response from a previously rewarding stimulus to a previously punished 
stimulus. Behavioural change of this kind, however, may require several stages of 
processing. For example, RR may entail: (1) detecting a contingency change; (2) 
evaluating whether the magnitude of the contingency change is sufficient to warrant 
behavioural change; (3) inhibiting the previously relevant response; and (4) initiating a 
newly rewarded response. Thus, RR may require several stages of processing mediated 
by different regions within the prefrontal cortex. To date, almost all investigations treat 
reversal learning as a unitary construct.
However, at least one other study has attempted to disentangle some of the 
potentially dissociable components of RR (O’Doherty et al., 2003). A two-condition 
probabilistic reversal learning paradigm was used. In the “choice” condition, participants 
chose between two fractal images (one associated with higher monetary rates of reward, 
and the other with punishment). In a second, “imperative” condition, the computer 
generated the selections while participants were asked simply to “track” the currently 
rewarded stimulus. It was thought that comparisons between the choice and imperative 
conditions would distinguish neural responding associated with response change from 
neural activity associated with encoding changes in the valence o f reinforcement. The 
authors implicate medial regions in representing outcome, particularly reward. They 
found that increased activation in medial and left lateral OFC was associated with 
feedback that preceded maintaining the same response on the next trial as opposed to 
feedback that preceded response change. Finally, parts of medial and central OFC were 
significantly more active during the choice condition than the imperative condition, thus 
suggesting a role that also includes decision-making. Activity in the anterior insula and
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caudolateral OFC was associated with punishment that preceded a change in response 
relative to punishment that did not; however, this was found in both the choice and 
imperative conditions, which contradicts interpretations that emphasize involvement of 
this region strictly in terms of response change. The authors propose that RR deficits 
seen following injuries to this region are not caused by a failure to inhibit a prepotent 
response, but rather, by a failure to detect changes in reinforcement value. One region 
that appeared to be selectively involved in response change in the choice over imperative 
condition was the dorsal region of anterior cingulate. They suggest a link between this 
region and autonomic facilitation of response change.
The complexity and apparent overlapping nature of the results may reflect 
confounds that still exist in the experimental design. That is, the experiment may not 
have been entirely successful in its attempts to dissociate neural responding to changes in 
valence from that related to response change. For example, in the Probabilistic Response 
Reversal Task, two distinct forms of feedback are indistinguishable. Probabilistic errors 
(error feedback received after choosing the correct stimulus) are indistinguishable from 
error feedback that represents a true reversal in reinforcement associations. In the case of 
a probabilistic error, overriding error feedback to maintain the same response may 
activate similar regions as actual response change. Alternatively, neural firing in a region 
of frontal cortex may be required to reach a certain threshold before response change is 
initiated. In either case, a considerable degree of overlap may exist in neural activity 
whether or not an error precedes response change.
The following investigation attempts to distinguish further neural responding to 
changes in reinforcement value from that related to initiating response change. The aim 
was to determine whether OFC activation classically viewed following RR is specific to 
response change, or generalises to all changes in stimulus value, regardless of demands
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on responding. A novel conditional learning task is presented in which participants make 
one of two responses to multiple stimuli on a screen. Following an initial acquisition 
phase, the value of the reinforcement changed for four of the five stimuli. The nature of 
the change for each stimulus varied according to a set schedule: (1) RR with valence 
change; (2) RR with only magnitude change (the valence remained constant); (3) changes 
in the valence of the reinforcement without demands for response change; (4) changes in 
the magnitude of reinforcement without changes in valence and without demands for 
response; and (5) a control condition in which valence and magnitude remain unchanged. 
The results are discussed within the context o f current models of VL/OFC function.
7.2: Methods
7.2.1: Participants
Thirteen right-handed healthy volunteers (4 females and 9 males) took part in the 
study, which was approved by the National Institute of Mental Health Institutional 
Review Board. All participants underwent a physical exam by a physician, were free of 
psychotropic medication, and were screened to exclude those with a history o f psychiatric 
or neurological illness.
7.2.2: fM R I data acquisition
Subjects were scanned during task performance using a 1.5 Tesla GE Signa 
scanner. Two-hundred seven functional images were taken with a gradient echo-planar 
imaging (EPI) sequence (repetition time = 2500ms, echo time = 40ms, 64 x 64 matrix, 
flip angle 90°, FOV 24cm). Coverage was obtained with 29 axial slices (thickness, 4- 
mm; in-plane resolution, 3.75 x 3.75 mm). A high resolution anatomical scan (three- 
dimensional Spoiled GRASS; repetition time = 8.1ms, echo time = 3.2ms; field o f view =
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24cm; flip angle = 20°; 124 axial slices; thickness = 1 . 0  mm; 256 x 256 matrix) in register 
with the EPI dataset was obtained covering the whole brain.
7.2.3: The Stock M arket Task
The Stock Market Task is a novel task designed to engage the participant in a 
decision-making task with changing reinforcement values and response demands. 
Participants completed a novel stock exchange task in which they were asked to decide 
which stock to sell or to retain based on the market values presented on a computer 
screen. The reinforcement values o f  learned responses were unexpectedly altered; the 
alteration resulted in varied demands for response change with and without changes in 
valence o f  reinforcement, and changes in reinforcement without demands for response 
change. The participants received the following instructions:
You are a successful trader on Wall Street who controls stock fo r  very wealthy clients. 
Unfortunately, the stock market has recently crashed and things are a mess. Some stocks 
have lost value and will continue to lose value. Other stocks have lost value, but will 
bounce back and are best kept. Still others were unaffected by the crash. O f these, some 
might drop i f  kept, but others will continue to grow. Your clients are turning to you to 
save their fortunes. It's up to you to decide which stock are bad and should be sold 
immediately and which stock are good and are best to keep around fo r  awhile.
Each individual stock item will appear as a black and white drawing depicting the goods 
that the stock represents. Next to the stock will be a square indicating how much money 
you will lose or gain relative to its original pre-crash value i f  you sell right away. I f  you 
choose to sell, this dollar figure is how much you will gain or lose. Otherwise, you may 
choose to wait. Once you make your selection, you will be told how much money your 
selection won or lost you, as well as how much money you would have made had you 
made the opposite choice. The dollar figure is always expressed relative to the pre-crash 
value o f the stock.
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Stocks will appear one at a time. I f  you wish to sell the stock shown, please press “1. ” I f  
you wish to keep the stock fo r  a while, please press “2. ” Once you have made your 
decision, the results will appear in two red boxes: One showing you the result o f your 
choice and the other showing you what the result would have been had you chosen the 
other option (selling instead o f keeping or vice versa). It is VERY important that you pay 
attention to both boxes to make sure that you are making the right choice each time.
Remember, to keep your clients happy you need to learn which stock items are bad and 
are best sold and which are good, and are best kept.
On each trial, participants had the option either to sell the stock immediately, or to 
retain it to determine whether it grows. Initially, participants learned that for each 
stimulus, the best outcome was associated with retaining the stock rather than selling it 
immediately. This “acquisition phase” consisted o f  15 trials in each run (3 presentations 
o f  each stimulus). The entire experiment consisted o f  8 runs and 120 acquisition stimuli. 
Each stimulus was associated with a unique level o f  reinforcement for retaining the stock. 
Figure 7.1(A), 7.1(B), and 7.1(C) illustrate sample response option screen, reinforcement 
screen, and trial schematic.
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Figure 7.1: Sample user interfaces
A) Response option screen: The stock product was depicted by a Snodgrass image (a 
pineapple below). The current market value of the stock is shown in a red box on the left. In this 
case, the value of the stock is set at $100 less than the pre-market crash value. Thus, selling the 
stock immediately would result in a net loss of $100. Participants also had the option of retaining 
the stock, which is indicated in the red box on the right of the figure, which displays the option, 
but not the value of that option.
Sell (his stock Keep this
now and lose stock and see
SI 00 if  it grow s
B) Reinforcement screen: The reinforcement screen displayed the consequence of the 
response, but also what the consequence would have been had the participant made the opposite 
choice. This ensured that participants were exposed to the reinforcement value of each response 
on every trial.
You would By keeping
have lost $100 this stock you
lost onlv $50
C) Trial schematic
 ►
+
Fixation Response Option Blank Screen Reinforcement
250ms 4500ms 500ms 4000ms
i
Bold signal modeled from 
reinforcement onset
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Following the acquisition phase, the reversal phase occurred without warning or 
perceivable change. The reversal phase consisted o f  five presentations o f  each stimulus 
for each run (25 trials in total). During the reversal phase, two out o f  the five response 
contingencies were reversed. For the RR and valence change conditions (RRVC), the 
valence o f  the previously correct response was changed and the previously 
disadvantageous response became advantageous. The RR condition stimuli (RR), in 
contrast, had a fixed valence, but the magnitude o f  reinforcement changed such that the 
previously incorrect response became correct and the previously correct response became 
incorrect. In the valence change condition (VC), the valence o f  reinforcement was 
reversed, but the advantageous response remained the same. In the magnitude change 
condition (MAG), the stimulus changed in value, but retained the same valence and 
response. In the control condition, the value and response options remained unchanged 
(CON). The stimuli that were used comprised a subset o f  Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s 
(1980) black and white images (standardized in familiarity and visual complexity) 
randomly assigned to each condition. Therefore, over the course o f  eight runs, 
participants saw 200 trials in the second phase (40 o f  each condition). Each participant 
underwent a practice task outside o f  the scanner before completing eight different 
versions o f  the task while being scanned. A different set o f  stimuli were used in each run, 
and each run conformed to the same schedule o f  reinforcement. Although the magnitude 
o f  the initial stock value varied within the run out o f  necessity, the magnitude o f  the 
difference in stock value from phase 1 to 2 was kept constant across conditions (with the 
exception o f  the control condition, which retained the same value across phases). Table 
7.1 provides a sample o f  the contingencies used in the present experiment.
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Table 7.1: Sample reinforcement table
Condition Sell Now Value Reinforcement for “Keep Stock” Response
Phase 1 Phase 2
RRVC -$75 $50 -$100
RR -$100 -$50 -$200
VC -$100 -$50 $100
Magnitude -$250 -$200 -$50
Control -$100 t W o -$50
7.2.4: JM RI analysis
Data were analyzed within the framework o f  the general linear model using 
Analysis o f  Functional Neuroimages (AFNI; Cox, 1996). Both individual and group- 
level analyses were conducted. The first four volumes in each scan series, collected 
before equilibrium magnetization was reached, were discarded. M otion correction was 
performed by registering all volumes in the EPI dataset to a volume collected shortly 
before the high resolution anatomical dataset was acquired. EPI datasets were spatially 
smoothed (isotropic 6mm Gaussian kernel) and converted into percent signal change from 
baseline. Regressors depicting each o f  the 13 response types (and sequence 1) were 
convolved with a gamma-variate hemodynamic response function to account for the slow 
hemodynamic response (Cohen, 1997). The regressors were defined as follows:
a) Acquisition of response to the stimulus later associated with RR without valence change 
(AQRR). Percent signal change was also calculated for this stimulus following reversal 
(RR).
b) Acquisition of the response to the stimulus later associated with valence change but no 
response change (AQVC). Percent signal change was also calculated for this stimulus 
following valence change in the second phase (VC).
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c) Acquisition of responding to the stimulus later associated with magnitude change without 
response change (AQMAG). Percent signal change was also calculated for this stimulus 
following a change in magnitude occurring in the second phase (VC).
d) Acquisition of the response to the control stimulus, which did not change values 
throughout the task (AQCON). Percent signal change was also calculated for this 
stimulus in the second phase (CON).
e) Acquisition errors collapsed across all stimuli in the first phase (AQERR).
f) Percent signal change for all reversal errors (RRERR) was calculated ((percent signal 
change to RRVC errors + percent signal change to RR errors) / 2).
g) Finally, errors to stimuli that did not reverse their reward contingencies (NRERR) was 
calculated ((percent signal change to VC errors + percent signal change to MAG errors + 
percent signal change to CON errors) / 3).
Paired t-tests were performed on a voxel-by-voxel basis across all subjects for the 
following contrasts: (1) RRERR versus correct reversals; (2) RRERR versus the control 
condition in phase 2; (3) VC condition versus the control condition in phase 2. The result 
was a group map o f  areas o f  differential activation. Regions o f  interest (ROIs) were 
defined at the group-level after each contrast by sampling areas that were differentially 
active. These ROIs were used to extract average percent signal change across each o f  the 
conditions.
7.3: Results
7.3.1: Behavioural Results
The proportion o f  errors was calculated for both the acquisition and reversal 
phases. Repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the proportion o f  correct 
selections in the acquisition (ACQ) and each o f  the five conditions o f  the reversal phase 
(RRVC, RR, VC, MAG, and CON). This revealed a significant main effect for condition 
(F(5,70) = 61.41;/? < 0.001). Subsequent planned contrasts revealed that participants 
made more errors on the two reversal conditions o f  the task than on any other condition 
(in each case,/? < 0.01). However, the RRVC and RR conditions did not differ
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significantly. Figure 7.3 displays the mean proportion correct with standard error bars for 
the acquisition phase and each of the phase 2 conditions
Figure 7.2: Stock exchange task behavioural data
Proportion Correct
Condition
7.3.2: JM RI Results
7.3.2.1: Response reversal errors versus correct reversals 
The first analysis focused on neural responding to error feedback following a 
reversal in reinforcement contingencies versus activation to feedback following a correct 
response to reversed stimuli in the second phase. The results showed robust bilateral 
ventrolateral activity corresponding to BA 47 and extending into insula and BA 45 
(activation is significant at p < 0.001, uncorrected). Significant activation was also seen 
in medial frontal cortex (BA 8) and OFC (BA 10). The activation is summarized in Table 
7.2.
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Table 7.2: Significant clusters of activation for RRERR versus correct RR
Region L/R BA X y z Volume
1) Medial frontal gyrus R 8 4 24 48 12216
2) Insula/Ventral lateral L 47/13 -31 22 3 4953
3) Inferior frontal gyrus R 45/13 40 22 7 1992
4) Middle frontal gyrus L 6 -36 5 45 1389
5) Middle frontal gyrus R 8 45 10 47 1193
6) Superior frontal gyrus L 10 -23 52 29 1128
7) Thalamus R - 7 -13 0 731
8) Superior frontal gyrus
9) Lentiform nucleus/
R 9 32 44 34 727
Medial globus pallidus L - -10 -1 -2 346
11) Superior temporal gyrus L 22 -49 -3 -1 261
12) Caudate R - 13 8 16 260
13) Superior temporal gyrus R - 52 -23 -4 247
L = left; R = right; BA = Brodmann’s Area; X, Y, Z, coordinates are MNI;
(t = 4.321; p <  0.001).
A functional mask to identify regions o f  interest (ROI) was generated from the 
contrast RRERR versus correct reversals using a statistical threshold o ip  < 0.001 
(uncorrected). Using the clusters o f  activation, ROIs were derived that corresponded to 
the following regions: bilateral VLPFC (BA 47, insula, BA 13), left OFC (BA 10), and 
right caudate. Following the identification o f  the specific ROIs, the average percent 
signal change for all o f  the conditions was calculated in AFNI using “3dmaskave” (AFNI; 
Cox, 1996). This yielded an average percent signal change in each o f  the specified 
regions o f  interest for each o f  the 13 conditions: AQRRVC, AQRR, AQVC, AQMAG, 
AQCON, AQERR, RRVC, RR, VC, MAG, CON, RRERR, and NRERR. In each ROI, 
percent signal change relative to baseline was significantly greater in the three error 
conditions than in the control condition. The three error conditions did not differ
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significantly from one another. The one exception was left OFC (BA 10), for which 
activation in response to NRERR was significantly greater than activity to AQERR. Each 
figure below contains an fMRI image depicting the pattern of activation elicited by the 
relevant contrast. In addition, each figure contains a graph plotting the percent signal 
change relative to baseline for each of the conditions within the region specified by the 
fMRI image. For each ROI, paired t-tests were conducted to determine whether activity 
in response to feedback following each of the three types of errors (acquisition, non­
reversal, and reversal errors) differed significantly from activity in the same region to the 
control condition. Paired t-tests were also conducted to determine whether the percent 
signal change among the three error conditions differed significantly.
Figure 7.3: Activation in medial frontal cortex for RRERR versus correct RR 
A) Sagittal view of ROI B) Percent signal change in BA 8 by condition
Percent signal change in dorsal region of medial 
frontal cortex (BA 8)
■  A cquisition
■  R eve rsa l
In Figure 7.3(A), a sagittal slice of activity in medial frontal cortex (BA 8) is 
shown. Figure 7.3(B) reveals percent signal change across conditions; all error conditions 
resulted in significant activation relative to correct reversals whether it was an acquisition 
error (AQERR), mean reversal errors for both reversal conditions (RRERR), or a non-
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reversal error (NRERR; p  < 0.001 in each case). Activation in this ROI did not differ 
significantly among the three error types.
Figure 7.4: Activation in VLPFC for RRERR versus correct RR
A) Axial view showing ROI B) Percent signal change in left VLPFC by condition
Percent signal change in left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(BA 47 extending to BA 45 & 13)
-0.05 - I
i Acquisition 
I Reversal
C) Percent signal change in right VLPFC by condition
Percent signal change in right ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (BA 47 & 13)
0.3
0.2
0.1 ■ Acquisition
■ Reversal
- 0.1
- 0.2
Figure 7.4(A) shows significant clusters of activation in left and right VLPFC for 
the contrast RRERR versus correct RR. Left VLPFC activation extends from the insula 
to BA 47, 45, and 13. Right VLPFC activation is focused in BA 45, 47 and 13. Figure 
7.4(B) shows that for the specified region of left VLPFC, RRERR {p < 0.001), NRERR (p
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< 0.005), and AQERR (p < 0.05) elicit significantly greater activation relative to the 
control condition. Figure 7.4(C) shows a strikingly similar pattern of results for 
activation in right VLPFC (including BA 47 and 13); all error conditions, RRERR (p < 
0.0001), NRERR (p = 0.001) and AQERR (p = 0.006) elicit significantly greater 
activation relative to the control condition. Activation in these ROIs did not differ 
significantly among the three error types.
Figure 7.5: Activation in left OFC (BA 10) for RRERR versus correct RR 
A) Axial view of ROI B) Percent signal change in left OFC by condition
Percent signal change in left orbitofrontal cortex 
(BA 10)
I Acquisition 
i Reversal
Figure 7.5(A) shows significant left OFC activation (BA 10). Figure 7.5(B) 
shows that activity in this region of left OFC (BA 10) was greater for each of the error 
conditions than for correct reversals (RRERR (p < 0.0001), NRERR {p = 0.001) and 
AQERR {p = 0.02)). Activation in this region did not distinguish between AQERR and 
RRERR nor NRERR and RRERR. However, significantly greater activation was seen in 
this region for NRERR errors over AQERR.
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Figure 7.6: Activation in right caudate RRERR versus correct RR
A) Axial view of ROI B) Percent signal change in right caudate by condition
Percent signal change in right caudate
0.25 y  
0.2 - 
0.15 ~ 
0.1 -  
0.05 -
■ Acquisition
■ Reversal
-0.05 
- 0.1 -  
-0.15 -
Figure 7.6(A) shows a cluster of activation corresponding to right caudate. As can 
be seen in Figure 7.6(B), this activity was significantly greater following any type of error 
(RRERR (p < 0.0005), NRERR (p = 0.001) and AQERR (p = 0.01) than seen in correct 
reversals. Activation in this ROI did not differ significantly among the three error types.
7.3.2.2: Response reversal errors versus the control condition 
The second analysis investigated neural activation in response to RRERR versus 
the control condition. For control stimuli, the value of the reinforcer remained unchanged 
throughout the task. The contrast showed a similar pattern of activation as the contrast 
RRERR versus correct reversals. The results showed robust bilateral ventrolateral 
activity corresponding to BA 47 and extending into insula and BA 45. Significant 
activation was also seen in medial frontal cortex (BA 8) and OFC BA 10. The activation 
is summarised in Table 7.3.
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Table 7.3: Significant activation for RRERR versus the control condition
Region L/R BA X y z Volume
Medial frontal gyrus L 8 -21 9 4 18302
Medial frontal gyrus R 8 4 28 48 13716
Middle frontal gyrus R 9 44 15 44 6398
Caudate R - 13 8 15 2654
Middle frontal gyrus L 9 -39 8 43 1974
Inferior frontal gyrus R 47 32 21 -1 1709
Superior frontal gyrus L 10 -23 54 27 1328
Middle temporal gyrus L 22 -58 -34 -2 1258
Medial frontal gyrus R 6 1 -25 59 1154
Superior temporal gyrus R 42 63 -9 9 1002
Supramarginal gyrus R - 52 -47 38 860
Inferior frontal gyrus R 11 29 36 -25 718
Middle frontal gyrus R 10 34 55 12 431
Superior temporal gyrus R 21 51 -24 -3 347
(t = 4.321;/? < 0.001, uncorrected).
Using the same procedure described in section 7.3.2.1, significant areas o f 
activation generated from the contrast RRERR versus the control condition were used to 
form functionally defined ROIs. On this basis, ROIs were derived that corresponded to 
the following regions: left caudate to left VLPFC, right VLPFC, right caudate, left OFC, 
and right OFC. Following the identification o f  the specific ROIs, the average percent 
signal change for all o f  the conditions was calculated in the manner described in section 
7.3.2.1. Each figure below contains an fMRI image depicting the pattern o f  activation 
elicited by the relevant contrast. In addition, each figure contains a graph plotting the 
percent signal change relative to baseline for each o f  the conditions within the regions
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specified by the fMRI image. The same series of paired t-tests were conducted as were 
described in section 7.3.2.1. As with the previous contrast, paired t-tests were conducted 
using percent signal change in the ROI to determine whether each of the three error 
conditions differed significantly from the control condition and to determine whether the 
percent signal change generated by each of the three error conditions differed 
significantly from each other. For each ROI, the percent signal change in response to 
errors was significantly greater than the control condition. The one exception was in left 
and right OFC (BA 10 bilaterally).
Figure 7.7: Axial and sagittal views of activity extending from caudate to left VLPFC 
A) Axial view of ROI B) Sagittal view of left VLPFC
C) Percent signal change in area extending from thalamus to BA 47 by condition
Percent signal change in area extending from 
thalamus to left insula, BA 45 and 47
0.25
0.2
0.15
■ Acquisition
■ Reversal
0.05
-0.05 -  
-0.1 -  
-0.15
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Figure 7.7(A) provides an axial view of extensive activation ranging from the 
thalamus to the caudate and insula to BA 47 and 45. Figure 7.7(B) provides a sagittal 
view showing a subset of the same activation in BA 47. In Figure 7.7(C), a bar graph 
illustrates the percent signal change in the ROI indicated in Figure 7.8(A and B) for each 
of the conditions in the task. Each of the error conditions show significantly greater 
activation than the control condition RRERR (p < 0.0005), NRERR (p < 0.0005, and 
AQERR (p = 0.007). Activation in this ROI did not differ significantly among the three 
error types.
Figure 7.8: Activation in right VLPFC for RRERR versus control
A) Axial view of ROI B) Percent signal change in right VLPFC by condition
Percent signal change in right BA 47
0.2
0.15
■  Acquisition
■ Reversal
0 .0 5 ------
-0.05
-0.1
Figure 7.8(A) shows activation of the right VLPFC for the contrast RRERR 
versus the control condition (p < 0.001). Percent signal change in right lateral prefrontal 
cortex (caudate and BA47) is shown for each of the conditions in Figure 7.8(B). Each of 
the error conditions show significantly greater activation than the control condition 
(RRERR (p < 0.001), NRERR (p = 0.001), and AQERR (p  = 0.016)). Activation in this 
ROI did not differ significantly among the three error types.
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Figure 7.9: Activation in right caudate for RRERR versus control
A) Axial view of ROI B) Percent signal change in right caudate by condition
Percent signal change in right caudate
0.2  - 
0.15 —  
0.1 -  
0.05 - ■ Acquisition
■ Reversal
-0.05
-0.15
Figure 7.9(A) shows a sagittal view o f right caudate activation. Figure 7.9(B) 
shows that each o f  the error conditions have significantly greater percent signal change 
than the control condition: RRERR (p < 0.0005), NRERR (p < 0.0005), and AQERR (p 
= 0.007). Activation in this ROI did not differ significantly among the three error types.
Figure 7.10: Activation in left OFC (BA 10)
A) Axial view of ROI B) Percent signal change in left OFC by condition
Percent signal change in left OFC (BA 10)
0.25 j
0 .2 ----
0 .1 5 ----
0 .1 ----
0 .0 5 ---- ■ Acquisition
■  Reversal-0.05 - 
-0.1 - 
-0 .15 - 
-0.2  - 
-0.25 J
Figure 7.10(A) shows activation in left OFC (BA 10) for RRERR versus the 
control condition. Figure 7.10(B) illustrates percent signal change in the ROI for each of 
the conditions in the task. Each o f the error conditions show significantly greater
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activation than the control condition RRERR (p < 0.0005), NRERR (p < 0.003), and 
AQERR (p = 0.014). Paired sample t-tests revealed no significant differences in the 
percent signal change between AQERR and RRERR. However, NRERR was associated 
with significantly greater activation in this ROI than AQERR (p < 0.05).
Figure 7.11: Activation in right OFC (BA 10)
B) Percent signal change in right OFC by condition
Percent signal change in right OFC (BA10)
0.4
0.3
0.2
■  A cquisition
■  Reversal
-0.2
-0.3
Figure 7.11(A) shows an axial view o f activation in right OFC (BA 10) for 
RRERR versus the control condition. Figure 7.11(B) plots the percent signal change in 
this region for each o f the conditions in the task. Only RRERR showed greater activation 
than the control condition in this region (p = 0.001). The percent signal change following 
AQERR and NRERR was not significantly different from the control condition.
However, activity in this region did not differ significantly among the three error types.
7.3.2.3: Correct valence change responses versus the control condition
The third analysis investigated neural responding that distinguished activity to 
reinforcement following VC from activity following the control condition. For the VC 
condition, correct responses following a change in the valence o f the response value 
occurred in the absence o f demands for response change. The contrast revealed
A) Axial view of ROI
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significant activation in a region o f  right cingulate gyrus (BA24; (t = 4.321; p  < 0.001, 
uncorrected). The activation is summarised in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4: Significant activation for VC versus control condition
Region L/R BA X y z Volume
Cingulate gyrus R 24 19 2 38 237
(t = 4.321; p  < 0.001, uncorrected).
The activity generated from the contrast VC versus control condition was used as 
a functional ROI in the manner described in section 7.3.2.1. Figure 7.12 depicts this 
activation.
Figure 7.12: Activation in cingulate (BA 24) to VC versus control
A) Coronal view of ROI B) Percent signal change in left cingulate by condition
Percent signal change in cingulate gyrus (BA 24)
■  A cquisition
■  R eversal
Figure 7.12(A) shows significant deactivation in the cingulate gyrus (BA 24) for 
the contrast VC condition relative to baseline or control (p < 0.001). A functional mask 
was generated as a result o f this area o f activation, and the percent signal change in each 
condition was examined. Figure 7.12(B) shows the percent signal change in the cingulate
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gyrus (BA 24). Significant modulation in activity relative to baseline was found for the 
following conditions: RR (without valence change) correct {p = 0.014), RRERR (p < 
0.05), all correct reversals (p < 0.05), and NRERR (p < 0.05).
7.4: Discussion
The current chapter presented fMRI data produced during the performance of a 
novel instrumental learning and relearning task. Participants made decisions about 
whether to retain or to sell stock items based on reinforcement values. In the first phase 
of the task, participants learned whether it was advantageous to sell or to retain each 
stock. In the second phase, the reinforcement value of four out o f five previously correct 
responses unexpectedly changed. Following the change, two of the previously 
advantageous responses became disadvantageous; for two others, the value of the correct 
option changed, but the correct motor response remained the same. To provide a control 
condition, the value and response to the fifth stimulus remained unchanged. Significant 
VLPFC, caudate, and insula activity was observed following error feedback whether this 
feedback occurred after a change in reinforcement or for errors committed during 
acquisition. Similarly, significant activity in the caudate and dorsal medial frontal cortex 
(BA 8) region was observed following error feedback. Like ventrolateral and orbital 
regions, this region of medial frontal cortex responded to errors whether they were related 
to acquisition errors, reversal errors, or non-reversal errors that occurred late in the task.
Recent investigations have examined whether dissociable units within the frontal 
regions are involved in separable processes during RR performance. Theories have most 
frequently suggested that functional divisions exist between ventrolateral and medial 
regions of prefrontal cortex. O ’Doherty and his colleagues (2001a) have suggested that 
the medial regions of prefrontal cortex may be involved in processing reward and that
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lateral regions process punishment. The Stock Market Task was not set up to provide 
direct contrasts between positive and negative reinforcement: in this task, positively 
valenced outcomes could be disadvantageous and negatively valenced outcomes could be 
advantageous. The results of the present study are, however, compatible with the notion 
that lateral regions o f prefrontal cortex are involved in processing incorrect feedback 
(without consideration of valence). This pattern of activation to error-related feedback 
was also found in medial prefrontal cortex (BA 8) and anterior regions of OFC (BA10). 
Thus, although the lateral/medial dichotomy proposed by O’Doherty and his colleagues 
(2001a), would not account for all of the error-related activation found in the Stock 
Market Task, it is compatible with the current results.
O’Doherty and his colleagues (2003) have recently put forth an alternative 
position on the functional dissociation between medial and lateral regions of OFC. The 
results suggest that some degree of functional overlap may exist between medial and 
lateral regions o f frontal cortex. For example, their probabilistic RR study associated 
medial OFC activation with reward processing and the maintenance o f a response; 
however, lateral regions were also active in some cases during reward processing. The 
authors implicate the caudolateral OFC and anterior insula in the detection of changes in 
contingency rather than RR per se; however, a separate area of caudolateral OFC was 
particularly responsive when response change was warranted. Because of the apparent 
overlap in function, it is difficult to generate specific predictions about lateral and 
caudolateral regions o f OFC based on the study of O’Doherty and his colleagues study. 
One of the findings that was consistent throughout the study was that o f medial OFC 
activation to response maintenance and reward processing.
The Stock Market Task data do not support these findings. For example, given 
O ’Doherty et al.’s (2003) results, one would predict that medial regions show greater
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activity following correct selections than incorrect selections. Alternatively, increased 
demands on a system for response maintenance may occur during the VC condition; if so, 
modulated activity in medial regions during the VC condition relative to the control 
condition would arise. The present study did not, however, find a modulation in activity 
in medial regions during the VC.
Elliott and her colleagues (1999; 2000) offer an alternate explanation. They 
suggest that medial regions o f prefrontal cortex are involved in processing the reward 
value of response options when the outcome is unclear on a trial-by-trial basis; thus, the 
medial regions are particularly important when advantageous responding requires the 
integration of information accumulated over time. They suggest that medial prefrontal 
cortex is crucial for maintaining the “familiar” response (1999). In contrast, they state 
that lateral regions of frontal cortex are crucially involved when a familiar response is 
inhibited. However, during the Stock Market Task, activity in VLPFC was observed 
whenever response change was warranted, regardless of whether a prepotent response had 
been formed. For example, ventrolateral activation occurred to errors in the acquisition 
phase before a prepotent response would have been developed. Similarly, significant 
activation in ventrolateral regions occurred to non-reversal errors in the second phase. 
Thus, activation was observed in the present study whenever an errant choice was made, 
even if  the errant choice was not a practised one. As a consequence, this finding does not 
support conceptualisations that emphasize a role for the lateral prefrontal cortex in 
response inhibition or the suppression of a prepotent response.
The IES model (Blair, 2004) is an alternative explanation of VL/OFC function 
that emphasizes the importance o f representations of expectations of reinforcement. The 
representation of response outcome expectations is implicit in many influential models of 
emotional processing. For example, models of emotional experience (e.g., Mandler,
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1984; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), anxiety (e.g., Gray, 1982), stimulus-reinforcement 
learning and relearning (e.g., Grossberg, 1982; Rolls, 1990), frustration (Amsel, 1992), 
and latent inhibition (Schmajuk, Lam, & Gray, 1996) include representations of response 
outcome expectations. Representation of response outcome can also be applied to OFC 
functioning. The IES model incorporates the notion of response outcome encoding and 
suggests that separate systems exist for the encoding of expectations, the detection of 
violations in these expectations, and for initiating changes in responding (Blair, 2004).
The Stock Market Task was designed to investigate elements of RR that are 
directly relevant to key components of the IES model (Blair, 2004). The IES model, 
depicted schematically in Figure 7.13, suggests that regions of VLPFC play a crucial role 
in response change within a larger circuit that includes medial regions of prefrontal 
cortex, the amygdala, insula, caudate, and premotor cortex. The amygdala contains units 
dedicated to the representation of reinforcer valence. These units are activated by 
aversive and appetitive reinforcers. Units within the insula represent outcome of the 
available response options, which acquire positive or negative valence based on input 
from valence representation in the amygdala. Thus, the representations o f these outcomes 
becomes rewarding or aversive. Valence information is conveyed to units within the 
medial OFC which code the expected reinforcement value of motor responses represented 
and initiated by the caudate and premotor cortex. Functionally, the model suggests that 
units within BA 47 detect mismatches between expectations of valence reinforcement and 
actual outcomes. Thus, damage to the insula, ventrolateral, or medial regions of 
prefrontal cortex will all impact RR.
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Figure 7.13: Suggested mechanism for RR (IES model; Blair, 2004)
R2
Motor responses 
(Caudate 
and Premotor Cortex)Units coding 
expected reinforcement 
(Medial OFC)
Object Y
Object X
Valenced
outcome
representations
(Insula)
Comparator units 
(VLPFC: BA 47) Valence representations 
(Amygdala)
With regard to the Stock Market Task, the IES model offers the clear prediction 
that regions o f VLPFC will be engaged whenever mismatches exist between the optimal 
amount o f reinforcement available, and the actual reinforcement received. The results 
supported this prediction. Activation in VL/OFC occurred whether or not the error was 
committed during acquisition or following a reversal. In this study, activity in the medial 
preffontal cortex did not distinguish between changes in reinforcement that did not 
compel response change from the control condition. Although a region of dorsal 
cingulate was sensitive to changes in valence, it also showed modulation relative to the 
control condition for reversal and non-reversal errors.
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In the present study, differential activation in the valence and magnitude change 
conditions was not apparent. This is surprising given the clear evidence for a role of the 
OFC in processing both primary and secondary reinforcement value (Thorpe et al., 1983; 
Critchely & Rolls, 2000). One possibility is that changes in the value of responses in the 
current task were not sufficiently salient. Participants may have been attending to the 
response-relevant information at the expense of the more subtle performance-related 
information. This possibility is currently being explored in an experiment in which the 
salience of the reinforcement change is increased without affecting behavioural choice.
7.5: Conclusion
The results of the study presented here supports theories of VLPFC (BA 47) and 
more anterior regions o f OFC (BA 10) in signalling an incorrect response whether or not 
the feedback violates an established stimulus-response association. This suggests that 
ventrolateral regions are not simply involved in inhibiting a prepotent response as has 
been suggested. The hypothesis that medial frontal activation would be associated with 
all changes in the value of reinforcement regardless of demands for response change was 
not supported by the present study. This may be due to reduced salience of reinforcement 
values that were not motivationally significant. The data did support the prediction that 
VLPFC would be active during RR. Activation was seen in these regions to all errors, 
regardless of whether they were following a violation in RR. The data generated by this 
experiment challenge theories that suggest that the primary role of the VL/OFC is in the 
inhibition of a prepotent response.
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Chapter 8
Summary, Conclusions, and Future Directions
8.1: Introduction
This chapter summarizes the implications of this thesis and suggests directions for 
future work. The conclusions drawn concern the impact o f emotion on attention, 
dissociable forms of instrumental learning, decision-making, and behavioural regulation. 
Cognitive processes were assessed using standard and novel experimental tasks in both 
healthy and patient populations. The cognitive functions discussed are specifically 
related to disorders of aggression such as psychopathy and acquired sociopathy. The 
relevance of amygdala and OFC dysfunction in psychopathic disorders is reviewed.
8.2: Summary and Conclusions
8.2.1: Reviewing OFC function, amygdala function, and psychopathy
This thesis began with a discussion of the construct of psychopathy and the 
impetus behind the theories and neurocognitive investigations of the disorder. This 
discussion was followed by sections concerning the basic anatomy and function of the 
OFC. The aberrant social behaviour that can follow OFC damage was also described.
The laboratory work reviewed implicates the OFC in expression recognition, decision­
making, and response change. Three influential theories of OFC function were discussed: 
the SRR theory (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000), the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio,
1994), and a RR theory (Rolls, 1999). An illustration of how these theories can be 
merged under the Integrated Emotions System model was provided (Blair, 2004). The 
clinical correlates of amygdala dysfunction and anatomy of the amygdala were discussed 
in the second half of the chapter, followed by a description of the involvement of the
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amygdala in emotional expression recognition, conditioning, some forms of instrumental 
learning, and the emotional modulation of attention. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of how the thesis addresses its chief aim of characterising OFC and amygdala 
dysfunction in psychopathy.
8.2.2: The emotional modulation o f  attention
A novel experiment investigating the modulation of motor behaviour by emotion 
in forensic samples with and without psychopathy was presented in Chapter 2. The 
introduction discussed evidence showing that healthy emotional responding can lead to an 
impairment of operant behaviour given the appropriate conditions. This was followed by 
a description of two mechanisms by which emotion can disrupt behaviour: (1) through 
the generation o f an incompatible response, “freezing,” generated by the basic threat 
circuitry, or (2) by “capturing” attention. In line with predictions, individuals with 
psychopathy showed reduced interference of ongoing behaviour in the presence of 
positive and negative images, but not for trials associated with neutral images. The 
disrupted behaviour during the positive images suggested that the mechanism of 
disruption involved in the Emotional Interrupt Task was through the depletion of 
attentional resources rather than through the activation of the basic threat response 
system. Specifically, conclusions drawn on the basis of this data suggest that although 
the comparison individuals showed reduced allocation of attentional resources to the 
operant task during positive and negative presentations, the individuals with psychopathy 
did not exhibit this modulation of attention.
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8.2.3: Stimulus reinforcement learning
Chapter 3 begins with a description of two fundamental forms of instrumental 
learning conceptualised by Baxter and Murray (2002) as stimulus-reinforcement learning 
and stimulus-response learning. The two classic tests of stimulus-reinforcement and 
stimulus-response learning discussed are thought to rely on the integrity of dissociable 
neural substrates. Thus, while stimulus-reinforcement learning is impaired following 
amygdala damage, object discrimination learning remains intact (Baxter & Murray,
2002). It was hypothesized that individuals with psychopathy would show difficulties 
only on instrumental learning tasks that required the formation of stimulus-reinforcement 
associations. The results of a stimulus-reinforcement association task involving groups 
comprised of individuals with psychopathy, individuals with sub-threshold psychopathy, 
and comparison individuals were presented. In line with predictions, a correlation was 
found between the level of psychopathy and the number o f errors in the acquisition of the 
instrumental response: psychopathic individuals made significantly more errors relative to 
the comparison group in the learning phase. Two reversal phases followed. In the 
second reversal phase, individuals with psychopathy and sub-threshold psychopathy made 
significantly more errors than the comparison group. As expected, psychopathy was 
correlated with the number of errors during acquisition and the second reversal phase.
The results were in line with suggestions that individuals with psychopathy present with 
an impaired ability to form stimulus-reinforcement associations and an impaired reversal 
o f such associations once they have been formed.
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8.2.4: Reversal learning and decision-making
The primary objective of Chapter 4 was to investigate further the presence and 
nature of the proposed reversal learning deficit exhibited by individuals with 
psychopathy. Two experiments were conducted. In the first, a gambling task was used in 
which participants chose between four response options of different reinforcement 
contingencies. Two responses were high-risk and ultimately disadvantageous, and two 
were low-risk and ultimately rewarding. The comparison group gradually showed a 
preference for the low-risk decks. In contrast, individuals with psychopathy continued to 
sample from the high-risk decks at the same rate throughout the task. The results are 
compatible with either an OFC or an amygdala dysfunction explanation of psychopathy; 
patients with lesions involving either the OFC or the amygdala are impaired on this task 
(Bechara et al., 1999). Chapter 4 included results from a second experiment, the ID/ED 
task, which is a multi-component measure of instrumental learning, attentional set- 
shifting, and RR. The task involves a form of instrumental learning (object 
discrimination learning) that is not thought to rely on the amygdala (Baxter & Murray, 
2002). The attentional set-shifting component of the task is thought to be sensitive to 
dorsolateral regions of frontal cortex and the reversal component to OFC regions (Dias et 
al., 1996). In line with predictions generated from the idea of a specific VL/OFC 
dysfunction theory of psychopathy, individuals with the disorder showed intact object 
discrimination learning and attentional set-shifting, but impaired RR.
8.2.5: Conditional learning
Chapter 5 presented an experimental investigation of conditional learning and 
conditional reversals. Unlike the experiment presented in Chapter 3, this task is thought
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to measure stimulus-response associations, and therefore is not reliant on the amygdala 
(Baxter & Murray, 2002). Conditional learning involves selecting from available 
responses in the context of a reference stimulus. In making conditional discriminations, 
participants do not approach or avoid stimuli that are intrinsically positive or negative, but 
rather, determine the appropriate response in a given stimulus’ presence. The distinction 
between stimulus-response and stimulus-reinforcement associations allows one to reliably 
predict which instrumental learning tasks depend on the amygdala and which do not. As 
a consequence, it provides an excellent means with which to explore whether the apparent 
instrumental learning deficit observed in individuals with psychopathy is due to a general 
emotional learning difficulty, or whether, as the amygdala dysfunction hypothesis of 
psychopathy would suggest, it is specific to stimulus-reinforcement associations. As 
predicted by both the amygdala and OFC dysfunction theories of psychopathy, 
participants with the disorder showed intact acquisition and maintenance of stimulus- 
response associations and impaired reversal of those associations. The results provide 
further support for a specific, rather than general, instrumental learning deficit in 
individuals with psychopathy.
8.2.6: Acquired sociopathy versus developmental psychopathy
Acquired sociopathy, a disorder that can arise following insult to the OFC, has 
been suggested as a model for developmental psychopathy (Damasio, 1994; Anderson et 
al., 1997; Anderson et al., 1999). Chapter 6 presents a patient alleged to have acquired 
sociopathy. Standard and experimental tasks were conducted to characterise his 
impairment and to compare and contrast his performance with a healthy community 
sample as well as psychopathic and non-psychopathic forensic comparison groups. As 
reviewed in previous chapters, considerable evidence suggests that OFC dysfunction may
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contribute to at least some o f the symptoms associated with psychopathy. However, 
given the hypothesis that amygdala dysfunction is the primary deficit involved in the 
disorder, it was predicted that patient C.L. would show a dissociable pattern of 
impairment relative to individuals with psychopathy. The results revealed that the 
psychopathic group demonstrates a strikingly different pattern of performance than C.L. 
For example, C.L. showed pronounced SRR deficits: he had facial expression recognition 
impairments (particularly anger and disgust) and had difficulties identifying situations 
that would result in anger in others. He also showed impaired Iowa Gambling Task 
performance, but surprisingly, he did not exhibit RR deficits on the ID/ED Task. In 
contrast, individuals with developmental psychopathy did not show evidence of SRR 
deficits. Like C.L., individuals with developmental psychopathy showed impaired 
decision-making on the Iowa Gambling Task, but, unlike C.L., they also showed RR 
deficits on the ID/ED Task. Theory of mind deficits were not evident in any of the 
groups. One of the most important findings of this chapter, however, was the double 
dissociation seen between C.L. and the psychopathic group on instrumental learning 
tasks. C.L. showed intact performance on the passive avoidance test, but pronounced 
impairment on the conditional learning task. Conversely, individuals with psychopathy 
showed gross impairment on the passive avoidance task and intact performance on the 
conditional learning task. C.L.’s performance profile is probably reflective of the extent 
of his frontal lesion and sparing of the amygdala. The performance profile of the 
individuals with psychopathy is predicted by conceptualisations that suggest the presence 
of OFC and amygdala dysfunction, but with sparing of cognitive function ascribed to the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
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8.2.7: Response change and value encoding
Substantial evidence exists to suggest that regions of OFC and VLPFC play an 
integral role in response change and decision-making. In Chapter 7, evidence was 
reviewed that suggested that regions of OFC play a role in processing primary and 
abstract reinforcement. Data was also reviewed showing that damage to this region 
resulted in impaired RR. Theories and studies of OFC function either look at these 
processes in isolation or collapse them together so that it is difficult to determine whether 
dissociable regions within OFC or VLPFC are involved in stimulus value encoding and 
response change. A novel Stock Market Task that attempts to disentangle stimulus-value 
encoding from response change was presented. The study showed a striking and 
consistent pattern of activation in VLPFC (BA 47) and orbital (BA 10) regions of 
prefrontal cortex whenever an error was made, regardless of whether it occurred during 
acquisition, to a change in reinforcement level, or to an errant response that occurred long 
after acquisition. In short, the signal appeared whenever a response was made that ought 
not to be repeated on the subsequent trial. One of the central aims of the experiment was 
to determine whether dissociable regions within the prefrontal cortex were involved in 
detecting changes in the level of reinforcement independent of response change. 
Significant activation was not, however, seen in the contrast valence change versus the 
control condition. This is likely to reflect a failure to encode the change in valence rather 
than being indicative of a common neural substrate. Rather than attending to the actual 
magnitude of reinforcement, participants may have been comparing the level of 
reinforcement that they received to ensure that they were making the advantageous 
decision. The absolute value of the reinforcement each time would therefore not be 
important.
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8.3 Relevance to the Clinical Presentation of Psychopathy
Neurocognitive deficits that are associated with a particular disorder may be 
characteristic of the disorder without having relevance to the clinical presentation. The 
neuropsychological tests presented in this thesis were designed or selected to investigate 
skills associated with real-world functioning such as decision-making, responding on the 
basis of reward and punishments, sensitivity to social cues, and response change. In most 
cases, the cognitive skills investigated can be considered a more basic, measurable marker 
of a more complex neurocognitive deficit that contributes to the clinical presentation of 
the disorder being explored. For example, psychopathy is characterised by elevated rates 
of instrumental and reactive aggression. It is thought that the circuitry involved in these 
two types of aggression are dissociable, and that both are impaired in individuals with 
psychopathy (Blair, 2003b; 2004). Deficits in response reversal do not, in isolation, result 
in persistent aggressive and otherwise maladaptive social behaviour. However, the 
relationship of reversal deficits to aggression is clarified by considering that response 
reversal is one component of a system that is involved in encoding the motivational value 
of response options and updating the values when they change. Furthermore, given that 
frustration, the precursor to reactive aggression (Berkowitz, 1993), results when an 
expected reward is not obtained, a failure in the system will leave someone at risk for 
heightened frustration, and consequently, increased rates of reactive aggression.
Similarly, insensitivity to distress cues is thought to be a risk factor for instrumental 
aggression (Blair, 2003a). Difficulty representing distress in others as an aversive 
stimulus may somewhat increase the risk of instrumental aggression (Blair et al., 1997; 
Blair, 2003b). However, sensitivity to distress appears to be mediated by a 
neurocognitive system (in this case involving the amygdala) that is involved in many
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forms of emotional learning and responding such as fear conditioning and other forms of 
emotional learning (LeDoux, 1998). In both examples, reversal learning and expression 
recognition, the skills explored are a measurable property of a larger neurocognitive 
system that together with environmental factors, contribute to the clinical presentation of 
psychopathy.
8.4 Strengths and Weaknesses
8.4.1: Strengths
One of the main strengths of the present thesis was the incorporation of a diverse 
range of research techniques. In developing theories with respect to psychopathy and the 
neurocognitive basis of instrumental learning, data from several levels were included 
ranging from animal research, developmental disorders, acquired lesions in humans, and 
functional imaging work all of which guided the experimental design and interpretation of 
existing results. Similarly, the experiments presented in this thesis combine established 
and novel neuropsychological as well as functional imaging techniques to address 
research questions. Like the techniques, the samples involved were varied. The patient 
groups included developmental psychopaths, a patient with acquired sociopathy, 
incarcerated controls, and healthy individuals from the community. The inclusion of 
these groups allowed for a rare experimental comparison between a case of acquired 
sociopathy and individuals with developmental psychopathy.
An additional advantage to utilizing data from a variety of domains is that it 
enables the generation of highly constrained predictions. The studies examined the 
performance of individuals with psychopathy on dissociable forms of instrumental 
learning for the first time. Based on data in the animal literature, specific predictions
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could be made about performance despite the surface similarities between the different 
instrumental behaviours. As a result, this thesis provides what may be the first evidence 
that psychopathy is characterized by a specific instrumental learning deficit rather than a 
global one. Psychopathy is characterised by an impairment in making stimulus- 
reinforcement associations. Stimulus-reinforcement associations entail attaching a 
positive or negative “affective tag” to a stimulus, which is thought to require the 
amygdala (Baxter & Murray, 2002; Everitt et al., 2003). In contrast, these experiments 
show no evidence for dysfunction in stimulus-response associations in individuals with 
psychopathy. Stimulus-response associations do not require intact amygdala functioning 
(Baxter & Murray, 2002).
Finally, the use of novel experimental techniques proved useful. For example, 
Chapter 2 presented a novel paradigm that allowed for an experimental manipulation that 
demonstrates that a neurocognitive deficit in psychopathic individuals could lead to 
enhanced performance relative to comparison individuals. In Chapter 7, a novel task was 
constructed to truly separate changes in valence and magnitude from the existing 
confounds of response change in a response reversal task.
8.4.2: Weaknesses
Minor adjustments to the methodology of some of the experiments will improve 
their utility for future studies. Chapter 2 presented an experiment in which participants 
were asked to attend to behaviourally irrelevant picture stimuli while responding to 
shapes. By removing any instruction to attend to the image, it would be clearer that a 
failure to modulate responding to the emotional material is due to insensitivity to the 
incidental emotional stimuli rather than failure to comply with a component o f the 
instructions.
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Chapters 3 ,4 , and 5 presented data on dissociable forms o f instrumental learning. 
Although providing valuable information about the dissociable forms of instrumental 
learning, the data could be more persuasive if the different tasks were matched for 
difficulty. For example, the fact that both groups perform at ceiling for the learning 
component of the ID/ED limits conclusions that can be drawn about the absence of an 
object discrimination impairment.
The ability to generalize the results contained in this thesis is limited for some of 
the studies due to small sample size. This is particularly clear in Chapter 6, in which a 
single case study with modest control sample size was presented. Patients with a focal 
lesion are relatively rare, which makes even a single case study of value. However, the 
results would be more persuasive with a larger healthy control group and a forensic 
sample that was better matched on age and education.
Chapter 7, although representing a novel examination of the different components 
of response reversal, did not detect substantial activation associated with changes in the 
magnitude of reinforcement. This may be due to insufficient power related to a relatively 
small sample size (n=12). Alternatively, the value change may not have been salient 
enough for participants to encode.
Future work aimed at addressing these weaknesses and building on the strengths 
of the experiments discussed in this thesis is described in the following sections.
8.5 Future Directions
The empirical work in this thesis has highlighted a number of possible avenues for 
further research. In the course of investigating neurocognitive deficits associated with 
psychopathy, more basic questions about the underlying cognitive processes under
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examination have arisen. The final sections of this thesis will discuss these possibilities 
for further research.
8.5.1: The modulation o f  attention and emotion
The Emotional Interrupt Task presented in Chapter 2 attempted to investigate the 
impact of emotional material on ongoing behaviour. This task is currently being 
implemented with special patient groups, including children with psychopathic tendencies 
and bipolar disorder, to test the generalisability of the result. One can predict that 
disorders that are believed to be associated with increased activation of threat circuitry, 
such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Gilboa et al., 2004; Nutt & Malizia, 2004), 
will also be associated with increased disruption on the Emotional Interrupt Task. This 
hypothesis is currently being investigated in a sample of women with PTSD.
This work inspired additional questions about the basic processes involved in the 
modulation of attention. The nature of the interaction between attention and emotion is 
currently debated. One perspective suggests that emotional material automatically gains 
access to attentional resources regardless of the extent to which attentional resources are 
depleted (Vuilleumier et al., 2001). An alternative view argues that emotional material is 
not automatically processed, but rather, requires that attentional resources be available 
(Pessoa et al., 2002). In support o f this position, Pessoa and his colleagues (2002) 
showed that emotional material is not processed by participants who are performing a 
cognitive task that places high demands on attention; brain regions that are consistently 
activated in the presence of emotional faces such as the fusiform gyrus (Kanwisher, 
Stanley, & Harris, 2000) and amygdala (Morris et al., 1996; Whalen et al., 2001) did so 
only when participants did not engage in the attentionally demanding task. This was true 
even when emotional stimuli were placed centrally at fixation and the stimuli relevant to
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the cognitive task were presented in the periphery. The two studies, however, used 
different cognitive tasks that varied substantially in terms of spatial organization, thereby 
making it difficult to evaluate the validity of the two opposing results.
This problem has inspired a new fMRI project, already underway, investigating 
the impact of emotional information under both high and low attentional load conditions. 
The task involves the rapid presentation (250ms) of compound stimuli consisting of a 
semi-transparent word superimposed on a fearful or neutral facial expression. The task 
has three conditions. In the control condition, participants are asked simply to judge the 
gender of the face. In the low attentional load condition, participants judge whether the 
superimposed words are presented in upper or lower case. In the high attentional load 
condition, participants are asked to determine the number of syllables contained in the 
superimposed word. The task is designed to address the continuing question of whether 
the amygdala responds automatically to emotional stimuli or does so only when 
attentional resources are available. It has an advantage over previous designs because it 
incorporates a powerful parametric design within one task and uses identical stimuli 
across conditions. If, as Vuilleumier et al. (2001) have suggested, the amygdala 
processes emotional stimuli automatically, equivalent amygdala activation should be seen 
in both the high and low attentional load conditions for fearful, but not neutral faces. If, 
as Pessoa and his colleagues suggest (2002), all processing requires the availability of 
attentional resources, the level of amygdala activation in the high load condition should 
be less than in the low attentional load condition. This study is designed to address this 
question.
8.5.2: Dissociable form s o f  instrumental learning
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This thesis examined different forms of instrumental learning that, although 
similar, are dissociable at the neural level. Much of the available work concerning 
dissociating these forms o f instrumental learning has been conducted with animals.
Future work incorporating imaging technology with human subjects to illustrate further 
the neural substrates involved in different forms of instrumental learning would be 
valuable. Chapter 4 presented data from the ID/ED Task, which features object 
discriminations and reversals. Object discrimination is thought to be a form of 
instrumental learning that does not rely on the amygdala. In line with this idea, 
individuals with psychopathy did not show impaired performance on this task. However, 
the simplicity o f the object discriminations in the ID/ED Task raises questions about 
ceiling effects. It is unclear whether the task is sensitive enough to detect existing object 
discrimination impairments. As an extension of the work presented in Chapters 3 ,4  and 
5 ,1 have recently designed a new computer-based object discrimination task involving six 
stimulus pairs. Through piloting with healthy volunteers, this new object discrimination 
task has been matched in difficulty with the Tokens Task. If the amygdala hypothesis of 
psychopathy is correct, patients with disorders that are characterised by reduced amygdala 
functioning, such as psychopathy, should show intact performance on this new 
instrumental learning task, but impaired learning on the Tokens Task. In contrast, patient 
groups that are thought to be hyper-responsive to stimulus-reinforcement associations 
should show altered performance on stimulus-reinforcement learning tasks, but intact 
functioning on stimulus-response learning tasks such as object discrimination.
8.5.3: Acquired sociopathy and other aggressive disorders
Chapter 6 reviewed evidence concerning the link between aggressive disorders 
and dysfunction involving the OFC and amygdala. Clinical reports of symptoms that
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follow damage to the frontal lobes have become more precise in identifying sub-regions 
within the frontal lobes that contribute to the aberrant behaviour. However, studies 
involving larger populations of individuals with damage to these regions can increase the 
specificity o f the link between neurocognitive deficits and social disturbance. For 
example, it is not clear whether RR deficits in themselves contribute to aggression or 
whether such deficits are symptomatic of the underlying disease. Rolls and his colleagues 
(1994) showed a correlation between reversal errors and behavioural problems as 
measured by a caregiver’s report. However, further studies that examine the correlation 
between RR errors and aggression are needed. For example, similar work relating extent 
of aggressive outbursts and RR or SRR impairments in other violent disorders would help 
clarify the relationship between this cognitive deficit and violent behaviour. Based on the 
theories presented in this thesis, the strength and replicability of either RR or SRR deficits 
in any patient population should be related to the degree of reactive aggression exhibited 
in this population.
As was discussed in the first chapter, the clinical picture of patients with lesions 
involving the amygdala is inconsistent. This may be due in part to the paucity of cases: 
circumscribed amygdala lesions are comparatively rare relative to lesions involving the 
OFC (most are gleaned from patients with temporal lobectomies). Research involving 
chimps suggests that lesions acquired later in life produce subtly different behavioural 
profiles than those acquired in infancy (Emery, Capitanio et al. 2001; Prather, Lavenex et 
al. 2001). More detailed studies of patients who develop lesions at different stages of 
development would be very informative. For example, research suggests that damage to 
the amygdala can lead to either increased (van Elst, Woermann et al., 2000) or decreased 
(Ramamurthi, 1988) aggression. These two findings are difficult to reconcile. However, 
Blair (2004) has suggested that dysfunction within the amygdala can increase the
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probability of aggression by reducing the individual’s sensitivity to distress cues in others 
or by disrupting the effect o f appetitive stimuli, both of which may have an inhibitory 
effect on threat circuitry. He has also suggested that the incidence of aggression can be 
reduced through amygdala lesions by decreasing the patient’s sensitivity to learnt threat. 
At present, however, the parameters that determine which of these effects occur is not 
known. Further research investigating patients with lesions involving the amygdala 
would help clarify the relevant determinants of aggression.
8.5.4: Response reversal versus valence change
Chapter 7 presented a novel instrumental learning task that dissociates between 
individual elements of RR traditionally treated as a unitary process. The experiment is 
the first in a series of studies planned to investigate the neural regions involved in 
separable components of RR. The task successfully distinguished between reversal errors 
and non-reversal errors to a degree not possible in previous reversal paradigms. The 
design was also novel in that it separated changes in reinforcement value that were 
sufficient to motivate behavioural change from changes that were not. The pattern of 
activation to changes in value o f a response, however, showed great overlap with the 
control condition. This may reflect reduced salience of changes in reinforcement value 
that do not have behavioural significance. Further investigation will increase the salience 
o f the magnitude and valence change conditions perhaps through the inclusion of a test 
phase. Plans are underway to implement these changes.
8.6: Summary
In this thesis, behavioural measures were conducted to explore the relationship 
between psychopathy and performance on measures associated with OFC and amygdala
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functioning. Consistent with theories stressing the presence of OFC dysfunction in 
psychopathy, patients with psychopathy showed deficits in the reversal of both object 
discriminations and conditional associations, as well as on a decision-making task.
Despite suggestions in the literature that equate psychopathy with acquired sociopathy, 
this thesis presented both theoretical and empirical reasons why an OFC dysfunction 
account in isolation is insufficient to explain the characteristics associated with the 
disorder. C.L., a patient with “acquired sociopathy” following lesions of the OFC, 
showed impaired conditional learning, but intact passive avoidance learning. He also 
showed gross SRR impairments, but intact reversal learning. Conversely, individuals 
with psychopathy showed impaired passive avoidance learning, but normal ability to 
make conditional discriminations. Furthermore, individuals with developmental 
psychopathy showed impaired reversal learning, but intact SRR. The data presented also 
bolster theories of psychopathy that emphasize amygdala dysfunction; individuals with 
psychopathy showed impaired modulation of behaviour by attention, impaired decision­
making, impaired expression recognition, and impaired stimulus reinforcement learning. 
Related to these findings, evidence was provided for a dissociation of instrumental 
learning into multiple forms: stimulus-reinforcement and stimulus-response learning. 
Individuals with psychopathy were impaired on the former, but not the latter form. An 
imaging study investigating RR was conducted. This study was unusual in that its design 
allowed for a genuine separation between reversal processes that have been traditionally 
confounded: changes in the value of reinforcement that are sufficient to motivate response 
change and changes in the value of reinforcement that are insufficient to induce 
behavioural change. The present chapter has identified some of the key questions raised 
by this thesis, and in doing so, suggested directions for future research.
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